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ABSTRACT: A dominant thesis in the analysis of flexible 
manufacturing is that accounting controls and objectives limit the 
utilization of technology such as FM5. It is demonstrated in this 
dissertation that companies do realise their manufacturing goals 
when introducing Flexible Manufacturing Systems. This is despite 
the superordinate formal position that accountants enjoy at many 
companies, and the biases in their pre-investment and cost 
monitoring techniques. It is shown by a study of 19 firms that have 
introduced a total of 21 IMS systems that it tends to be engineers, 
rather than accountants, who decide how IMS systems are deployed. 
The study has relevance to broader theories of wholesale shifts to 
either "Flexible” or "Fondist" futures. The evidence reported here 
demonstrates that different companies were introducing FMS to 
realise economic gains that were consistent with Mass Production, 
Flexible Manufacturing and Just-in-Time strategies. This indicates 
that the pattern of change is more piecemeal than the advocates of 
either "Flexible" or "Fordist" futures suggest.
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Chapter One.
1.1 Introduction.
When I started this project two significant changes were 
taking place in the economies of the developed world. Each had 
origins dating back 15 - 20 years. The first suggested the end of 
an era: many countries, including Britain, had experienced a major 
economic recession for the first time since the Second World War 
and a number of their key industries were encountering 
difficulties. The second was the development of microprocessors 
which allowed knowledge to be stored and transmitted cheaply. This 
raised hopes of invigorating ailing companies by bringing under the 
control of a single integrated computer system all of a firm's 
operations from the design of a product and the ordering of raw 
materials through manufacture to the dispatch of the finished 
goods, with their accompanying bills and dispatch notes. The 
collective term for this development was computer integrated 
manufacture (CIM).
From the late 1970s the engineering industry had witnessed 
same movement towards attainment of this vision as the computer 
based configuration of machine tools known as flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS) were being developed and deployed in 
small but increasing numbers. However, in the USA, FMS systems were 
being used to produce a limited range of goods in large batches 
(Jaikumar, 1984). This had only brought marginal increases in the 
productivity of labour and, thus, minimal improvements to a 
company's overall economic performance (Jaikumar, 1986) (1). 
Greater benefits seemed likely if systems were deployed for the 
production of a wide range of components in small batches
(Jaikumar, 1984, 3, 8? 1986, 70; Jones, 1989, 44 - 5) as this would 
enable companies to cater to customer specifications, with 
corresponding increases to value added to products, and realisation 
of the qualitative improvements in technical capabilities which the 
new production system promised. In other words, there was a 
conflict between using system time for production purposes to 
increase the volume of output or using same time for development 
purposes to increase variety. American firms appeared to be 
pursuing the former route whilst the more successful Japanese firms 
were using their systems to machine a wider variety of goods in 
smaller batches.
The implicit dangers of not operationalising FMS for 
flexibility appeared to be accentuated by the similarity between 
the competitive advantages of flexible deployment of IMS systems 
and the economic order of "Flexible Specialization” which some 
authors such as Piore and Sabel (1984) had argued was evolving to 
replace "Mass Production" or "Fordism" in some regions of the 
industrialized world. Piore and Sabel contend that consumers are 
rejecting mass produced standardised products and selecting goods 
that are more suited to their individual needs and tastes. Thus, if 
companies are to succeed in the more differentiated markets of the 
future, they will have to develop new types of production unit to 
manufacture the wide variety of goods that are new being demanded. 
The introduction of IMS systems into the engineering industry 
appear to complement such a development, but as yet the systems 
have been used to machine standardised parts in large batches. 
Jaikumar (1984: 24, 4 - 6; 1986, 76) suggested that a major factor 
contributing to this misuse of IMS systems was the rationale of
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Scientific Management; see Chapter Two below. This resulted in a 
division of skills at the point of production into programmers and 
operators. It has also led to the use of methods of cost control 
that emphasised maximum operating time. These have discouraged 
companies from using valuable production resources to change 
systems to different manufacturing objectives. The first issue of 
the relationship between skill distribution and the deployment of 
FIB in Britain was already the subject of a study by Scott (Scott, 
1987? Jones and Scott, 1985) and did not require further 
investigation.
It was the second issue of cost control which Jaikumar had 
raised that stimulated my interest as it presented an attempt to 
bridge the theoretical and methodological gaps that had hitherto 
existed between the disciplines of management accounting and 
industrial sociology. As Kaplan (1984: 408) has pointed out, 
researchers into management accounting have developed complex 
theories of accounting behaviour based on simplified models of the 
firm which do not embody the complexity of existing production 
processes. On the other hand, industrial sociologists have 
conducted detailed research into changes in work organisation that 
have arisen from the pursuit of profit, but they have neglected to 
consider the role of management accountants who are a company's 
custodians' of finance (Littler and Salaman, 1984? 64: Armstrong, 
1985? 130). It was Professor Jaikumar's fusion of insights that I 
aimed to emulate by conducting a similar study into the 
installation and use of FMS systems at firms in Britain. My initial 
intention was to examine the extent to which Scientific Management 
had influenced the development of cost control in Britain and the
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effect which this was now having on the deployment of FMS.
However, on closer scrutiny I found a nunber of ambiguities in 
Jaikumar's argument which necessitated that I refined his 
terminology, investigate seme of his assumptions and even broaden 
my area of study before embarking upon the fieldwork for this 
investigation. The particular aspects of Jaikumar's argument that 
demanded clarification were: (a) the exact sources of change and 
resistance to flexible deployments of FMS from within the 
enterprise? (b) whether it was possible to generalise previous 
production systems as dominated by scientific management-informed 
mass-production principles, and the only viable option being a 
change to flexible deployment of the intrinsically flexible FMS? 
and, (c) the influence of other accounting techniques and 
procedures, particularly pre-investment justifications, on the 
eventual use of FMS. Each of these areas will be discussed in turn 
as a means of providing a detailed prologue to the issues that are 
considered in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Before that, 
Jaikumar's ideas will be explained in greater detail.
1.2 Jaikumar's thesis outlined; Scientific Management, Cost 
Controls and Productivity as Obstacles to Flexibility?
When expressed in its most stark terms Jaikumar's thesis may 
be understood as a descripticn of the conflict between the logic of 
two types of philosophy - "Scientific Management” and "Flexible 
Manufacturing" - which he perceives to be present in modem 
manufacturing (2).
Jaikumar argues that, historically, "Scientific Management" 
has been the dominant philosophy (3). It originates from an era
4
when firms competed in markets for similar products on the simple 
bases of their relative price. At this time variable costs, 
particularly labour, constituted a high proportion of all 
expenditure. This had to be reduced if the companies were to gain a 
market price advantage (Jaikumar, 1986? 74 - 6). In logical terms 
Jaikumar presents "Scientific Management” as viewing labour as 
having a negative value; that is to say, its presence makes a firm 
less profitable. "Scientific Management” offered firms a means to 
reduce labour costs by increasing the productivity of workers 
through a sub-division of their tasks. This entailed a 
reorganisation of the whole company. White collar technicians, who 
were situated in offices, decided how work should be performed, 
whilst shopfloor employees carried out these instructions. Cost 
accounting was developed to measure the efficiency of this 
reorganised work process. It did so by counting the output from 
each individual worker at each stage of the reconstituted work 
process. Thus, "Scientific Management” pervaded a company's 
operations.
The "Flexible Manufacturing” philosophy finds it's 
manifestation in the machine tool configuration of FMS. This 
facilitates a wide range of production outcomes. The absence of 
dedication in the system's hardware and the acccmpanying computer 
system allows FMS to be reprogrammed and oriented to new uses. The 
advantages of reprogramming are cumulative. The costs of their 
realisation are being reduced by the organisation of parts into 
families at different stages of the manufacturing process, and the 
transfer of the operator's knowledge that is used when machining 
one part to the machining of others within the same family
5
(Jaikumar, 1984: 7). However, such usage is contingent upon 
shopfloor operatives being given the right to act in an autonomous 
manner, and to initiate changes in the way that parts are machined, 
in order to develop knowledge of synergies. In "Flexible 
Manufacturing” philosophy multi-skilled workers are the cornerstone 
of successful companies and constitute a positive value. In other 
words, they cure necessary to realise the full advantages of new 
systems which improve the company's competitive position.
Jaikumar (1986: 76) argues that the general economic context 
of what constitutes viable production has new changed. The steady 
displacement of labour - first, through the reorganisation of work 
tasks in Scientific Management and subsequently by the introduction 
of highly efficient machinery - means that most costs are now 
fixed. The low levels of labour that are employed limits the 
potential for gaining a competitive advantage through further 
reductions in staffing. Therefore, new measures which deflect 
attention away from the aggregate volume of inputs and outputs are 
necessary to monitor the performance of the company in the new 
environment (4). The continued domination of "Scientific 
Management" as manifest in the performance measures and 
architecture of the firm gives rise to the following undesirable 
consequences when FMS systems are installed.
(a) IMS systems are staffed by relatively unskilled operators who 
are not provided with the training necessary to understand the 
principles and mechanisms of Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
(Jaikumar, 1984, 38 - 41). In accord with the principles of 
"Scientific Management" this group of employees are taught to 
follcw a number of definite procedures for operating IMS. They are
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not entrusted with the knowledge necessary to change those 
procedures even when such changes would enhance the performance of 
the system (Jaikumar, 1986: 71).
(b) As with "Scientific Management” a separate group of people are 
responsible for deciding exactly hew a particular system should be 
used. Project teams that are comprised of a number of non-manual 
staff are set up to supervise the installation and 
operationalisation of FMS. These tend to be disbanded shortly after 
the systems are operational (Jaikumar, 1984: 41, 46: 1986, 71). 
Programmers, who are marked off from operators both in terms of 
status and physical location, are allowed to change procedures 
(Jaikumar, 1984; 26). Hcwever, their general brief is "if it ain't 
broke, don't fix it" (Jaikumar, 1984: 24).
(c) Finally, there is the impetus given towards volume production
of a limited range of goods by the system of cost control. This
articulates the philosophy of "Scientific Management" and
emphasises machine uptime and volume of output per labour input.
The experimentation that is required to increase the potential
range of uses of FMS is, thus, discouraged. Skinner (1986), whose
analysis is of a similar genre to Jaikumar, describes the effect of
cost monitoring on operators:
"wark (takes place) in an ervircnment where one 
is told what to do, how to do it, when to do 
it, is measured in minutes and sometimes 
seconds, is supervised closely to prevent any 
inefficiencies, and is paced by assembly lines 
or machines to produce at a rapid and 
relentless rate.11 (1986: 58. Jaikumar, 1984: 23 
- 4, makes a similar argument.)
Skinner also reports the effect of current cost criteria on 
managers:
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"Managers under relentless pressure to maximise 
productivity resist innovation. Preoccupied as 
they are with this week's cost performance, 
they know well that changes in processes or 
systems will wreak havoc with the results on 
which they are measured. Consequently, 
innovations that lead to, better service or 
shorter lead tiroes for product changeover are 
certain to suffer." (Skinner 1986: 56. See 
also, Jaikumar, 1984: 44 for similar argument.)
All of this appears persuasive. However, there is an important 
emission in this part of Jaikumar7s argument. That is he fails to 
explain why "Scientific Management" should remain as the dominant 
philosophy when there is a new and apparently superior one at hand. 
The gist of his argument is that the personnel of a firm introduce 
"Scientific Management" which is complementary to one historical 
period. In a subsequent era personnel at the same firm introduce a 
machine tool configuration that embodies the philosophy of 
"Flexible Manufacturing". The flexible manufacturing system and 
philosophy are compatible with the current time period. The later 
generation then employ their new machinery according to the 
anachronistic principles of "Scientific Management" even though 
this course of action is to their detriment.
Why such contradictory behaviour should take place is not made 
clear. If the principles of "Scientific Management" are so 
pervasive, how is a system that embodies a different philosophy 
introduced in the first instance? If the introduction of a system 
embodying new principles occurs because engineers, who initiate 
technical change, subscribe to a different rationality to 
accountants, who supervise the administration of accounting 
techniques, why are the latter able to impose their analysis on an 
engineering system in such an inappropriate way? Further, if an
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accountant's actions are to the detriment of the firm why is there 
no challenge to his or her authority? These are issues that will be 
addressed in Chapter Two below. Before that, consideration will be 
given to the question of whether one application of FMS is 
naturally superior to another in the present context.
1.3 The Value of the Flexibility of FMS in the Present Context.
Jaikumar's claims of the superiority of flexible deployment of 
IMS are based on two assumptions: The first is that the fundamental 
quality of FMS is its flexibility? the second is that that quality 
coincides with the general economic conditions for its 
exploitation. The first assumption will be considered here by a 
critical evaluation of Jaikumar's example of Japanese firms which, 
he alleges, are pursuing a strategy of "Flexible Manufacturing” by 
exploiting the flexibility in FMS. The second issue will be 
considered below by means of a critical discussion of a number of 
theories on the long term trajectory of industrialised economies.
1.3 (a) The Over-riding Value of Flexibility in FMS? The Japanese 
Case Reconsidered.
Jaikumar equates the financial merits of deployments of FMS by 
reference to their flexibility in terms of the range of parts that 
they machine, and the ease with which they introduce additions to 
that range. Thus, for example, he (Jaikumar, 1986) praises systems 
at Japanese firms that machine an average of 93 different parts and 
criticises those in American firms which machine an average of just 
10 parts. He attributes the latter to the pursuit of high levels of 
machine uptime. However, Jaikumar's description of Japanese
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companies' deployment of FMS is not always supportive of his 
argument that their success is due to their pursuit of flexibility. 
Whilst he proposes a strategy of "Flexible Manufacturing” when he 
admonishes American firms for their pursuit of productivity ends, 
elsewhere he recommends Japanese utilisations of FMS that "have 
achieved untended operations and system uptime of an astonishing 90 
- 99%" (Jaikumar, 1986? 72).
Given this inconsistency, it is not surprising that his claims
about the source of the competitive advantage of Japanese systems
are also incompatible with one another. Most regularly, the
weaknesses of American systems are attributed to the principles of
"Scientific Management", with its emphasis on system uptime and
separation of conception and execution? and also the contingent
absence of diagnostic and programming skills of system operators
(Jaikumar 1984? pp 26: 1986? pp 71). At other times the competitive
advantage of Japanese systems also stems from their emphasis on
zero defects. Thus, when talking of the greater productivity of
Japanese systems Jaikumar says:
1'Where does so huge a difference cone from? In 
a word, the reliability designed into the 
system. In Japan, system designers strive to 
create operations that can run untended."
[First emphasis is original, second emphasis 
has been added.] (Jaikumar, 1986: 72)
The consequence of this is a difference in emphasis on how the 
poor performance of American systems may be remedied. At one point 
we are told that American systems suffer from their deficient 
position because of the absence of multi-skilled workpeople at the 
point of production (Jaikumar, 1984? 41). At other times the 
advantage of Japanese companies is not attributed to the constant
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presence of their multi-skilled design team but instead to the 
point of their withdrawal from a system which is when "the FMS 
achieves 90% uptime and untended operation" (Jaikumar, 1986; 75).
It would, therefore, appear that the deployments of FMS in 
Japan perform better than those in American firms on both of the 
criteria of flexibility and productivity. This is not inconsistent 
with the more general findings of other research that Japanese 
companies are more efficient than Western firms in the production 
of goods for both niche and mass markets (Wood, 1989? The 
Economist, 1991).
The general success of Japanese companies is often attributed 
to their manufacturing strategy of "Just-in-Time". Contrary to what 
Jaikumar's thesis implies, this did not involve a rejection of Mass 
Production/ Scientific Management principles but their adaption to 
the limited size of the markets in the East (Sayer, 1986). Sayer 
explains that the lower volume of throughput at the time of Japan's 
industrialisation meant that high transport costs could not be 
justified and this necessitated locating suppliers of materials 
closer to the purchasing firm.
The emergent clustering of dependent firms provided the 
infrastructure for the just-in-time (JIT) organisation of 
production. With JIT parts are purchased, brought to the factory, 
machined and delivered to the next stage in the manufacturing 
process just-in-time as machine capacity becomes available to carry 
out subsequent operations. The start, conduct and completion of the 
production process at the manufacturing firm is synchronised with 
the timing of customers orders to ensure delivery of products at 
the precise time that the customer wants them. Once such an
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infrastructure was in place Japanese companies were able to make a 
conscious effort to reduce the levels of stock vhich they carried. 
This exercise was carried out between the mid-1950s and the mid- 
1970s when Japanese companies reduced stocks by one third (Williams 
et al, 1988) and the time of some of their changeovers between 
macdiining operations to between 6 - 8% of what they were originally 
(Kaplan, 1983: 692). These innovations were not matched by 
companies in the West. Japanese companies, thus, gain an advantage 
over their Western counterparts by avoiding the cost of purchasing 
inventory stocks, interest on their value, the rent of space to 
accommodate stocks and the personnel to administer them. Japanese 
companies have used the absence of stocks to identify defects in 
the production process and rectify them at source. This pursuit of 
"zero defects" allows Japanese companies to avoid the scrap and 
quality inspection costs incurred by Western companies.
JIT's focus on the levels of stocks means that it does not 
address directly the labour-machinery axis. Therefore, it cannot be 
perceived simply as extending the economic advantages of mass 
production (cf Scott, 1987). Nor, as may be read into Jaikumar's 
account, is it a natural complement or enhancement of the financial 
benefits of Flexible Manufacturing.
The simultaneous realisation of some advantages associated 
with Flexible Manufacturing, Mass Production and JIT may be 
possible at times. For example, JIT objectives often coincide with 
Mass Production ends. With JIT, labour productivity may rise 
because indirect labour is no longer needed to administer stocks 
(Williams et al., 1989), and because an intensification of work 
takes place. Turnbull (1986) reports that labour itself is used on
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a just-in-time basis and operators mind an increased number of 
machines. These often come to a standstill whilst the worker is 
performing tasks elsewhere. The machines then need attention 
immediately the operator is free, so work intensification takes 
place by rotating the tasks of the employee. However, the Japanese 
example also demonstrates that there is a trade-off between same 
"Mass Production” and "JIT” objectives. The attainment of 
reductions in stocks has been at the expense of machine output 
(Williams et al. f 1988? Oliver, 1990: 24). This is because: (a) the 
eiphasis in Japan has been to utilise the time of the worker rather 
than the machine and this results in machines standing idle at seme 
times; and, (b) the imbalance between the times of each constituent 
machine process and the absence of buffer stocks means that 
progress of parts through machinery at each of the processes is 
restricted to the time of the slowest.
Similar overlaps and divergences can be found between the use 
of resources in JIT and Flexible Manufacturing. Like Flexible 
Manufacturing, JIT employs general purpose machinery and multi­
skilled labour (Tailby and Turnbull, 1987). What is more the 
reductions in the times of set-ups is an integral part of reducing 
the cost of flexibility whilst the emphasis on zero defects 
stimulates a desire to experiment with the production process. This 
is essential to Flexible Manufacture. Sayer (1986) details this 
last point in the following terms:
"The reduction of buffers .... stimulates a
continual learning process, indeed ideally the 
production process never becomes entirely 
standardised and the "learning curve economies" 
continue long after the learning curves of
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orthodox firms have levelled out. It is for these 
reasons that JIT is not simply a low-inventory 
system of production. It is a particular and 
sophisticated method of learning-by-doing. And 
this is a reason why Japanese firms have had so 
much success in cut-competing established western 
firms which had treated their industries as 
mature and for which relocation to cheap labour 
countries was seen as the only way of improving 
competitiveness.” (Sayer 1986: 53. Original 
emphasis.)
However, low stock levels also place restrictions on 
flexibility because the absence of available materials prohibit 
design changes (Production Engineer, 1981? Aggarwal, 1985) or any 
fluctuations in the numbers demanded by a customer (Sayer, 1986? 
Tailby and Turnbull, 1987). In addition, attainment of short set­
ups may put limits an the type of set-up that can take place and, 
by implication, the flexibility of the machine (Maskell, 1986).
It should be clear from the preceding that as integrated 
systems such as IMS offer the opportunity to reduce inventories, 
Jaikumar is wrong to represent potential utilisations as either 
akin to unprofitable Mass Production deployments or profitable 
Flexible Manufacturing use, depending on how the labcur-machinery 
axis is organised. Instead, there are three manufacturing 
philosophies which could inform a company's deployment of FMS. 
Further, pursuit of the gains associated with one philosophy at the 
expense of both of the other two carries opportunity costs which 
could outweigh the advantages obtained. (Diagram 1.1 represents the 
types of costs and benefits which arise ffxm pursuing the different 
philosophies.) Thus, contrary to what Jaikumar implies, there are 
limits to the profitable pursuit of flexible ends with FMS.
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Diagram 1.1: Relationship between the advantages of "Just-in-Time"; 
"Flexible Manufacturing"; and "Scientific Management"
Direction of arrows indicate the types of economic advantages that 
are gained as companies move towards one or other of the 
manufacturing strategies
In summary, Jaikumar's report of the relative merits of the 
deployments of FMS in firms in America and Japan appears to be 
contradictory in places. It has been reported that the general 
manufacturing success of Japanese firms appears to be linked to 
their Just-in-Time philosophy. It has been argued here that Just- 
in-Time could provide a third set of principles or philosophy for 
the deployment of FMS in addition to Jaikumar's "Scientific 
Management" and "Flexible Manufacturing". The financial gains of 
each sometimes overlap but are often mutually exclusive. Pursuit of 
flexibility, therefore, carries opportunity costs which could 
outweigh any benefits. As a consequence, it would be incorrect to 
argue that the benefits that accrue from the installation of FMS 
can be read, unproblematically from a single or dominant 
rationality in some notional configuration.
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1.3 (b) The Economic Context of the Introduction of FMS: The 
Genesis of an Era of Flexible Production?
Even if "Flexible Manufacturing” was not the only philosophy 
embodied in IMS systems it would still be possible to sustain an 
argument that flexible deployment was the best use of IMS if the 
general economic conditions favoured the realisation of flexible 
ends. Jaikumar argues that they do. His argument about the general 
economic conditions and their present compatibility with flexible 
deployment of IMS implies a theory of the long term trajectory of 
industrialized economies. In effect, he describes what forms of 
work organisation were viable in the past and he details the 
changes that have to take place to ensure a firm's economic 
viability in the future. He also offers an explanation of the 
factors that drive the transformation from the past through the 
present to the future. If the best use of IMS is to be read from 
general economic developments it is necessary to evaluate 
Jaikumar's thesis on the general movement of the economy and 
compare it with others on the same subject.
Jaikumar argues that, historically, most production costs have 
been variable and largely constituted of the wages and salaries of 
labour. Fixed costs, by contrast, were lew. The firms that rose to 
a position of dominance were those which were successful in 
reducing the variable element of their expenditure. The source of 
this advantage was, first, work reorganisation in the form of 
"Scientific Management” and subsequently the introduction of 
machinery. This gave the innovating firms a price advantage over 
their rivals. Although not explicitly stated by Jaikumar, it must 
be presumed that the markets were of a sufficient size to absorb
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the increased volume of the type of goods that were manufactured.
Jaikumar goes on to argue that the labour displacement which 
has already taken place has changed the whole economics of 
manufacture. This has created a new route by which firms will ccme 
to dominate production. The majority of costs are new comprised of
fixBd capital. The most successful firms will be those that succeed
/.*
in using labour to exploit the flexibility of production systems 
such as FMS and add the greatest value to each individual product. 
Again Jaikumar does not state explicitly that markets are available 
to absorb the new type of goods that will be manufactured. We can 
only assume that they do exist. It is from his belief in the 
changed situation that Jaikumar makes his assertion that the most 
profitable uses of FMS are being precluded by the legacy of 
"Scientific Management" in cost control.
There are a nuntoer of weaknesses and emissions in this part of 
Jaikumar's argument which renders it inadequate for explaining the 
most advantageous use of FMS in the current context. Firstly, as 
Jaikumar relies solely on the changing economics of production to 
explain the superiority of particular forms of manufacture he fails 
to explain why there are corresponding shifts in demand to 
accommodate such dramatic changes in production. Secondly, in 
discussing the economics of production he fails to give attention 
to such factors as local labour markets or industrial and sectoral 
contingencies. For example, companies that are able to recruit 
staff with programming skills are likely to view the benefits of 
FMS differently to firms in areas where such skills are in short 
supply. Similarly, the relative benefits of achieving reductions in 
labour will be affected by such factors as safety hazards in
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production processes. Thirdly, and as was noted above, Jaikumar 
fails to provide an adequate explanation of the obstacles to a 
company's recognition of the benefits of the production systems 
which they install and the impact of this on their initial choice 
of system. Thus, Jaikumar's argument, when couched as an
explanation of the long term trajectory of industrial societies, is
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at best incomplete. It may be totally incorrect. There are other 
theories which seek to explain the long term direction of 
industrial societies. These interpret the economic context, the 
suitability of production systems to different eras and the motor 
of change differently to Jaikumar. Three of these theories, 
"Flexible Specialization", "Labour Process" theory and "Neo- 
Fordism" will be considered in order to establish whether they 
provide a better explanation of the economic advantages of 
different deployments of FMS in the current context.
(i) Flexible Specialization.
The leading advocates of "Flexible Specialization", Piore and 
Sabel (1984) (see also, Sabel, 1982? Zeitlin and Hirst, 1991) 
suggest a similar change in the ecancxnics of production and propose 
a similar scenario to that put forward by Jaikumar. In others 
words, they argue that the long term trajectory is away from large 
scale production of standardised goods and they advocate a switch 
to flexible production of a wide range of items for specialist 
markets. However, in contrast to Jaikumar's thesis, which is 
concerned with the engineering industry, Piore and Sabel focus on 
the consumer goods sector.
Piore and Sabel's argument (see also, Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985)
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is that at certain historical points or "Industrial Divides" 
Government initiatives, market opportunities and companies' own 
perceptions of their relative strengths and weaknesses lead firms 
to select a particular type of system of manufacture. If that 
system proves successful the innovating companies will enjoy an
economic advantage over their rivals who will then have to adopt
/*
similar methods. Ihe system of production which was adopted at the 
first "Industrial Divide" was what Piore and Sabel have described 
as "Mass Production". The principles and economics of this are 
analogous to Jaikumar's description of American companies' 
utilisation of Scientific Management. That is, "Mass Production" 
was characterised by large factories where semi-skilled workers 
were employed on dedicated machinery in the mass manufacture of 
identical products for mass markets. As consumers discriminated 
between the goods of different companies on the basis of their 
price firms sought to gain a competitive advantage over their 
rivals by reducing the cost of the variable input, namely labour. 
Although mass production organisation brought economies of scale 
and reductions in unit costs the items that were manufactured by 
this method were consumer durables. As these had had high prices 
vis-a-vis average incomes, the State had to play a role in ensuring 
that markets were available to absorb the goods produced. 
Consequently, national Governments' pursued Keynesian demand 
management policies, provided welfare benefits and protected Trade 
Union rights in order to create mass markets.
Piore and Sabel (see also, Sabel; 1982) argue that the "Mass 
Production" system has experienced a crisis in the past 15 - 20 
years. This is not simply a consequence of the changing costs of
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production. It is also the outcome of changes in markets which has 
led to a disjuncture between the output from "Mass Production" 
factories and the types of goods that are being demanded by 
consumers in advanced industrialized countries. Demand for the 
standardized goods produced by the "Mass Production" industries has
peaked. Consumers are now more discriminating and select products
/>
which express their individuality. Falling demand has been 
accompanied by a competitive threat from international rivals. 
Developing countries have found it easy to replicate the 
standardized and unsophisticated "Mass Production" industries and 
produce the same goods more cheaply by taking advantage of their 
abundant supply of cheap labour. As a result they have been able to 
capture markets which were previously supplied by western 
industries. The threat to industries in the developed world has 
been accentuated by their own rising costs of production due to: 
Wage inflation as marginalised immigrant workers have sought 
equality with their indigenous counterparts? and, destabilisation 
of international trade because of uncertainty caused by the 
floating of the dollar and shortages of oil and other raw 
materials. The net result of this has been to undermine the 
hegemony of the previously dominant "Mass Production" industries in 
the developed world and create the conditions for a second 
"Industrial Divide".
Piore and Sabel entitle one of their concluding chapters: 
"Possibilities for Prosperity: International Keynesianism and 
Flexible Specialization." (1984: 251 - 280). In it they outline two 
possible routes that companies may follow at this juncture of 
change. The two potential options resemble closely Jaikumar's
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description of American and Japanese firms respective uses of FMS. 
In "International Keynesianism" the central tenet of companies' 
manufacturing strategies is to seek further marginal improvements 
in the productivity of labour in the manufacture of standardized 
items. Companies continue to employ an extensive division of labour 
and a semi-skilled workforce but seek improvements over existing 
production facilities through the introduction of new computer 
technology and advances in telecommunications. These allow 
companies to locate factories in different nations and obtain 
greater economies of scale by making each factory responsible for 
the production of a single part or range of parts. An example of 
this option is the "World car" strategy. Piore and Sabel believe 
that "International Keynesianism" could meet with same success if 
greater powers were given to international organisations such as 
the IMF and GAIT. These could help to create a worldwide market of 
consumers for standardized products by performing regulatory 
exercises comparable to those conducted by national states in the 
"Mass Production" period.
Piore and Sabel are opposed to this option. They argue in 
terms that are not inconsistent with Jaikumar's thesis, that this 
course of development would be an economically inferior one. The 
potential of its success is undermined by the hidden costs of: 
labour dissatisfaction with the technical division of labour; high 
levels of inventory? fluctuations in consumer demand; and, 
international instability which international regulatory agencies 
are unlikely to be able to remedy. Piore and Sabel's preferred 
option is "Flexible Specialization". The form which they hope that 
this will take is a community of small workshops collaborating with
21
one another to ensure satisfaction of the increasingly 
differentiated market. The central economic logic of these 
workshops is analogous to Jaikumar's report of Japanese firms' 
deployment of FMS. Highly skilled workers are employed to enhance 
the value of output from the general purpose machinery by 
manufacturing a wide range of specialised goods in limited numbers. 
When markets are satisfied the machinery is turned to some other 
production objective. There would still be a role for the State in 
such a regime but their interventions would take a qualitatively 
different form to earlier periods. Government policies vrculd not be 
directed towards demand management as in the "Mass Production" era. 
Instead they should aim to protect the continued existence of the 
small workshops essential for "Flexible Specialization" by ensuring 
that "market transactions do not permanently advantage cne group of 
traders - and thus undermine the balance of wealth and power that 
makes possible a ccmmunity of producers" (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 
305) .
In presenting a more detailed analysis of society as a whole 
Piore and Sabel do manage to fill in sane of the gaps in Jaikumar's 
account and still arrive at similar conclusions. Conclusions that 
suggest that the roost viable use of FMS is the manufacture of a 
wide range of parts in small numbers. Their most notable addition 
is to describe the changes in markets that accompany changes in 
production. There are, hcwever, a number of weaknesses in Piore and 
Sabel's argument which undermine the validity of their conclusions. 
Firstly, it is questionable whether a new regime is arising. 
Williams et al (1987) raise doubts about one of Piore and Sabel's 
starting premises by challenging whether demand for mass produced
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goods such as televisions and cars have peaked. If this is not the 
case the large scale industries are not on the precipice of 
inevitable decline and further expansion may be possible on the 
basis of '•Mass Production" informed economic logic. However, even 
if manufacturing industries catering for consumer markets were to 
be experiencing change to more flexible production, would it be 
correct to generalise a new regime on the basis of the adoption of 
new principles and techniques in a single sector? Some industries 
or sectors may experience change in the opposite or other 
directions. As Walker (1989) has argued qualitatively different - 
and more advanced - forms of work organisation have existed in 
chemicals, electricity and other branches of industry alongside so 
called "Mass Production" manufacturing and Piore and Sabel have not 
used the introduction of these systems to infer the genesis of a 
new regime (cf, Blauner, 1964).
Secondly, even if the present does mark the inception of a new 
regime, the current economic superiority of "Flexible 
Specialization" appears to be extremely fragile and less pervasive 
than its advocates imply. Flexible production systems are 
expensive; more expensive than dedicated systems. This 
necessitates that a high initial fixed cost is embodied in each 
unit of production (Boyer, 1987). The burden of these initial costs 
will multiply quickly if companies have purchased extra capacity in 
the hope of manufacturing new products for markets that do not 
materialise. In situations where companies have excess capacity any 
markets will appear attractive including those that are demanding 
standardized items. At least some companies, or even whole 
industries, may find that markets for standardized goods offer a
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more viable option at particular points in time. Thirdly, the 
contours of "Flexible Specialization" regimes are unclear. As Wood 
(1989? 27) points cut it is difficult to envisage the logistics of 
the market under "Flexible Specialization" where consumers would 
presumably have severed "fittings" to ensure that each and every 
product they purchased matched their individual needs.
A final weakness in the scenario of "Flexible Specialization" 
is that the strength of political forces that may oppose change 
tends to be understated. The large scale factories of the "Mass 
Production" era did not develop simply as a method for satisfying 
the demands made for mass produced goods by a population of non- 
discerning consumers. A precondition of their existence was that 
they could make profits for their owners. The pursuit of this 
objective gave rise to highly differentiated business 
organisations. These employed both a hierarchy of executives and 
managers who exercise a great deal of pcwer and influence and, in 
the instance of Britain, a shopfloor workforce enjoying different 
degrees of autonomy over their immediate work situation. Advocates 
of "Flexible Specialization" do not make clear how the amorphous 
mass of disorganised consumer interests will be translated into a 
force that can erode the power of company executives or even 
facilitate autonomous work conditions for all shopfloor workers. 
The pattern of recent industrial change suggests that existing 
interests are being protected. Boyer (1987) reports that recent 
movements towards smaller plant size has been accompanied by 
financial/ ownership concentration. It is also difficult to see why 
and hew relationships within the firm should change to the extent 
that Piore and Sabel advocate. Even if highly differentiated
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markets are being embraced and cultivated by producers sane mundane 
tasks such as loading/ unloading of work pieces, swarf removal and 
other cleaning exercises will still have to be performed with 
advanced multi-purpose systems. There is no reason to believe that 
employers will stop allocating these tasks to cheap, unskilled
operatives. These unskilled workers could co-exist with more highly
/■*
skilled programmer-operators. Contrary to what Piore and Sabel 
imply the economic principles of “Flexible Specialization” and 
“Mass Production”, and the accompanying forms of work organisation 
(Kern and Schuman, 1987), may co-exist harmoniously within the same 
company.
In summary, Piore and Sabel offer a perspective on the 
development of society that compares with Jaikumar's account of the 
changing economics of manufacturing. They share with Jaikumar a 
view that rigid production systems that manufacture goods in large 
volumes are no longer economically viable. Whilst they do not 
discuss FMS directly, it is possible to extrapolate fron Piore and 
Sabel's advocacy of "Flexible Specialization" ideas that are 
parallel to Jaikumar's support of flexible deployment of FMS. Both 
argue the need for multi-skilled workpeople, employed on multi­
purpose machinery, producing a wide range of goods.
Piore and Sabel's account offers improvements to Jaikumar's 
thesis as they address the issue of market changes. Hcwever, Piore 
and Sabel, like Jaikumar, tend to ignore a range of social, 
economic and political factors. Their portrayal of industrial 
change is, thus, incomplete and does not suggest an exhaustive 
account of the potentially viable deployments of FMS.
There are other theories of long term trajectories which cure
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better equipped to recognise both the persistence of "Mass 
Production" type of deployments of computer based systems such as 
FMS and the vested political relationships which support them. 
These are the marxist positions of (a) "Labour Process" theory and 
(b) "Neo-Fordism" which will now be considered.
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(ii) Labour Process Theory (5).
Although "Labour Process" theory has its origins in Marx's 
"Capital" (1954) it was "rediscovered" by Braverman (1974) and has 
found subsequent expression in Ziirbalist (1979), Shaiken (1984) and 
Armstrong (1988) amongst others. It's explanation of long term 
technical and industrial change is located in the wider patterns of 
ownership and control of industry. Braverman recognises profit as 
the lifeblood of an economy organised around capitalist patterns of 
ownership. He follows Marx in viewing workers as both the source 
of, and the threat to, profit (6). On the one hand workers 
manufacture items of value from which profit is derived; on the 
other, they are disaffected with their work because its direction 
by others prevents expression of their natural creativity. The 
development and purchase of work technologies in capitalist 
societies follows a path which allows employers to increase the 
efficiency of labour which is the only truly productive force and, 
thus, the source of profit. The work technology also embodies 
capital's need to exercise control over their workforce and counter 
any resistance to work.
These twin needs gave rise to Scientific Management. The sub­
division of work allowed employers to realise the financial 
benefits of the division of labour that were articulated by Adam
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Smith and Charles Babbage. Workers become more productive because 
of their increased dexterity in a limited range of tasks and 
because they spend less time in preparations between work stages 
(Smith, 1937). Euployers are also able to save mcney by only paying 
premium rates to the limited nunber of workers who were given sole 
responsibility for all of the skilled tasks in the reconstituted 
work process (Babbage, 1971) • Scientific Management also afforded 
employers control over their workforce by taking the responsibility 
of conception of how a job should be performed away from the 
shopfloor and locating it in a separate planning division. Workers 
deprived of the right to determine hew they carried out a job had 
only to follow the highly detailed instructions of others.
Braverman argues that the drive for profit in capitalist 
economies has led to a concentration of ownership, development of 
large corporations and a movement from competitive to monopoly 
capitalism. The natural successor to Scientific Management in the 
period of monopoly capitalism is Henry Ford's development of 
mechanised production systems. This not only increased the 
productivity of workers but also subjected them to greater control 
as the machine paced and regulated their actions. The recent 
integration of computers and machine tools in the development of 
"intelligent" machines is, Braverman claims, simply an extension of 
this "Fordist" logic of capitalist development to sectors of the 
economy where workers' autonomy and skills have hitherto been 
protected by the lew volume of throughput. By inference it may be 
said that, contrary to the arguments of Jaikumar, the use of FMS to 
realise the benefits of increasing the productivity of labour - 
rather than harnessing their creativity to proliferate the range of
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goods provided - is not the result of a conflict of manufacturing 
principles belonging to two different historical periods. It is, 
instead, the natural resolution of class conflict in the medium and 
small batch production industries in a society that is dominated by 
capital.
"labour Process” theory is useful for drawing attention to the 
fact that there are sectors of the economy where there may still be 
great potential for increasing the productivity of labour through 
the introduction of FMS. Despite this, there are logical flaws in 
the theory and counter evidence which suggests that deployment of 
FMS for productivity purposes offers no more of a natural ”fit” 
with modem society than systems introduced to meet flexibility 
purposes. Firstly, it is questionable whether there is any logical 
consistency between the examples which Braverman uses to imply the 
"law" of capitalist development and the pattern of deployment of 
computer based work systems. There is no reason to see "Fordism” as 
a natural extension of "Scientific Management". The principles that 
underpin these systems are different from one another. The most 
famous exponent of Scientific Management, Frederick Taylor, argued 
that a number of factors should mediate in the decision of whether 
or not to sub-divide a job to obtain economies. These included 
ensuring that each worker was fully employed for the duration of 
the working week even when this resulted in a combination of tasks 
which could otherwise be separated. (See Kelly, 1982, for further 
discussion of this issue.) This is not the case in "Fordism" where 
sub-divided jabs are locked into dedicated technologies with short 
cycle times. The difference between Scientific Management and 
Fordism in principle may be seen in practice by the area of the
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economy where each were employed. Taylor's Installations were 
primarily in batch production in engineering machine shops where 
skilled craftspeople were employed. Ford's installations were in 
the evolving mass-producticn industries which employed semi-skilled 
workers to assemble consumer goods such as cars, bicycles, 
typewriters and domestic appliances. Further, each system sought to
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bring improvements to different areas of the work process. Walker
(1989) disaggregates the labour process into five dimensions:
"(1) conversion, or the transformation of 
materials into different forms; (2) assembly, 
or the combination of parts; (3) transfer, or 
the movement of materials frcm one work station 
to another; (4) integration, or the 
coordination of various sub-processes in 
complex production systems; [and] (5) 
regulation, or the self direction and 
correction of machine performance." (Walker,
1989: 61.)
As Walker points out, whilst Taylor's most important gains were 
achieved through intensification in conversion, Ford's significant 
contribution to productivity was in transfer and integration 
through the introduction of the assembly line.
Secondly, the internal logic of Braverman's argument is 
contradictory. Braverman claims to draw his inspiration frcm Marx. 
Yet in Marx's economic writings machinery is nothing other than 
dead labour. It is dependent on the living qualities of workers' 
labour power to set it in motion. Hence capital cannot exercise the 
degree of control over workers that Braverman implies (Cressey and 
Maclnnes, 1980: Littler and Salaman, 1982).
Thirdly, the raison d'etre of any capitalist enterprise is to 
make a profit. This is not always best served by deskilling 
workers. Instead employers may develop strategies (Friedman, 1977;
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Edwards, 1979 cf. Jones and Pose, 1983? Rose and Jones, 1985) for 
rewarding certain groups of employees with a number of privileges. 
These might include use of discretion as a means of reconciling 
their employees actions with their own interests of pursuing 
profits. There is an abundance of enpirical evidence that links the
ability and desire of companies to pursue profitability by
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deskilling workers to a number of other factors; including the 
presence or otherwise of craft traditions of shopfloor workers, 
trade union strength and the extent to which shopfloor managers 
identify with the plight of manual workers (Jones, 1982), a 
company's markets (Wilson and Buchannan, 1988) and national 
variations in the extent to which a division of labour has existed 
between technicians and operatives in the past (Songe et al, 1983? 
Scott, 1987). Thus, there are examples of the introduction of IMS 
systems that do allow workers to exercise a wide range of skills 
(Jones and Scott, 1986; Kelley, 1989).
In summary, whilst labour process theory may draw our 
attention to a viable rationale for utilisations of IMS that seek 
to reduce labour in areas which were previously labour intensive it 
is unable to explain systems which allow workers to exercise a wide 
range of skills. In this, its strengths and weaknesses are the 
exact opposite of those of Jaikumar and, to a lesser extent, Piore 
and Sabel. It would therefore be unwise to portray the use of IMS 
to gain an economic advantage by deskilling workers as seme natural 
continuation of the long term ncmological trends that are present 
in capitalist societies. The final thesis of "Neo-Fordism” 
assimilates some of the stronger points of both "Labour Process" 




The French regulationist writers (See Palliox, 1975; Aglietta, 
1979) who pioneered the analysis of •'Neo-Fordism" (7) also draw on 
Marx's theories to esqplain the pattern of technical change but: (a) 
put greater enphasis cn the pursuit of surplus value than do labour 
Process theorists and less stress on the need for control of the 
workforce? and (b) incorporate an acknowledgement of the regulatory 
mechanisms that were recognised by the "Flexible Specialization" 
theorists. In Aglietta's version of the theory of "Neo-Fordism", 
stages of capitalist development may be classified by: the sector 
of the economy which is experiencing growth? the form of 
exploitation which is dominant? the type of surplus value which is 
extracted? and, most notably for our purposes, the form of labour 
process. As in "Labour Process" theory changes in these areas are 
driven by the search for profit which stems from capitalist 
patterns of ownership.
Aglietta describes the early phase of capitalist development 
as the "extensive" accumulation regime. In this period production 
relied heavily on the skills and efforts of workers. The primary 
form of exploitation was the extraction of absolute surplus value, 
ie, realising and increasing profits by getting people to work 
harder or more productively without increased assistance from 
mechanical means. At this time "department one" of the economy, the 
capital goods sector, was expanded as countries underwent 
industrialisation. Periods of accumulation are marked by those 
stable times when production capacity does not exceed consumption.
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Change subsequently canes about because production output, which is 
expanded under the search for profit, finally outstrips customers' 
desires or capacity to purchase. The initial period of accumulation 
was brought to an end because the market far capital goods had been 
satisfied. Further expansion could have taken place if the 
unexploited "department two" of the economy, the consumer goods 
sector, had been developed. However, there was not a consumer 
market for the products such as motor cars and other large durable 
products. The crisis was resolved following the establishment of 
regulatory mechanisms (such as the development of the Keynesian 
welfare state) which ensured that there was a mass of consumers 
able to purchase the products of the new industries in the 
developing "department two". The next period of expansion, 
Aglietta's "intensive" accumulation regime, then ensued. Fordist 
production systems were introduced, mainly into "department two" of 
the economy, and this facilitated capital's realisation of profit 
from relative surplus value, ie, a rise in income that is due to 
increasing the output of workers by a development in mechanisation 
rather than from an increase in workers' efforts.
The course of development of work systems in this scenario is 
compatible with the claims of "Labour Process" theorists. 
Capitalist owners seek to increase the productivity of the labour 
that is employed in order to increase profits. This leads to the 
refinement of work techniques and the development of machinery and 
a shift from labour intensive methods to capital intensive 
"Fordist" ones.
Aglietta argues that the owners of capital did not increase 
their percentage share of what was produced in the course of the
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"intensive" accumulation regime. Nonetheless, they did obtain rises 
in aggregate profits because markets were expanding constantly as 
growing numbers of the population could afford to purchase consumer 
durables. However, a crisis ensued when the expansion of markets 
reached its limit and capital could no longer rely on increased 
output to protect their profitability. Capital was unable to reduce
t-
their costs by cutting its labour bill. The strong trade unions 
that had grown out of the employment of an amorphous mass of semi­
skilled workers at the large, single site, "Fordist" factories 
would have resisted such a move. Indeed, Capital its costs rising 
as its contribution to State provision of welfare and other 
collective services increased. The outcome was stagnation and 
decline.
The societal level of Aglietta's analysis means that as with 
the "Flexible Specialization" theorists the potential resolution of 
the current crisis is dependent on many factors. These include: 
commodification - ie, privatisation - of social services so that 
their growth can be regulated by the market? State regulation of 
investment and incomes to ensure comparability and proportionate 
growth between the different departments? and a period of 
devalorisation of capital to recreate the opportunities for 
profitable production. Most importantly for our purposes it would 
also involve the establishment of "Neo-Fordism" in the production 
sphere. This could entail a number of changes, capital link-ups and 
telecommunications could be used to decentralise production to a 
number of different plants as a means of overcoming the militancy 
of the collective worker. Caiputerised systems such as IMS could be 
used in both mass production and batch production to eliminate seme
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work processes and also to overcome capital's dependency cn skilled 
labour in the latter. However, as Aglietta follows the argument 
espoused by Marx in "Capital”, the underlying principle in any 
reorganisation of work systems in both mass production and batch 
production is to increase the productivity and output per unit of 
labour.
Despite the fact that this theory is able to explain the 
application of computerised systems to different sectors, it too 
suffers from a number of weaknesses. Firstly, some aspects have 
been refuted by historical developments. For example, national 
states have tended to draw back from regulation of economic 
activity such as income levels and investments. Secondly, like 
Piore and Sabel, Aglietta has extrapolated changes in work 
organisation and used this to generalise movements between whole 
societal formations or "accumulation regimes”. Any changes in the 
sector where surplus value may be extracted or alterations to the 
form of state activity are all supposed to have arisen because 
there are no further opportunities for enhancement of production 
performance by existing "Fordist” methods. Thirdly, as Boyer (1987) 
points out, there is no reason to believe that transition to a 
different regime will necessarily continue the economic principles 
of the regime that it has succeeded. In his modification of 
Aglietta's stance Boyer argues that there is only a probability 
that the application of artificial intelligence to new production 
systems will be used to increase the productivity of labour in long 
run manufacture of parts. He also contends that as Capital's 
overriding concern is to make a profit, there will be a number of 
different deployments. The form of any new production system will
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be influenced by sectoral and national contingencies on the 
opportunities for profitable production. Computerised 
configurations could be introduced to pursue the principles of 
,fNeo-FordismM, "Flexible Specialization" or other manufacturing 
obj ectives.
It should be clear frcm the preceding discussion that Boyer's
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suggestion of alternative paths of development and production 
principles in different sectors and national settings is more akin 
to the reality which it seeks to explain than any of the other 
theories of trajectories including that proposed by Jaikumar. All 
of these tend to emphasise only one possible route to future 
economic prosperity: either further restrictions on labour as a 
means of increasing productivity? or, the lifting of restrictions 
as a means of increasing variety of output. There are, however, two 
salient weakness in Boyer's account. These are shortcomings which 
he shares with all of the theories already di scussad and they serve 
to render his, and the other, arguments inadequate for explaining 
the problems confronting this thesis.
Firstly, all of the theories of trajectories tend to be 
expressed at a level of abstraction that is inapplicable when 
explaining the economic behaviour of most firms. Whilst all of the 
authors imply the strengths of systems over the long term, 
companies assess the value of their investments over the short to 
medium term. The investments in the FMS systems that are considered 
by this study were amortised over periods of between two and twelve 
years.
Secondly, all of the theorists assume that some form of Mass 
Production system was the dominant method of production in the
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past. This must be questioned, at least with regard to the types of 
production techniques that have been deployed in Britain. No more 
than 7% of the workforce have been employed in mass production 
factories (Gallagher; 1980; 76) and less than half of manual 
workers in such factories have been engaged on mass production work 
(Wild, 1974: 535). It is, therefore, not surprising that 80% of 
engineering components are machined in batches of less than 1,000 
(Littler and Salaman, 1984; 90). This situation makes it difficult 
to sustain any of the arguments above as they all generalise the 
future development of the economy on assumptions of the proven 
merits or exhaustion of a system that has had only limited 
applicability. This is not to deny that different authors may have 
identified the strengths of different manufacturing strategies such 
as "Flexible Manufacturing"/ "Flexible Specialization" or :,Mass 
Production"/ "Fordism". However, it does mean that the financial 
advantages that accrue to a company when they adopt these 
strategies must be established by some means other than reference 
to the theories of long term trajectories discussed here. It is 
only subsequent to this that it is possible to establish the extent 
to which organisational factors such as cost controls are leading 
to the misuse of work techniques and systems.
1.3 (c) Summary.
In summary a provisional assessment of Jaikumar's claims that 
systems of cost control contribute to the misuse of FMS shews that 
his arguments imply a set of dominant manufacturing principles 
embodied in FMS and/ or predictions about the long term economic 
trajectory of society. A detailed critique of both assumptions has
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shown then to be inadequate for establishing the most viable use of 
FMS. But this must be done before an assumption of the impact of 
accounting practices on the deployment of FMS is possible. This 
issue will be returned to in Chapter Three.
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1.4 The Impact of Pre-investment justificatiois cn the utilisation 
of FMS?
Before this introductory chapter is concluded one other part 
of Jaikumar's argument will be considered; that is his failure to 
treat the deployment of FMS as part of a process of technical 
change and to investigate the earlier stages in that process. 
Jaikumar's argument is,. that companies have introduced FMS systems 
that are best suited to the production of a wide range of goods in 
small batches. The legacy of "Scientific Management” inherent in 
American firms' structures and cost control methods results in FMS 
being used for large batch production of a limited range of goods. 
Jaikumar believes that a comparison between Japanese and American 
companies suggests that the American firms' deployments of FMS are 
not financially viable in the long term.
But this argument leaves unanswered the question of why 
American companies selected FMS in the first instance? Was it to 
machine a wide or limited variety of parts? A number of other 
authors (Avlantis and Parkinson, 1981? Bessant and Haywood, 1985) 
have argued that a limited range of ten parts, which were machined 
on systems in American firms in Jaikumar's study, does constitute a 
financially viable form of production with FMS. It may also be 
asked whether flexible or high productivity aspirations were 
expressed in pre-investment justifications? As Jaikumar (1984: 20 - 
21) himself acknowledges, biases also exist in pre-investment 
appraisals. Yet he fails to explain what the consequences are, for 
the deployment of FMS and post-installation cost control, of a 
scenario projected in either biased or representative pre­
investment justifications. Unless Jaikumar is claiming systems are
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introduced at random, the eventual pattern of deployment of IMS 
cannot be understood by simply focusing on the influence of cost 
control. Thus, Chapter Four will investigate the potential impact 
of weaknesses in both pre-investment financial evaluations and cost 
control on the eventual deployment of FMS.
1.5 Summary, conclusion and outline of remainder of thesis.
This introductory chapter has explained that the objective of 
this study is to examine the inpact of accounting techniques on the 
deployment of IMS at firms in Britain. The impetus for this study 
came from work conducted by Jaikumar (1984; 1986). He reports that 
FMS in American firms are used for less flexible objectives than 
their Japanese counterparts. This, he argues, is to the detriment 
of American companies. He believes that such an undesirable outcome 
occurs because of continued presence of the anachronistic 
philosophy of "Scientific Management" and its manifestation in the 
cost controls of American firms.
In the critical evaluation that has been provided of 
Jaikumar's thesis, a number of weaknesses have been identified. 
These must be remedied before it is possible to assess the impact 
of cost control on the deployment of FMS systems in British firms. 
The particular issues that require clarification cure as follows. 
Firstly, is it possible for accountants to apply an inappropriate 
analysis to the evaluation and monitoring of an engineering system 
and still retain their position when their actions are detrimental 
to a firms interests? Secondly, how can the financial merits and 
best use of FMS be established other than by reference to the 
coincidence of the systems' implicit rationality with the emergent
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economic order? Thirdly, what influence do the biases in pre- 
investment justification have on the eventual pattern of FMS, and 
are the biases in cost control additional to these? The 
clarification of these issues in the first half of this thesis will 
provide a framework from which the findings of this study may be 
analysed in the second half of the dissertation. Chapter Two 
provides a sociological account of the relationship between 
engineers and accountants in British firms, and theorizes the 
extent to which accountants are able to impose an inappropriate 
analysis on engineers' proposals of new systems. Chapter Three 
considers the economic viability of particular types of deployment 
of different FMS systems frcm within the context of the production 
systems that preceded them and the opportunity cost of not pursuing 
other manufacturing alternatives. Chapter Four reports in detail 
the structure of pre-investment justification and cost control 
practices so that their divergence from the contours of different 
deployments of FMS are apparent. This chapter also uses the 
framework developed in the first part of this thesis to evaluate 
the existing evidence on the relationship between accounting 
practices and the deployment of FMS.
The findings of this study are reported in the second half of 
this dissertation. Chapter Five describes how the respective 
positions of accountants and engineers, discussed in Chapter Two, 
materialise in the capital sanctioning route. This will illustrate 
the nature of engineers' opportunity to influence accounting 
practices to prevent the misuse of engineering systems. Chapter Six 
discusses the stages of selection and financial justification of 
FMS in the process of technical change. The findings reported in
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this chapter illustrates that different patterns of deployment of 
IMS can be perceived partly as an intended consequence of conscious 
decisions taken prior to a system's installation. Chapter Seven 
looks at the extent to which post installation cost ccntrol systems 
were able to measure the anticipated benefits of FMS and the 
outcome of any failure to do so. Chapter Eight concludes the 
discussion. The main findings are as follows.
* Companies in Britain that have introduced FIB have selected their 
systems for one of three reasons: "To increase machine 
utilisation11; '*to reduce the value of inventories carried"; and "to 
respond to demand for an increasing range of parts".
* These different motivations for selecting IMS demonstrate that 
whatever is the long term trajectory of the economy, there is 
evidence of a number of different and counterposing tendencies. 
That is to say, local situations allcw different firms to pursue 
different forms of profitable production with FMS.
* Accountants do not impose their analysis on FMS. Engineers 
conduct the initial pre-investment justification and play an 
important role in articulating the standards by which IMS systems 
are assessed.
* There is a strong strand of continuity running through the whole 
process of technical change at each company- Companies were largely 
successful in justifying and monitoring their respective FMS 
systems in accord with their stated manufacturing objectives.
* Whilst accounting practices do not articulate a complete profile 
of certain deployments of IMS they do, nonetheless, help to promote 
the continuity alluded to above. The claims made in the pre- 
investment justification of what a system is able to produce is
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transferred to the cost monitoring apparatus of flexible budgets 
and provides the standards by which a system is monitored.
Footnotes:
(1) In contrast to Jaikumar who claims that further labour savings 
are minimal, British authors have claimed that further labour 
savings may be quite large. For example, claims about the amount of 
labour reductions that will follow the introduction of FMS varies 
frcm between 10% (Ingersoll Engineers, 1982) to 60% (Department of 
Industry: National Engineering Laboratory, 1978).
(2) Jaikumar does not use the term "Flexible Manufacturing". It is 
used here for the sake of convenience to describe the form of work 
principles and organisation that he counterposes to "Scientific 
Management.
(3) Jaikumar presents a rather limited view of "Scientific 
Management". He tends to perceive it as equivalent to standard 
forms of mass production organisation. That is, it is concerned 
with minimising unit costs by the employment of semi-skilled 
workers to produce the maximum number of parts with highly 
productive machines that are dedicated to a single use (even if 
they sure not designed for that purpose). Thus, whilst there are 
differences between the two (see p. 23 of this thesis) the term 
"Mass Production" may be read as interchangeable with "Scientific 
Management" when Jaikumar's ideas are being discussed.
(4) Another critic of cost control, Robert Kaplan (1983: 693) 
suggests that these could include the speed of introduction and 
delivery of new products to customer specification.
(5) "Fordism" is used in different ways by "labour Process" and 
"Neo-Fordism" theorists. Writers in the labour Process tradition 
use the term to describe the work system associated with Henry 
Ford. That is the organisation of dedicated single purpose 
machinery around a mechanised flew line. Hie regulationists such as 
Aglietta use "Fordism" to describe an era in society when this 
production form co-existed with mass consumption and a national 
State dedicated to reconciling production and consumption with one 
another. Aglietta's use of "Fordism" is, thus, comparable to Piore 
and Sabel's notion of "Mass Production. The reader should be 
sensitive to the different uses of the term "Fordism" and read 
their different meanings according to the author that is being 
considered.
(6) Hie reason why profit is derived from labour is because labour 
is the only force that is employed in production which is capable 
of creating more than the value which is expended in its 
recreation. Thus, for Marx labour value is central to defining the 
extent and rate of profit. This is different to the everyday 
notions of profit expressed in monetary values. As Thompson (1978) 
points out, this does not mean that either set of calculations are
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'•wrong11 or internally illogical. It means simply that attempts to 
move between the different forms of discourse are laden with 
problems. Thus, whilst throughout this dissertation reference will 
be made to sociological and political theories which draw on 
Marxism, these are accepted as having validity per se. No attempt 
will be made to use marxist value categories to assess the validity 
of the calculations made by the firms surveyed. This study is 
primarily concerned with the limitations of current accounting 
practices when conducting the calculations that the firms 
themselves make.
(7) The term "Neo-Fordism” has often been used to describe 
production forms discussed by writers from a different theoretical 
background. "Neo-Fordism" is sometimes used to refer to the 
Flexible Specialization theorists (See: Sabel, 1982; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984) notions of "International Keynesianism". As I have 
already discussed the merits of this theory there is no further 
need for a discussion of this use of "Neo-Fordism". A third use of 
"Neo-fordism" is that employed by sections of the British left (see 
Murray, 1985; 1988). However, there is some confusion in their 
terminology which makes it difficult to delineate between "Neo- 
Fordism" and "Flexible Specialization" (Scott, 1987; Wood, 1989). 
As a consequence, it has limited relevance in considering the long 
term trajectory of industrial societies as being towards either one 
or other of these two forms of organisation. Therefore, I do not 




Chapter One has explained that this research aims to 
investigate whether the application of biased accounting techniques 
is preventing FMS systems from being used for the most beneficial 
of Exposes. The extent to which financial criteria may divert an 
engineering system away from the purposes for which it was 
initially intended will be dependent on three factors. First, 
practitioners of accounting must be in a position to conduct an 
evaluation of engineering systems. Second, accountants must enjoy a 
position of sufficient influence to override other criteria. What 
is more that influence must have seme basis other than the "truth” 
in the accounting analysis if the re-direction of engineering 
system is to the detriment of the firm. Third, accountants must 
possess the necessary instruments to stop the engineering system 
from being used for one purpose and then direct it tcwards another.
This chapter aims to provide a generalised account of the 
ability of accountants to intervene in the process of technical 
change. This will provide the means of identifying in the 
subsequent chapters, the potential for accounting criteria to be 
deployed to mis-direct IMS systems away from desirable objectives. 
The Chapter falls into three sections. The first details the 
relationship between accountants who are responsible for initiating 
the introduction of new systems and accountants who supervise the 
application of financial criteria. In the second section theories 
of accounting are examined for their insights into the extent of 
"truth" that may exist in the accounting analysis and the source of 
the accountant's power. This will allow an assessment of the extent
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to which accountants' ability to make interventions is linked to 
the validity of those interventions. If the accountants' analysis 
only generates "truthful” financial evaluations of the performance 
of a system a re-orientation of FMS towards a new use as a 
consequence of that evaluation cannot be considered to be an
inappropriate or undesirable outcome. The third section compares
/-*
the development of cost control techniques in Britain with those 
pioneered by the Scientific Jfonagers in the USA and uses the latter 
to highlight the limited knowledge that accountants have of 
shopfloor processes in Britain. The chapter concludes that, whilst 
accountants may be in a position of formal superordination in the 
enterprise, they have limited knowledge of shopfloor processes. 
Accountants are dependent on engineers for information and this is 
likely to limit the nature of an accountant's opportunity to direct 
systems away from the purpose that they were initially introduced 
to meet.
2.2 Engineers and Accountants as Fractions of Management.
In the course of this century there has been a concentration 
of industrial production and a general growth in the size of 
business organisations. For example, the largest 100 firms in 
Britain produced 40% of manufacturing net output in 1970 compared 
with only 16% in 1909 (Littler and Salaman, 1984: 32). Thus, by 
1978 25% of the people who were employed in manufacturing worked 
for enterprises that had 20,000 or more employees (ibid, see also 
Hannah, 1976? Prais, 1976; 1981). Transnational ownership and 
corporate forms of organisation have resulted in the manufacturing 
facilities of these firms being situated across a number of
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different sites, subsidiary companies and even nations. Public 
flotations have increased the number of people who share in the 
ownership of these companies. One consequence of these factors is 
that many owners are no longer able to take direct responsibility 
for managing their firms. There is recognition by writers from a
wide range of political opinions and academic disciplines (for
/•
example, Burnham, 1941? cf Galbraith, 1967? cf Wright, 1976? 
Carchedi, 1977) that the function of managing has been devolved to 
a range of specialist groups of employees. Rule-governed procedures 
have generally been instituted into a company's structures to 
provide guidance for each occupational group when carrying out 
their responsibilities (1). Two such groups of employees are 
accountants and engineers. These share in the responsibility of 
ensuring that the company purchases and deploys effectively new 
production systems that are able to meet the firm's manufacturing 
objectives and protect its profitability.
The contribution of Management Accounting to this has been
defined as:
"the application of accounting techniques to 
the provision of information designed to 
assist all levels of management in planning 
and controlling the activities of the firm."
(Sizer, 1975: 13. Original emphasis.)
The important tools that are used in this are plans, costs and
budgets (see, Hofstede, 1968? 27: Storey, 1983? 150 - 152). The
overall plan describes a company's operations for the year. Each
operation will be given a cost and the total of the costings will,
if all current costs are being charged to products, give the total
value of the master budget for the year. This is then sub-divided
into constituent budgets of various types - for example, sales,
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manufacturing department's budgets, inventory, purchasing and
capital. The control function is achieved through each budget as:
"it serves to authorise, or conversely, render 
illegitimate, certain expenditures and courses 
of action which do not concur with the official 
plan." (Storey, 1983; 151.)
The overall objective of the accounting function is to ensure that
the firm's planned and-actual expenditure is kept at a level which
protects a company's profitability.
The "direct practice of engineering" contributes to the
management of a company by:
"designing new products and systems, or in 
supervising their production or operation"
(Berthoud and Smith, 1980: 27).
The points in the process of technical change where there is 
an overlap in the responsibilities of accountants and engineers, 
and where the allegedly inappropriate techniques are administered 
by accountants, are the stages of pre-investment justifications and 
post-installation cost control. The pre-investment justification is 
the stage when the merits of a proposed new system are evaluated to 
assess whether the adoption of such a change is likely to bring 
financial improvements to the ccnpany's performance. Engineers tend 
to be involved in the early stages of the capital sanctioning 
process and define the parameters of savings in pre-investment 
justifications? accounting staff are employed in the subsequent 
corroboration of the existence of these savings and assessment of 
their impact cn the financial performance of the ccnpany (KLahorst, 
1983: 67). Changes in manufacturing capacities and performance that 
stem from the introduction of new equipment cure then converted 
back, by accountants, into changes in the expectations of
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performance of departments and these changes are reflected in 
amendments to the budgets that engineers and others are expected to 
work to. Thus, there is a clear relationship between the 
calculations performed at the pre-investment justification and 
post-installation cost control stages.
Accountants and engineers do not only play different roles 
within the enterprise? they also tend to hold different places 
within the company's hierarchy. The senior financial staff cure 
often situated close to the apex of a company. For example, McKenna 
(1978; 14) found instances where the titles and/or functions of 
"Financial Controller", "Chief Accountant" and "Financial Director" 
were interchangeable. Also, a growing number of company chairmen 
(sic) started their careers in accountancy (Stanworth and Giddens, 
1974: 86) and the single most common qualification of directors in 
Britain is membership of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(The Director, January 1965, pp. 87 - 91).
By contrast, engineers are now often situated in a lowly 
position in a company's hierarchy. Whilst engineers are often 
involved in the management of projects and processes (New, 1976: 
10? Berthoud and Smith, 1980? Scott et al., 1991: 22) they do not 
generally have other managers or even line supervisors reporting to 
them (Venning, 1975: 62-3? Whalley, 1986: 92? Smith, 1990). It is 
also unusual for them to rise to board level. Mcnck (1954) reported 
that one-third of the companies in his sample did not have a 
technically qualified director.
There is evidence that the different locations of the 
different functioned groups influences the weight given to their 
respective analyses in the decision-making process. In the higher
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echelons of a company the emphasis is on financial control 
(Armstrong, 1987a: 415) and this allows accountants to define as 
invalid engineering considerations when they do not conform with 
accounting criteria. This is illustrated vividly by the research of 
T.C. Jones (1990a). He reports an accountant's description of his
interaction with engineers in the following way:
/■
"The engineers are designing an all-singing, 
all-dancing machine - the best that they can 
design. Very often they don't look at the 
financial side of things. Their job is to 
design a damn good machine - that's what they 
want to do. They get upset when we come back 
and say "this machine is too expensive - can 
you cut down this? Can you select a cheaper 
material?" They get very upset." (1990a: 280)
Similarly, Komach (1966) reports that financial criteria have
percolated down into engineering and that "calculation of costs is
fundamental in engineering and overdominates all other
calculations".
In summary, engineers and accountants are two occupational 
groups involved in the management of companies. Both have the 
opportunity to intervene in the process of technical change. 
Engineers have the initial responsibility for proposing methods of 
how a firm should manufacture its products. Accountants have the 
responsibility for ensuring that the contours of such proposals are 
confined within the financial parameters that protect a company's 
profitability. Thus, the engineers' conduct of their functions 
tends to be proactive and precede those of the accountant who react 
to the engineers' proposals. The accountants' tend to occupy a 
position of greater stature than that held by engineers in the 
firm. As a result, accounting criteria may be used to precipitate 
revisions in engineering considerations. For example, accounting
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criteria are used to decide whether or not to purchase an FMS 
system and whether its current deployment is financially 
acceptable, lhe bases of accountant's greater stature, the validity 
of the accounting analysis, and why it might diverge from the logic 
embodied in engineering systems such as FMS, will be considered in 
the next section.
t-
2.3 Theories of Accounting.
Critics of accounting argue that current applications of pre- 
investment appraisals and post-installation cost controls (see 
Chapter Four belcw) fail to produce the best possible outcome for 
companies that are considering, or have succeeded in, introducing 
FMS. Yet no explanation is offered of why accountants' failure to 
select the most profitable option does not lead to a challenge to 
their authority. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate whether 
any theory of accounting can explain this issue. Loft (1989) 
suggests that there are variants of four theories of accounting: 
The "Conventional" or "Traditional" view; the "Changing Cost of 
Accounting Information" stance, which is subsumed below under the 
title of "The American Engineering-Accounting Discord School"? the 
"Genealogical" analysis; and, the "Labour Process" perspective. 
Each viewpoint will be examined in turn as a means of establishing 
its potential to explain the extent of "truth" in the accounting 
analysis? the reasons for any divergence in analyses between 
accountants and other groups of personnel such as engineers; and, 
the bases of the accountants' apparent power which allegedly allows 
them to impose an inappropriate analysis on the evaluation and 
monitoring of an engineering system.
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(i) Traditional Perspective.
The Conventional or Traditional view of accounting (see, for 
example, Stacey, 1954) parallels the tradition in Sociology which 
originated from Emile Durkheim (1933) and found subsequent 
manifestation in writers such as Daniel Bell (1974). From this
perspective accounting, like any other discipline, is viewed as a
/•*
set of neutral techniques based on scientific principles. These are 
administered by accountants who are dispassionate and objective 
practitioners articulating the collective interests of the 
organisation. The constituent population of any enterprise co-exist 
harmoniously with m e  another and share in its single rationality. 
The relative position of accountants vis-a-vis other groups is 
determined by the degree of abstraction and thus general 
applicability of the different groups' respective analyses. The 
basis of accountant's authority over other groups in the firm is 
their ability to develop and employ techniques which facilitate the 
financial well-being of the company. Therefore, the history of 
accounting may be viewed as the ontological development of 
practices of increasing complexity and applicability in response to 
and reflective of the corresponding developments in the company and 
society as a whole.
The ability of this perspective to explain the issues 
addressed in this dissertation is questionable. The traditionalists 
imply that all of the systems of knowledge employed in a company 
run parallel to one another as they are all predicated on a single 
rationality. Yet the potential divergence between "productivity" 
and "flexibility" goals that were discussed in Chapter One 
illustrates that this is a contentious issue. (See also Dermer and
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Lucas, 1986: 476; Cooper and Robson, 1990: 371.) The
traditionalists perceive this and other conflicts as mere 
pathological abberations that will be resolved because of the 
essential validity and increasing applicability of the disciplines. 
However, this denies the possibility that the origins of conflicts
may be structured into patterns of ownership, control and
/■*
administration of production, which leads to the various groups 
that exist within the enterprise having different interests (Hopper 
et al., 1987 ; 440). It also ignores the potentiality that the most 
powerful groups will institute structures and practices that 
present their own interests as tantamount to the interests of the 
enterprise more generally. Thus, any influence that accountants 
enjoy in decision making structures may be related to their 
allegiance with the most powerful groups rather than being a sinple 
product of their technical competence (Oocper and Robson 1990: 371; 
Willmott, 1990: 315 - 6; and, see also “labour Process" theory, 
below).
The traditionalists' failure to address the competing 
interests that might exist means that they legitimize rather than 
explain the pursuit of a specific set of economic values and goals 
and the subsequent economic decisions and they marginalise others 
(Macintosh, 1990: 153 - 4). Moreover, as the "Changing Cost of 
Accounting Information" perspective demonstrates (see directly 
belcw) accounting techniques did not develop along a unidirectional 
path from the least complex to the most sophisticated.
(ii) The American "Engineering-Accounting Discord" School.
The idea expressed by these theorists is that accounting
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practices are out of time with engineering changes. The first set 
of theorists (Kaplan, 1986; Jaikumar, 1984; 1986) suggest that 
there is sane type of "accounting lag” (Kaplan, 1986: 199) between 
the development of new engineering systems and changes to the 
accounting analysis. As Jaikumar's claims have already been 
discussed in sane detail and the emphasis shifts in Kaplan's ideas
A*
this part of the discussion will concentrate on the second set of 
arguments, the "Changing Cost of Accounting Information" (Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1988).
These writers suggest that there has actually been a 
regression in the sophistication of accounting techniques. Thus 
they argue against the unidirectional and progressive development 
of accounting knowledge implied by the traditional viewpoint. 
Johnson and Kaplan recognise that accounting is intended to provide 
information about the firm but they do not believe that the 
complexity of its analysis has stayed in step with the increased 
complexity of the organisation. They argue that accounting is 
subjected to a number of pressures, not least the financial cost of 
generating information. As organisations have developed, accounting 
has been expected to perform an increasing number of functions. The 
consequence of the concurrent demands for more financial 
information and the conflicting restrictions on the development of 
accounting has been the evolution of a caricatured system that may 
be sufficiently refined to meet one objective but is applied to 
many. Thus, there is the divergence of accounting from the reality 
that it seeks to explain. The historical development of accounting 
techniques are discussed in some detail below. However, for the 
purpose of elaborating on Johnson and Kaplan's theory, their
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discussion of the developments of different uses of "standards” in 
accounting will be considered briefly.
Johnson and Kaplan (1987: pp 47 et seq. and 125 - 7) argue 
that there have been three developments in the use of standards in 
costing. Hie first of these was when standards were developed as a 
management tool to control production. This innovation came from 
the Scientific Management school - see section 2.4 below - who 
dissected the production process to determine the appropriate 
levels of efficiency or standards of output for individual workers 
in a given industry. The second development, variance analysis, was 
also concerned with control of production and again originated from 
practitioners of Scientific Management such as Gantt, Longmuir, 
Harrison and Emerson. This involved the formulation of equations 
for determining the actual degree of variances in output and 
contingent financial performance of production departments from the 
initial standards set by the Scientific Managers. The purpose of 
this was to allow companies to differentiate between increases in 
expenditure that were attributable to controllable conditions and 
those which management could do nothing about. At this time any 
costs (ie, overheads) that were incurred by the firm outside of the 
production process could either be apportioned in a general way to 
each unit of the single type of product manufactured or would be 
meticulously traced back to their source of origin by the 
Scientific Managers.
Subsequent to these early developments, companies have 
expanded in size and adopted a multi-divisional form of 
organisation. The new corporation now produces a wide range of 
goods, often within the same division. Government agencies demand
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that the corporations report their assets for tax and other 
purposes. In this changed situation a third use of standards, 
inventory costing, has been developed by accountants as a simple 
method of evaluating part processed goods. When calculating the 
value of inventory amongst the company's assets accountants have
simply multiplied the volume of goods at a given stage in the
/-
production process by a standard value. That value is believed to 
represent the cost of the work that had been carried out on the 
product up to that point and includes a standard proportion of 
overheads. However, as most companies now produce a range of goods, 
overhead costs are not incurred in a standard way, but bear a 
relationship to the complexity of the process of their individual 
production.
Despite this inadequacy, the same information is used to 
decide the relative, financial, efficiency of different operations. 
Production decisions are then made on the basis of this false 
information (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987 ? 127 et seq.). Johnson and 
Kaplan believe that the reason why the Scientific Manager's 
practice of tracing all costs to their original source has ceased 
may be due in part to "their high cost-to-benefit ratio". However, 
they attribute the ascendancy of inventory costing to the need for 
companies to provide information for outside bodies for tax and 
investment purposes.
Johnson and Kaplan go on to argue that these problems are 
often accentuated by the techniques that are new used to control 
and motivate company personnel. Higher managers examine the Return 
on Investment (ROI) that particular departments earn, which embody 
the false information described above, and then use the allocation
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of departmental budgets and promotions as a means of disciplining 
and rewarding personnel. As these assessments are made over a 
limited period they encourage departmental managers to pursue 
short-term goals. This discourages the use of any technique of 
production, such as flexible usage of FMS, that requires some
foresight. Johnson and Kaplan argue that the use of these
/-*
inadequate practices are being perpetuated by staff at University 
departments through their teachings and writing of accounting text 
books. Their proposed solution to a single and inadequate, all 
purpose costing system is to have several different systems; each 
of which is directed to a specific purpose such as overhead 
allocation or control of shopfloor activities (see also, Kaplan, 
1988).
The merit of this theory is that it serves to illustrate that 
there is not a single rationality within a company. There is 
clearly the potential for conflict between different fractions of 
management such as engineers and accountants. Johnson and Kaplan's 
thesis also offers a way of filling the gaps in Jaikumar's 
argument. As was noted in Chapter One, Jaikumar failed to explain 
fully how flexible systems came to be introduced into companies 
where the philosophy of Scientific Management pervades all 
activities. In Johnson and Kaplan's argument accountants are able 
to establish a power base by offering cheap methods of financial 
control and of conversing with outside bodies. These methods, 
whilst having the appeal of cheapness, also contain logic which 
impels companies to produce standardized products. It may be 
construed from Johnson and Kaplan's writings that engineers who do 
not subscribe to this logic attempt to introduce different
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production systems.
Despite these strengths Johnson and Kaplan's thesis suffers 
from a number of weaknesses. First, they fail to explain vhy it is 
accountants, rather than other groups of personnel, who have 
developed systems of analysis, albeit inesqpensive ones, far control 
of the production process and for dialogue with outside bodies. 
Second, they tend to oversimplify the different interests that 
exist within the company. Conflicts of rational ities are presented 
as revolving around scenarios advocated by either accountants or 
engineers. Johnson and Kaplan thus fall into the trap of the 
conventional approach of legitimating only a limited range of 
interests and marginalising others. In so doing, they ignore power 
relationships other than those between accountants and instigators 
of new systems. This leads to their failure to explain in whose 
interests accountants are acting when they apply their inadequate 
analysis to select inappropriate options in preference to others. 
Perhaps more importantly, they do not follow through the logic of 
their own argument. If engineers are introducing systems that 
embrace a non-standardized production rationality, the power of the 
accounting analysis and its ability to direct systems towards the 
wrong goals may not be as pervasive as these authors suggest.
(iii) Genealogical Approach
The third perspective of accounting which is considered here 
is the "Genealogical Approach” (see Loft - 1986? 1988; 1989; 
Roberts and Scapens 1990). Advocates of this viewpoint derive their 
inspiration from Foucault's work on punishment and discipline; They 
perceive accounting as "one of the central disciplinary techniques
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in industrial society" (Loft, 1989: 16) with a structure that is 
analogous to a panoptican. In a panoptican observers are based at 
the centre with the remainder of the organisation forming 
concentric circles surrounding them. The centre is divided from 
other parts of the organisation by frosted windows. As the beam of
light is fran the outside shining inwards, silhouettes of the outer
/•*
rings are projected to the benefits of those on the inside. The 
people situated at the kernel of the organisation are able to view 
the activities of those in the outer rings but not vice versa. 
Accounting techniques are perceived as analogous to the panoptican 
because they bring into vision the full range of activities that go 
on in the production process. In this Loft (1986, 139: 1988, 6) 
draws on Braverman's analysis and views accounting as the "parallel 
activities" which are "a replication of the process of production 
in paper form before, as, and after it takes place in physical 
form".
Following Foucault, theorists from the Genealogical Tradition 
argue that there is a dialectical relationship between power and 
knowledge. The people in a position of power are able to institute 
the accounting techniques which generate valid knowledge and this 
in turns secures their tenure in those positions of power. The 
initial source of this power is derived from a number of general 
and/ or historically specific origins. For example, Roberts and 
Scapens (1990; 107) report that it is the executive boards of 
organisations that sit in the centre. Loft (1986? 1988), by 
contrast, discusses the power that accounting systems gives to 
accountants. She details how the Government's actions in the 
unusual circumstances of a wartime economy provided an environment
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in which accountants rose to a position of authority within the
enterprize through the conscious pursuit of a professionalisation
project. That is to say, accountants used notions of competence to
define their domain and to identify those who were and were not
able to practice accounting techniques. Loft says:
"For accounting in business enterprises in the 
United Kingdom is not simply carried on by a 
hierarchy of bureaucratic functionaries, but by 
professional accountants with allegiances to 
their professional associations as well as to 
the organisations in which they work. Through 
their publications, meetings, examination 
syllabi and other activities these associations 
play a role in defining and furthering the 
techniques of accounting, deciding who is 
competent to practise and in elaborating the 
discourse. They are clearly closely involved 
with the creation of management accounting as 
it is." (Loft, 1986: 140. My emphasis.)
According to Loft, the period that provided the springboard 
for accountants to advance this project was the First World War. 
The Government had to find ways of preventing profiteering vhen the 
pattern of wartime demand had rendered the market an inadequate 
mechanism for allocating resources. Wholesale nationalisation or 
centralised direction of all areas of the economy was considered 
unacceptable. Instead the method adopted for determining a fair 
price for goods provided fcy private factories was by assessment of 
reasonable costs. These were determined by a ccnparison between the 
costs in National Factories and others. Accountants projected 
themselves forwards to assume responsibility for assessment of 
these costs.
Loft, in addressing both the conditions external to the firm 
and the activities of groups of personnel, offers a more adequate 
explanation than the other approaches discussed so far of how
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accountants have risen to a position of authority within the 
enterprise. Her theory tends to fall down because she follows 
Braverman in arguing that accounting creates a paper replication of 
shopfloor activities in the office so that it may exercise control 
"from the very bottom of the organisation to the uttermost top"
(Loft, 1989: 16). - Roberts and Scapens do not use the same
/•
argument in this respect and see gaps between what occurs in 
practice and what is presented on paper. - Yet if this control is 
so absolute how is it possible to introduce systems that are 
allegedly incompatible with the logic in pre-investment 
justifications? Further, the inference of increasing power and 
influence of accountants based on their increasing knowledge does 
not allow the scenario that Johnson and Kaplan suggest, ie, that 
accounting does not generate valid and accurate knowledge which 
perpetuates the existence of the enterprise. The corollary of this 
is that, instead of actually cementing the power position of the 
people at the apex, it could be undermining it.
(iv) Labour Process Approach
The final theory which is considered here is that of the 
"Labour Process". Its advocates (Hopper et al, 1986; Hopper et al, 
1987; Bougen, 1989) draw their inspiration from Harry Braverman's 
(1974) "Labour and Monopoly Capital". The central tenet of their 
argument is that the overriding concern of all capitalist 
organisations is to obtain profit or surplus value (Hopper et al, 
1987). Thus, employers treat their workforce who are autonomous 
beings as simple commodities malleable to the demands of the 
production process. The alienating effects which this has on
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employees presents employers with the problem of how to turn the 
potential output of labour or labour power, which they purchase 
from a recalcitrant workforce, into items or commodities that are 
of value. Accounting has been developed as a means of surveillance 
and control whenever problems in the production sphere, or some 
other part of the valorization process, invokes a crisis for 
capital.
It is, therefore, not possible to perceive accounting as a set 
of neutral techniques. They are, instead, a set of practical and 
ideological tools used on behalf of capital and at the expense of 
oppressed classes to perpetuate capitalist patterns of ownership by 
extracting surplus value. Consequently, practitioners of accounting 
are not neutral professionals. Accountants occupy an ambiguous 
position between the antagonistic classes of capital and labour; 
they perform some of the functions of capital, but they do not 
share their objective class position of owning the means of 
production. Their world view is shaped by this position. The 
relative standing of accountants and other occupational groups 
within management depends on their respective abilities to win 
favourable patronage from capitalist owners by devising strategies 
that resolve problems which confront employers.
This perspective has much to recommend it. It has the 
advantage of explaining; hew changes in the accounting analysis may 
be precipitated, the way in which accounting may only represent the 
interests of some groups, and the nature of some of the unequal 
pcwer relationships and competing interests that exist within the 
enterprize. Nonetheless, it too suffers from a number of 
weaknesses, which undermines its ability to explain the problems
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confronting this thesis.
As Loft (1989: 11) remarks, Labour Process theory sees the 
development of accounting from "primitive cost accounting systems 
into sophisticated management accounting systems". This suggests an 
ontology which is often absent as is demonstrated by the research 
of Johnson and Kaplan (1987). One salient weakness in Labour
t*
Process Theory has been highlighted by one of its advocates, Peter 
Armstrong. Armstrong (1985: 1987a) has remarked that the 
description of the historical development of accounting controls 
offered by Labour Process theory often comes close to 
functionalism, and the traditional perspective discussed above, 
because accounting techniques are seen to arise as and when capital 
needs them to resolve a problem at a time of crisis. Further, 
explanations of the authority of different fractions of management 
by reference to their administration of given techniques are 
teleological. Armstrong, in his revision of "Labour Process 
Theory", seeks to explain the relative position of different 
fractions of management by an examination of the factors that led 
to accounting methods of control being adapted by companies and why 
the application of such methods has been under the supervision of 
accountants. It is therefore of value to outline Armstrong's 
(1984a: 1984b: 1985: 1987a: 1987b) refinement of Labour Process 
theory in some detail.
According to Armstrong, the growth of the corporation and the 
accompanying societal-wide changes have important implications for 
the valorization process in capitalist economies. In present times 
employers have to find ways of: (i) ensuring that operatives work 
to a satisfactory capacity in the production process even though
62
they are not under the direct supervision of the owners of 
corporations; (ii) selling the range of goods that are produced at 
a price which provides the company with a sufficient level of 
profitability and to introduce when necessary any innovations in 
products and processes vftiich protect that profitability; and, (iii) 
ensuring that other companies observe the rules of the game and
if
protect the continued existence of the capitalist system by 
maintaining the value of their capital assets at their true worth 
instead of distributing too much of their revenue in dividends. 
Armstrong (1987a: 417 - 418) uses Marxian concepts to classify 
these respective activities as (i) extraction, (ii) realisation, 
and (iii) allocation of surplus value. The fortunes of different 
occupational groups in general, and engineers and accountants in 
particular, have been tied up with their ability to carry out 
whichever function was of greatest importance to the perpetuation 
of the enterprise at different points in history.
When capitalist firms were limited in size the creation of 
goods or increasing the productivity of labour in the creation of 
goods were of prime importance. Mechanical engineers either ran 
their own businesses or managed the companies of others as 
engineering knowledge was important to increasing output/ producing 
surplus value (Armstrong, 1984b: 106). By contrast, the high profit 
margins which companies enjoyed rendered insignificant any value 
that the existing coarse costing methods offered (Armstrong, 1985: 
135). When the relevance of engineering to managing ccrpanies first 
started to diminish engineers were able to reestablish a position 
of prominence - at least, in American firms - by applying their 
knowledge of machines to the management of people. The result of
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this was the development of Scientific Management techniques for 
the purpose of increasing output and facilitating employers 
extraction of surplus value (Armstrong, 1984a: 3, 8).
Since that time economic crises have necessitated further 
reorganisation of industry and the accountants have used their
knowledge of financial criteria to gain a position of prominence.
/-
Armstrong argues that the decade of the 1920s was particularly
significant to the accountant's rising trajectory in both the USA
and Britain. American companies' response to the recession of the
time was to introduce the M-form type of organisation to simplify
administration at each of the new divisions. Accounting techniques
were important in conducting relationships between the divisions
as, to quote Chandler, they provided the:
"essential tools by which the visible hand of 
management was able to replace the invisible 
hand of market forces in coordinating and 
monitoring economic forces" (Chandler, 1978:
448) .
Up until the inception of the M-form of organisation accounting and
financial personnel had simply been one group of staff who provided
an advisory function for line management. Accountants' possession
of a repertoire of dispassionate financial techniques which could
be used for co-ordination of a firm's activity then helped the
financial personnel to move to a central position at the
administrative head of the divisionalised American firm. Armstrong
(1984a: 14 - 15) says:
"To put the matter very crudely, accountants 
displaced engineers and other operational 
managers from key positions within the global 
function of capital because decisions of 
allocation between dissimilar operations could 
only be made on a common abstract - and 
therefore financial - basis."
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Armstrong reports that the position of accountants in Britain 
follows a similar trajectory. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century legislation was passed that aimed to protect the interest 
of investors as first the railways and then a number of industrial 
ventures drew capital from a wide range of sources. The legislation 
had provisions for the conduct of audits. The performance of this
ff
"allocation of surplus value" function gave accountants a foothold 
in the enterprise (Armstrong, 1987a: 419 - 420). From this position 
they were subsequently able to spread their sphere of influence 
into other areas. We have already seen from loft's (1986? 1988) 
work that legislation in the First World War created work which 
accountants used to negotiate an extended role for themselves. 
Armstrong (1987a: 424 - 5) reports that, subsequent to the economic 
recession of the 1920s, financial personnel have extended their 
influence yet further by instigating their own supervision of new 
capital sanctioning procedures.
For Armstrong, the changing nature of the enterprise and wider 
society is only part of the explanation: It does not explain fully 
why the accountants have been able to wrest control of particular 
techniques from engineers. In attempting to answer this question, 
Armstrong (1984a: 5, 9) utilises Jamous and Peloilles' (1970) 
concepts of technicality and indetermination. Technicality refers 
to the codifiable elements of a profession's knowledge base. 
Indetermination refers to the non-codifiable elements such as 
charisma and ascriptive qualities. The more of the qualities of 
technicality that are embodied in a profession's knowledge base and 
the less of the qualities of indetermination, the greater is the 
probability that other occupational groups will expropriate the
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important resources of a profession. Industrial engineers fell from
their position of prominence because:
"the techniques of scientific management proved 
too lucid and could too easily be detached ffcrn 
the ambitions of the engineers" (Armstrong,
1985: 132)
As a consequence, the practices of job timing, planning and 
organising were either appropriated or replaced by analogous 
techniques belonging to other fractions of management, in 
particular accountants. Armstrong argues that the engineer's 
situation has not been helped by the physical nature of their 
product. Other groups such as solicitors and accountants produce a 
service and the particularistic and intangible nature of this 
allows them to monopolise evaluation of the effectiveness of their 
work. By contrast, engineers produce a concrete and durable product 
which may be evaluated, subsequently, by others (Armstrong, 1984b: 
108). The relative accessibility of measures of quality of what is 
produced determines the extent to which others may challenge the 
authority of practitioners.
Accountants have also been helped in their aspirations by the 
nature of capital markets in Britain and the USA. Whilst there was 
seme collaboration between banks and industry at the inception of 
industrialization in Britain, a separation of finance and industry 
soon developed. The localised nature of the banks and their limited 
funds meant that any long term investment tended to create crises 
of liquidity for banks and a mnrber of banking failures (Armstrong, 
1987a: 420 - 421). The result of this separation was legal 
compulsion to perform audits as a pre-condition for generating new 
funds from stock markets. This has increased the importance of the
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accountant's role.
Even with Armstrong's modifications "Labour Process Theory" is 
inadequate. Conflict does not only revolve around the Capital- 
Labour axis and/ or rivalry between different fractions of 
management on who offers the best technique for providing a 
solution to a problem that is confronting Capital. It is possible 
to envisage different scenarios of problems in the workplace and 
potential solutions which cut across class lines and draw support 
from different strata. For example, implementation of equal 
opportunities policy, "green" alternatives and, in the context of 
this thesis, choices of systems in pursuit of one set of 
manufacturing objectives rather than others when all offer 
comparable levels of profitability.
What is more, Armstrong's arguments imply that accountants and 
accounting criteria enjoy a position of authority over engineers in 
any decision-making process. Yet there are a number of reasons why 
this should be questioned. First, as the work of Jaikumar and 
Johnson and Kaplan illustrate, it appears possible for new systems 
of manufacture to be introduced, even though accounting criteria 
are inocnpatible with the logic in such systems. This suggests that 
Armstrong may be confusing simple location of different groups of 
personnel in a company's structure with their ability to make an 
effective intervention in decisions on capital's behalf. Second, 
the arguments that prompted this research suggest that the 
techniques employed by accountants are generating false 
information, which is resulting in work systems being employed 
ineffectively. Accountants could, thus, be creating crises for 
capitalist firms rather than resolving them. Yet it is the ability
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to perform the latter which is reported to provide the bases of 
accountants' superior position in the enterprise. Third, if 
Armstrong's work is read in conjunction with his (Armstrong, 1988) 
writings on the organisation of work, the practical application of 
accounting would be to only favour the introduction of systems 
which deskilled workers. The validity of this view has already been
t*
challenged in Chapter One.
Discussion.
The aim of this section was to examine whether any theory of 
accounting could provide insights into the consequences of the 
theorized current conflict between accounting practices and 
flexible manufacturing systems. To this end four theories of 
accounting have been examined. All of the theories considered are 
able to explain the pattern detailed in the preceding section that 
accountants enjoyed a position of greater stature in the upper 
echelons of a company and that their analysis may override 
engineering decisions made within the firm. However, three issues 
that have relevance to this thesis have been considered and the 
theories differ from one another on at least one of the following: 
the validity or extent of "truth11 that is perceived to exist in the 
accounting analysis; the scope for any divergence in analyses and 
proposals of accountants and other groups such as engineers; and 
the bases of accountants' power which allows their analysis to take 
precedence over others in the enterprise.
In the conventional view of accounting nothing other than 
"truth" is generated by the accounting analysis and this provides 
the source of authority of accountants. No divergence takes place
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between the analyses of accountants and engineers, as both 
subscribe to the same rationality. By inference, current conflicts 
between accounting and engineering systems are transient and will 
be rectified. The '‘Changing Cost of Accounting Information" 
theorists view the important source of accountant's power as the
universality of accounting language which allows dialogue and
/•*
alliances with powerful external forces. Accounting techniques are 
not sufficiently complex to produce valid interpretations of all 
events, especially the production changes being presented by 
engineers, and this is leading to a threat to different companies' 
financial viability. Either accounting systems are changed or 
American companies will suffer further demise. In the "Genealogical 
Approach" it is the ability to exploit a range of general and 
historically specific situations which provides the bases of 
accountants' power and enables them to generate information which 
strengthens their position further. As accounting "replicates" the 
production process no divergence between accounting and engineering 
would appear to take place. If it does, as knowledge is power, 
accounting systems' misrepresentations of financial reality will 
serve to undermine the standing of accountants. According to 
"Labour Process" theory, accountants derive their power from 
allegiances with Capital. They may diverge from engineering 
proposals in defining routes to profitability but if they were 
failing to articulate profitable options their position of 
dominance would be challenged.
None of the theories appear to be able to provide total 
resolution of the problems confronting this thesis. They all 
generalise the accounting analysis as either applicable or
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Inapplicable to current times and they all tend to overstate the 
extent of each accountant's pcwer in applying the analysis. The 
different theories can be divided into two. On the one side there 
are the optimists, These include the "Traditional" theorists, the 
"Genealogical" school and writers from the "Labour Process" 
tradition. These all view accounting as meeting their designated 
objectives for the owners of companies. If they did not, in time, 
there would be a challenge to their position. On the other side 
there are the pessimists. These include the American "Accounting- 
Engineering Discord" school and other critics of current accounting 
practices (see Chapter Four below) who provide what T.C. Jones 
(1990b) has described as a "Failure Thesis". That is, accountants 
are providing the wrcng information which could eventually lead to 
the demise of the companies. There are two possible reasons for 
such a pronounced difference of opinion. The pessimists overstate 
the extent to which the structure of accounting logic is 
incompatible with FMS. Alternatively, the optimists overstate the 
extent to which the accountant is able to act independently to 
resolve the problems that arise when there are changes in the 
external environment such as when a new manufacturing system is 
introduced.
It is the contention of this author that both are 
overstatements that arise because the optimists and the pessimists 
tend to view the everyday application of accounting channelling in 
a single direction from the accountants themselves. That is to say, 
accounting techniques are seen to be the possession of, and 
administered by, accountants. Others sure perceived as simply the 
recipients of those administrations. The consequences of this is
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that the theories of accounting tend to provide "formalist” 
explanations that equate the power of accountants with their 
official location in a company's hierarchy and the presence or 
otherwise of formal accounting techniques. This misrepresents the 
effective influence of accountants. As the preceding section 
outlined, accountants' application of accounting techniques takes 
place after engineers have made their contributicn to the financial 
decision-making process. This does not allow accountants to 
determine exactly what their cwn contribution to that process will 
be. They may, either correctly or incorrectly, rule that engineers' 
submissions are invalid. But this raises the issue of what 
accountants will put in place of those submissions. It will be 
explained in the next section that accountants have limited ability 
to act in this way independently of engineers. Alternatively, the 
accountants may accept engineers' proposals. This dependency of 
accountants on engineers for information serves to limit the 
potential divergences of accounting standards from engineering 
systems. Thus, accounting should not be seen simply as the 
possession of a single group within the enterprise. Instead, they 
are practices that are constructed by accountants in conjunction 
with others. In order to understand this more limited role of 
accountants in British firms it is necessary to investigate how 
that role developed. It is to this issue that we now turn.
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2.4 Engineers and Accountants Knowledge of the Shopfloor.
The main objective of this research is to examine whether the 
application of accounting techniques in the evaluation and 
monitoring of manufacturing systems results in utilisations of IMS 
that sure to the detriment of the company that installs them. So
far in this Chapter it has been reported that accountants hold a
/•
formally superordinate position to engineers and this gives them 
the opportunity to apply accounting standards to engineering 
systems. It has also been argued that accountants are not in a 
position to act without reference to the content of engineers' 
interventions. To do so would require extensive knowledge of 
shopfloor processes. For example, when the pre-investment 
justification is carried out accountants would need to have 
independent access to the relative values of existing and 
prospective processes. When the post-installation controls were 
implemented accountants would have to be able to (i) stipulate 
independently the standards of performance that a system should 
obtain, (ii) monitor whether they cure being achieved and (iii) 
subsequently impose the mode of working that will ensure 
realisation of the stipulated standards of performance if these 
were not being achieved.
A discussion of the development of cost control in Britain 
will demonstrate that accountants have never gained access to the 
full details of shopfloor processes. First, this section will 
provide a description of the extensive form of cost control that 
the Scientific Managers in the USA sought to develop. This will 
serve to highlight the limited nature of the knowledge of shopfloor 
processes of accountants in British firms.
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(i) The Development of Cost Control in America.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ie, the 20 year 
period prior to the development of Scientific Management, the 
American econcxny experienced rapid industrialisation. High levels 
of production of increasingly standardized goods were being
obtained due to the growing mechanisation, product specialisation
/ • *
and fragmentation in the use of labour (Littler, 1982a). A growth 
in homogenous markets fuelled this process: the rapidly expanding 
population included many immigrants "whose ancestral diversity of 
tastes had been erased by transportation to the New World" (Piore 
and Sabel, 1984: 41). As income distribution was less skewed than 
in other industrialised nations (Chandler, 1976: 47) and wages were 
higher than in Europe due to American industries' increasing 
efficiency (Littler, 1982a), this growing population had the 
capacity to purchase the goods manufactured.
Industries in the USA were, however, confronted by one major 
problem: they suffered from a shortage of skilled labour (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984: 40), which was accentuated by, and manifest in, the 
skilled-labour turnover of between 100% - 300% per annum (Sayer, 
1986: 44). The immigrant workers lacked both industrial experience 
and the time discipline that accompanies it (Hill, 1981: 24) and 
did not provide employers with a ready made solution to the skilled 
labour shortage. These conditions appear to have provided fertile 
ground for the development of a system that could employ the mass 
of unskilled "green" immigrant workers, induct them into the time 
discipline of industrial work, pay them relatively high wages and 
still improve companies' profitability by increasing output of 
standardised goods.
It was in this context that Scientific Management with its 
prescriptions for the single best method found a space. Ihe most 
famous proponent of this system of work reorganisation was 
Frederick Taylor. Whilst the extent to vhich Taylorism was diffused 
in the USA is open to interpretation (Nadwarny, 1955; Nelson, 1974? 
cf. Drucker, 1954, Littler 1982a). Even the studies which suggest 
that Taylor had only limited influence report comprehensive 
installations of his system at a number of major companies. It is, 
therefore, of value to use Taylor's (1903? 1911) works as the focus 
for this part of the discussion.
Taylor sought to develop a "scientific” method for determining 
a single best way of performing each job of work. He believed that 
the resulting increases in labour's efficiency and productivity 
would produce rewards for everyone and promote harmonious 
relationships between workers and employers. Taylor's proposed 
methodology for establishing the best work methods was for the 
works engineer to observe a number of people conducting the same 
task. The engineer would conceptualise each of the constituent 
elements of the operators' different techniques and time them for 
their efficiency. He would then reconstitute the process by 
assembling the most efficient movements used by the operatives into 
a single best method. Thus, Taylor standardised the way of 
performing each task.
Scientific Management's next concern was to define actual 
output levels by determining !lwhat really constituted a full day's 
work that a man could properly do, year in and year out, and still 
thrive under” (Taylor, 1911? 55). This involved identifying the 
important aspects of a task which led to a person tiring, and
pacing the conduct of these activities and the timing of breaks so 
that the desired level of work could be attained an all days. This 
implied a standard level of output for each worker and a standard 
time for performing each task.
To ensure that each operator enjoyed an equal opportunity of
realising the stipulated output the engineer would define the
/■*
layout of the materials and the tools vhich were to be used far the
purpose in hand. Taylor stated that:
"the workman should be given such standardized 
conditions and appliances as will enable him to 
accomplish his task with certainty." (Taylor,
1903, pp 63 - 4. My emphasis.)
The works engineer also had the responsibility for matching 
suitable workpeople to each job according to the demands of the 
work and the attributes of the individual. The employees who were 
selected to perform shopfloor tasks were inducted into the mode of 
working by a member of the supervisory staff who understood the 
logic of the new methods. Supervisors were expected to demonstrate 
the techniques to the worker and then oversee the operatives to 
make certain that each worker observed the correct method of 
working and rested at the appropriate times to ensure optimum 
performance. Taylor's theorized standard method of working was thus 
enacted in practice.
Taylor also proposed the setting up of a planning department. 
This was to have many functions (see Taylor, 1903: 112 - 120) but 
> its overall objective was to make sure that no process on the 
shopfloor went ahead without its consequences being evaluated in 
advance: diagrams and maps in the office replicated the layout of 
the shopfloor (Taylor, 1911: 39). These were to be used to identify
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in advance routes of parts, methods of production including the 
machine tools to be used, the speeds of machine tools and the 
volume of output from each worker. Shopfloor staff received written 
instructions about their tasks from the planning office. An optimum 
level of efficiency from the whole factory could then be realised. 
Taylor's work, thus, provided clear stipulations for how the 
Scientific Managers could define the single acceptable contingency 
for the functioning of the whole production process. This entailed 
standardisation of all the constituent operations in the work 
process to ensure optimal performance regardless of which 
"scientifically" selected workers were performing the tasks. The 
only dimension of their own performance that operators had to 
concern themselves with was the extent of their own exertion in 
achieving the number or volume of output requested.
The standard cost method of cost control was both predicated
on, and a natural extension of, the above standardisation in the
work process. Epstein says:
"Standard cost accounting techniques can be 
viewed as the ultimate in refinement and 
sophistication of the scientific management 
principle." (Epstein, 1978: 95.)
Epstein (1978) demonstrates that the development of a system 
of standard cost was by Scientific Managers at those companies 
where systematic work re-organisation had already taken place. As a 
result the system of financial control utilised and extended the 
Scientific Manager's knowledge about efficiency of different 
functions. Key stages in the development of standard costing came 
from Emerson and Harrington. Emerson used the theorized notions of 
efficiency in the standardised method described above to determine
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a standard cost for producing goods and performing particular 
tasks. This could then be used to provide a budgetted sum against 
which actual performance could be ocnpaned (Unersan, 1908. Reported 
in Epstein, 1978: 100 - 104.) Harrington extended this process. As 
described above, the Scientific Managers sought to control every
contingency in the overall work process so that labour had only to
/•
provide the effort necessary to drive that process. Harrington 
identified the different contingencies that was assumed in the 
standardised method - such as speed of machines or optimal 
organisation of machine time - and other factors that affected 
overall costs, and measured the actual performance of these against 
standard. This allowed isolation of the different causes of the 
variance in a factory or department's budget. (Harrington, 1919. 
Reported in Epstein, 1978? 118 - 120.) Thus, the Scientific 
Managers could identify immediately why costs rose and who it was 
that was responsible for this. For example, it was possible to 
identify whether it was due to employees' lack of efforts, the 
fault of the planning department in not routing work efficiently, 
or a consequence of seme outside source such as a rise in the cost 
of raw materials.
In short, Scientific Managers sought a total knowledge of 
shopfloor processes vhich allowed them to construct a system of 
cost control from the bottom up. They were able to stipulate 
exactly what the physical work process should be. They controlled 
the machinery that monitored the work processes and its output and, 
as a consequence, they could reintroduce a standard method of 
working if operatives veered from the mode of operation in vhich 
they had been instructed. The Scientific Managers were also
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responsible for translating production performance into financial 
terms. They were, thus, able to view directly the economic 
efficiency of each physical process. What is more, the Scientific 
Managers were mechanical engineers who had applied their knowledge 
of machinery to work layout and people (Armstrong, 1984a: 3, 8).
Therefore, they were able to act independently in their assessments
/>
of whether new plant would improve the efficiency of a given 
process. The Scientific Managers were, theoretically, in possession 
of all relevant manufacturing, engineering and financial knowledge 
pertaining to a company's shopfloor operations.
There is no intention here to to infer that such a totally 
comprehensive system of Scientific Management and cost control ever 
worked as the Industrial Engineers intended. It is highly unlikely 
that it did. There were too many factors that militated against its 
operation: there were gaps in the Scientific Manager's thinking. 
For example, Taylor never provided a systematic way of defining 
what was "a full day's work that a man could properly do, year in 
and year out, and still thrive under". (See, Littler, 1980: 1982a.) 
Employers did not always give the Scientific Managers sustained 
support for full implementation of their systems. (See, Rose, 1975, 
for an account of some of Taylor's experiences.) Perhaps, most 
importantly, the possession of knowledge of work processes by 
managers does not mean that the workers themselves have been 
dispossessed of their understanding of the same process (Kelly, 
1982). US studies of more recent times have shown that workers are 
able to use their knowledge to manipulate representations of what 
actually happens in the work process and present a false picture to 
managerial staff. Thus, whilst work may appear to the latter as if
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it conforms to their designations, at times output targets are 
being exceeded to compensate for shortfalls at other points (Fqy, 
1955; Burawoy, 1978). Therefore, the above description of 
Scientific Management and the accompanying standard cost method 
that was developed in the USA in the early part of this century 
should be seen simply as an "ideal type" (2). Nevertheless, it was
t:
an "ideal type" that afforded to those responsible for the 
financial evaluation of production methods full access to the 
intricacies of the manufacturing process. This was not the case in 
Britain.
(ii) The Development of Cost Control in Britain.
Britain's conversion to an industrial capitalist economy took 
place earlier and over a longer period of time than had been the 
case in the USA. This was to have implications for the distribution 
of knowledge of shopfloor processes. For example, skilled workers 
(littler, 1982b, 130 - 1) were not an uncommon feature of the small 
independent companies that prevailed (3). As businesses were small- 
scale, owners often managed their own firms. The managerial staff 
that were employed had an engineering background (Armstrong, 1984b: 
106). The owners' spirit of independence made them reluctant to 
borrow from outside sources to fund any expansion (Payne, 1967: 
526). This, coupled with the widespread presence of sub-contracting 
systems vhich spread capital risks (Littler, 1982a: 67) and the 
high profit margins which the early entrepreneurs enjoyed 
(Armstrong, 1984a: 13), contributed to the initial phase of 
industrial development taking place without any form of systematic 
cost control. With a few notable exceptions (4) accounting
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throughout the nineteenth century was directed at auditing, rather 
than managerial control purposes (Puxty, 1990: 351). Thus, whilst 
shopfloor workers and engineers were in possession of knowledge of 
manufacturing processes, accountants were not.
Around the time when American firms were starting to develop 
new methods of working and, subsequently, cost control the interned 
sub-contracting system started to break down in Britain (Littler, 
1982a). However, a number of factors were to militate against the 
British firms adoption of the standardized methods of production 
that had provided the American Scientific Managers with the 
opportunity to accumulate a comprehensive knowledge of all 
dimensions of a company's manufacturing operations. First, 
companies7 experimentation with new payment systems after the 
breakdown of the sub-contracting system led to the intensification 
of industrial conflict in the 18907s (Littler, 1982a). This 
discouraged employers from introducing new work methods such as 
Taylorism for fear of further antagonising labour (Lewchuk, 1983). 
Second, the pattern of ownership described above did not encourage 
investment in new techniques. Britain's early industrialisation 
left a legacy of methods vhich, although not necessarily efficient, 
did offer a no risk return (Hill, 1981: 38). Any need that 
companies may have felt to experiment with new methods was 
alleviated further by their access to protected Empire markets 
(Zeitlin, 1983).
The pattern of demand for British goods did not encourage the 
introduction of standardized methods. Markets were more 
heterogeneous than those serviced by American producers. Home 
consumers demonstrated a taste for craftsmanship and individual
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character whilst exports went to consumers in different 
commonwealth countries where conditions and tastes varied 
considerably (Payne, 1967).
Heterogeneous markets cure best catered for by the use of 
general purpose machinery. These require skilled labour (More,
1982: 116 - 117). Ihus, just prior to the First World War skilled
/•*
workers constituted half of the workforce in many large industries 
including engineering (More, 1982: 113). By contrast, the 
development of any form of financial monitoring controls at this 
stage can, at best, be described as sketchy. (See, for example, 
Loft, 1988: 112.)
Yet, whilst engineering employers either could not or would 
not introduce new methods of production that might have given them 
access to detailed information of shopfloor operations they were 
subjected to pressure frcm another source to introduce accounting 
controls.
Loft (1986? 1988) has described the First World War and its 
immediate aftermath as the period when cost accounting "came into 
the light". She reports the increased significance of costing at 
this point as an outcome of the political and economic pressures 
peculiar to a wartime economy. Thus, to state briefly Loft's 
argument: Following the build-up of political pressure the 
Government attempted to prevent profiteering when the market could 
not operate freely to determine prices. The mechanisms vhich the 
Government selected to define a fair price were contingent on the 
development and application of cost accounting techniques and this 
led to the more widespread use of cost control.
Loft explains that in the course of the First World War the
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State's direct involvement in the interned affairs of the country 
reached an unprecedented scale: The Government took responsibility 
for purchase of goods and materials both for military purposes and 
the sustenance of their population. However, the prevailing 
principle of competitive tendering for Government contracts led 
the competing companies' to demand materials in advance of their 
winning of contracts. Hie outcome was that the cost of those raw 
materials rose and so did the eventual cost of production to the 
Government.
Pressure from both civilian and military circles built up on 
the Government to regulate product costs and prices following the 
"Shell Scandal” early in 1915. In this episode a military offensive 
had failed because Government-imposed financial constraints had led 
to the imposition of limits on the number of shells which could be 
used daily. Pressure for changes to the methods of pricing also 
came from the labour movement who were concerned that war time 
dilution of skilled labour should not be permitted to increase the 
profits of employers. Hie setting up of the Ministry of Munitions 
and the passing of the Munitions of War Act ensued.
Loft (1988: 146) reports that the latter made provisions for 
the creation of a category of "controlled establishments" of plants 
whose production was "essential to the manufacture of munitions". 
Wages and conditions, staffing levels, choice of operatives and the 
organisation of work in these plants were open to sanction by the 
Ministry. Their profits were also limited to a standard based on 
their pre-war level by a "munitions levy". Loft reports that the 
Government subsequently introduced mechanisms for establ ishing a 
fair market price by inserting a new clause into the Defence of the
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Realm Act in 1916. These standards were:
"In determining such price regard need not be 
had to the market price, but shall be had to 
the cost of production of the output so 
requisitioned and to the rate of profit usually 
earned in respect to the output of such factory 
or workshop before the war." (Quoted in Loft,
1988: 149.)
The different mechanisms vhich the Munitions of War established for
/■
determining this were:
"(i) Technical costing, "the estimate of costs 
by engineering experts resulting from an 
analysis of the process of manufacture into its 
elements, and the calculation of what the costs 
of each of these ought to be in the light of 
all known conditions."
(ii) Accountancy costing: "the ascertainment of 
any given contractor's actual costs of 
production by examination of his books."
(iii) Using the cost returns from National 
Factories where similar articles were being 
produced.
(Ministry of Munitions, unpublished. Vol 3. 
part 2. ch 1. pp. 10 - 11 quoted in Loft, 1986,
144 - 5: 1988, 150).
The first method is the one that resembles most closely the 
introduction of the cost control methods that were part of 
systematic management in the USA. Hcwever, according to loft (1986: 
1988) it was the third method vhich was the most popular. Loft 
reports that quite sophisticated costing methods were set up in 
National Shell Factories (Loft (1988: 150 - 1). This involved 
finding out the process costs of shell manufacture by discovering 
the cost of labour, materials and establishment costs for the given 
output at each process that the shell passed through. Information 
on variances due to either bad work or faulty materials were also 
ascertained. From this, the average cost of each process was 
computed and the aggregation of average costs of the different 
processes gave the average total cost of the shell. The information
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obtained then provided a basis for comparisons between factories 
and within the same factory across time.
Nonetheless, from Loft's work it would appear that only 
aggregate costs, albeit determined by itemising costs of production 
at National Factories, were used when the Government purchased
parts from other engineering companies. In other words a maximum
/•
budget for producing a given volume of parts was set by the 
Government. This gave accountants the role of introducing and 
administering costing systems in manufacturing enterprizes (Loft, 
1986: 1988). However, there are a number of reasons for believing 
that the content of the activities of shopfloor workers and 
engineers remained shielded from the accountants' gaze and that the 
coverage exercised by costing systems was never as extensive as in 
the USA.
Firstly, the same Munitions Act that had prompted companies to
introduce cost monitoring techniques also protected the rights of
shopfloor workers to exercise a degree of influence over their
immediate work situation. This gave rise to the Shop Stewards'
Movement. Lewchuk has said of the relevant provisions of the Act:
"The Munitions Act differed from the EEF 
proposals. Only customs which directly reduced 
output were challenged. Of equal importance 
management was not given the sole authority to 
decide which practice reduced output. The 
Government became the final arbitrator. Unlike 
direct control vhich eliminates the need for 
management to confer with labour, the Munitions 
Act had actually increased the need. 
Increasingly these consultations took place at 
the point of production." (Lewchuk, 1983: 89.
Emphasis added.)
Secondly, Loft (1988: 149) reports that the aim of the 
Munitions Act was to hold profits to a pre-war level. Yet, profits
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were already exceedingly high in the munitions industry. Increased 
military expenditure and rearmament in the decade before the start 
of the war ensured the financial well-being of armaments companies. 
Zeitlin (1983) reports that Sir Andrew Noble of Armstrong-Whitwarth 
claimed that his company could make more money from building a 
single river boat than from manufacturing 6,000 cars. Thus, the
i:
introduction of the Act was unlikely to have placed any great 
squeeze on profitability that might have otherwise prompted 
companies to reduce costs by potentially disruptive reorganisation 
of production.
Thirdly, Littler (1980? 1982a; 1982b? 1985) has dated the 
movement towards systematic management in Britain as taking place 
after the First World War. Finally, engineers and accountants 
already existed as different groups operating in different spheres 
within the company and with markedly different frameworks of 
analysis and knowledge. This was likely to prevent the accountants 
from intruding into the realms of engineering even when 
manufacturing performance was not as anticipated. The divergence 
between engineers and accountants at this early period is best 
illustrated by Loft's (1988) report of an instance in the 
professionalisation project vhich the ICWA embarked on after their 
inception in 1919.
At a number of firms the ICWA won the right to organise the 
personnel who were supervising costing techniques. The tactics 
which the ICWA employed in their quest for recognition and 
authority included selection and exclusion of membership, 
definition of their relationship to other bodies and identification 
and refinement of their own knowledge base. Thus, there was some
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discussion on their relationship to engineers and that group's
professional expertise. "Workshop knowledge" was included in the
ICWA syllabi and amongst exam topics. However, from Loft's work
this appears to have been perceived by the majority of the members
of the ICWA as a subsidiary and relatively unimportant element of
their expertise: a debate on the relationship between engineering
and cost accounting took place in the pages of The Post Accountant.
A deluge of protest letters brought a revision to an editorial that
had implied that a practiced level of training in engineering was
essential to cost accountancy. Thus:
"The author had to explain that he had not 
meant to imply that the **1nost suitable approach 
to Costing was to be gained through a thorough 
apprenticeship in engineering ... ". He said 
that he had been trying to make the point that 
"technical knowledge" was important for 
grappling with the "higher branches" of the 
work such as "the relationship of design to
cost, or the presentation of a statement
showing the relative cost efficiency of rival 
process methods ..." (The Cost Accountant,
November 1922, p. 165)." (Loft, 1988: 230 - 
231.)
All of the above factors highlight how knowledge of the 
engineering and manufacturing dimensions of production processes 
remained the prerogative of shcpfloor workers and engineers. Unlike 
Scientific Managers in America, the accountants remained dependent 
on others to furnish them with details of shopfloor practices.
After the war cost accounting was introduced as part of a 
movement towards systematic management in the newer industries such 
as cycles and sewing machines. However, it does not appear that 
this gave accountants the same degree of knowledge of shopfloor 
production activities as had been enjoyed by the Scientific 
Managers in the USA. The most common method of systematic
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management introduced into Britain was that devised by Bedaux. 
Littler (1980: 376) reports that there were 225 installations of 
this system into firms in Britain by 1937.
The Bedaux system was not a comprehensive system of work 
organisation. Instead it revolved around a definition of the
fatigue which workers were likely to experience in the course of/■
their work as a consequence of performing different motions such as 
lifting, pushing, pulling or pressing.
The method for installing the Bedaux system (see Littler, 
1980; 394 - 8) was for departments to be rationalized individually. 
The first department would be identified and the conditions 
external to the worker in that department, namely regularity of 
material supply, routing of work, machine speeds and feeds, etc., 
would be standardized (Littler, 1980? 396). The rationale for this 
was that the operatives could then perform their work at their most 
efficient pace. The tasks which the worker was performing were 
analysed into their constituent elements and the operator was timed 
for his or her efficiency. The standard of efficiency which the 
operator was supposed to work at was defined as 60B. Littler (1980; 
397) reports that if the observer believed that the operator was 
working at an unnecessarily slow pace the observer would rate the 
volume of work produced in that period at a level lower than the 
60B.
Once the information on the types, timing and efficiency of 
movement had been collected they were then despatched to the 
central planning office. Here, the efficiency engineer defined the 
workload for each operative by adding estimated time allowances for 
fatigue and unavoidable delays to the work study staff's
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observations of the time taken to perform different tasks. Bonus 
systems of payment were then constructed around the definitions of 
workload. Operators, supervisors and departments were measured 
against the designated B-factor and sanctions could be invoked if 
either the operator's or the supervisor's performance was below 
par. In this way a system of cost control was instituted.
t-
There are a number of important variations between the 
Scientific Management of Taylor and Bedaux's system. As a 
consequence, the users of the latter did not share the same 
capacity of their American counterparts to influence the conduct of 
shopfloor activities. Firstly, Bedaux had little to say about work 
design. The work study engineers simply timed the workers 
operations and then determined the amount of rest required. The 
content, if not the breadth, of the work operation was left to 
either the operator or existing supervisory and management 
personnel to decide. Taylor, on the other hand, had specified how 
tasks were to be performed. He was concerned with eliminating 
"awkward, inefficient or ill-directed movements" as well as getting 
workers to increase their efforts. Secondly, Taylor's definitions 
of the work environment was meant to enable the worker to carry out 
the operations as scientifically determined by the works engineer. 
In Bedaux it was used to drive the velocity of throughput. The 
Taylorites tried to dissociate themselves with Bedaux as they were 
afraid of the stigma of "sweating" or "speed-up" due to the 
latter's failure to provide details of how the employee should 
change their methods to increase their output (Littler, 1980). 
Thirdly, work volume in Taylor's system was determined by reference 
to the number of items vhich the worker could be expected to make
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using the method designated by the works engineer. Hie volume in 
Bedaux was determined by calculating the rest time vhich the worker 
needed. A system of bonus payments was then linked to levels of 
output to ensure that the pace of work was achieved. By contrast, 
Taylor perceived the type of payment system that was used as a
subsidiary element of his scheme. The main purpose was to reward
/■
workers for following the Industrial Engineer's exact instructions.
Bonus systems such as those used by Bedaux are most necessary when
managers do not exercise direct control over shopfloor activities.
Hopper et al. state:
"the logic of productivity schemes and piece 
rates is intended to provide management with 
control of output without their having to 
bother with detailed work practices, direct 
supervision or elaborate formal controls11 
(1986: 5? emphasis added).
Finally, in Taylor's system the exact operation of work tasks 
was demonstrated by supervisory staff and workers were 
systematically inducted into the correct mode of working. The only 
way that the Bedaux system encroached on work operations was by the 
setting of the B factor according to how efficiently the time study 
observer believed the operator to have worked.
Clearly, there was an element of control over shopfloor 
processes in Bedaux's system. It enabled those responsible for cost 
monitoring to define a volume of output that workers could be 
expected to produce and to identify the areas where the numbers of 
output fell short of what was anticipated. However, the definition 
of standard output which systematic managers provided largely 
accepts the traditional method of performing a task as defined by 
the workers or by existing managers. Unlike Scientific Management
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of the Taylorian variety the Bedaux system did not seek to define 
exactly hew workers should realise their output but simply assumed 
that the most effective method was the one being employed. Indeed, 
one of the major attractions of Bedaux to employers was that it did 
not involve "restrictions on the authority of traditional
management" (Layton, 1974: 383) .
/ •
This is not to deny that the personnel who were responsible 
for monitoring performance of departments could invoke sanctions 
against shopfloor staff who failed to meet their output targets. 
Littler (1980: 383 - 8) provides details of Bedaux's own "Factory 
Posting Sheet" vhich was a public statement of performance and, 
thus, an explicit warning to those who were performing below the 
par of 60B. However, the person responsible for monitoring did not 
have the knowledge that would have allowed them to institute a 
particular mode of working if the desired level of output was not 
obtained. They had predicated their definitions of standards cn the 
operations that existed. By contrast, the American Scientific 
Managers had constructed their own definition of what the 
standardized operations should be. Thus, even at those factories in 
Britain where seme notion of standardization in work operations had 
been introduced, accounting staff failed to acquire intricate 
knowledge of manufacturing and engineering dimensions of shopfloor 
operations.
There have been other factors since Bedaux that have led to 
companies introducing accounting controls. The merger of different 
companies into corporate groups from the 1920s onwards (Hannah, 
1976) has created the need for some type of financial co-ordination 
(Armstrong, 1987a). However, the form of corporate ownership that
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existed prior to the Second World War was loose federation of firms 
amalgamated through a holding company with each continuing to 
function as it had under its previous form of ownership (Payne, 
1967). As the prevailing financial control method adopted by these 
groups was audits of their constituent firms (Armstrong, 1987a: 
425) it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that accountants 
never extended their view of shopfloor activities.
Later, in the Second World War the Government again took 
action to protect against profiteering. However, the method which 
they used was inspection of a company's books and rationing of 
materials (Armstrong, 1987a: 426). It appears unlikely that this 
would have brought any great pressure on companies to extend 
shopfloor accounting controls on the shopfloor.
In the post-war period there have been a number of pressures 
on British companies to extend "American” techniques. Tomlinson 
(1987) reports a number of Government education initiatives aimed 
at increasing productivity through the adoption of American methods 
including cost control. The multi-divisional form of organisation 
has often been adopted following recommendations by American firms 
of consultants (Armstrong, 1987a: 430) and multi-divisional 
organisation grew in prominence in the 1960s (Steer and Cable, 
1978) and was to be found more frequently than the holding company 
by the 1970s (Chandler, 1976). Ihe overall effect of this has been 
a change in the method of cost control. In the 1960s historical 
costing predominated in British companies (Parker, 1969: 11 - 12) 
but by 1990 standard cost techniques were used in the majority of 
firms (lyall, Okah and Puxty, 1990: 44 - 5). Despite this switch in 
the techniques enplcyed, it is unlikely that such a change has been
91
accompanied by re-organisation of the shopfloor: any transfer of 
American techniques post-dates America's own adoption of the multi­
divisional form vhich, according to Johnson and Kaplan (1987), was 
when American companies switched to using standards for valuing 
inventory rather than as a means of controlling shop-floor 
activities.
/■
Ihe vrork of a number of authors also highlights the fact that 
accountants' ability to direct work activities remains limited. 
Engineers maintain a large degree of autonomy and control in 
different projects (Whalley, 1986). Shopfloor management continue 
to hold considerable responsibilities (Hill, 1981: 31) and many 
skilled workers in engineering have continued to exercise the right 
of deciding how a job is to be carried out, the sequence of 
operations and the speed of production (ibid.)
Part of the protection against the accountants' incursion into 
the activities of the shopfloor in Britain is the predominance of 
small batch production (5) and the complexity vhich is involved in 
this form of work. Turner (1970) quotes Loveridge and Sawyer 
(1968), who point out that anyone searching for the optimum way of 
scheduling 9 jobs with 3 operators on 3 machines is faced with 
47,784,735,839,827,000 possible routings. Thrner found that because 
of the complexity in production, cost prevented firms from planning 
workflow in advance. Instead, work was allocated to available 
machines to meet shortfalls in available stock when orders were 
pending. If companies are unable to allocate work in advance they 
will not be able to stipulate the exact method of working and 
accountants are unlikely to be able to enforce a particular use of 
a given machine. In short, accountants' knowledge of shopfloor
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activities is limited and engineers, shopfloor management and 
workers all maintain a degree of autonomy in their respective areas 
of work.
None of this is intended to deny that accountants do enumerate
different activities that go on on the shopfloor or that they
define as problematic levels of output which fall below a given
level. Nor is it being argued here that there are not biases in the
dimensions of performance which accountants seek to quantify. There
clearly are. Present day accounting techniques are focused
disproportionately on labour savings rather than other criteria.
Both New (1976: 15 - 16) and New and Myers (1986: 7) report that
currently the most important cost to companies is bought out
materials. Yet companies still dedicate the resources used to
control performance to the monitoring of direct labour input. New
and Myers claim:
"For the average plant in our sample, a 10% 
reduction in the materials purchase content 
would reduce total factory cost by 5.1%, 
whereas a 10% reduction in the direct labour 
requirement would reduce total factory cost by 
only 1.8%. That is to say, purchasing 
effectiveness has a "leverage factor" almost 
three times the "leverage factor" of direct 
labour. Moreover, a specified percentage 
reduction in purchase costs is probably far 
easier to achieve than the same percentage 
reduction in direct labour content - with all 
its ramifications for manning levels, etc."
(1986: 7).
What is being asserted here is that accountants have failed to 
' establish the means for acquiring knowledge of the manufacturing 
and engineering intricacies of production processes in British 
firms. This leads to accountants being dependent on other personnel 
such as shopfloor management and engineers to identify the most
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efficient processes and the numbers of output that m y  be obtained. 
It is only after engineers and others have done this that 
accountants can attach costs to different processes. In effect, the 
construction of accounting standards takes place in conjunction 
with other groups of personnel in the firm. They are not applied 
unilaterally. This contrasts with the American Scientific Managers 
who identified the most efficient processes and defined both the 
acceptable standards of output and the costs that would be incurred 
in this.
In summary, this section has contrasted the different 
histories of cost control in USA and Britain. It has illustrated 
that cost control in the USA developed as a corollary of work 
reorganisation by the same Scientific Managers that had instigated 
the initial re-arrangement of the work process. This gave rise to a 
holistic form of cost monitoring that allowed the Scientific 
Managers to assess the engineering, manufacturing and financial 
merits of different operations. By contrast, Britain's early 
industrialisation resulted in forms of cost monitoring being 
introduced at different times to work reorganisation. Different 
personnel are, thus, responsible for engineering, manufacturing and 
financial dimensions of performance. Accountants who supervise the 
latter are dependent on others to provide them with details of 
engineering and manufacturing dimensions of performance.
2.5 Conclusion.
The main concern of this thesis is the extent to which 
deployment of accounting techniques may result in the misuse of FMS 
systems. This Chapter has aimed to examine the ability of
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accountants to erploy an analysis which results in such an outcome. 
It has been explained that the accountants hold a position higher 
in a company's formal structures and mate their interventions later 
in the decision making process than do engineers. A number of 
theories of accounting have been examined as a means of 
understanding the source of this apparent power of accountants and 
the extent of the validity of the accountants' analysis. It has 
been reported that the different theories suggest a number of 
different factors that contribute to accountants superordinate 
position ranging from expertise in performing accounting tasks to 
the ability to converse with outside forces, develop allegiances 
with owners and to pursue successfully professionalisation 
projects. This thesis does not dispute the relevance of these 
factors.
The theories of accounting differ from one another in the 
extent of "truth" that they perceive to exist in the accountants' 
analysis. One set of theorists views accounting techniques as 
totally inappropriate for evaluating and monitoring FMS, whilst 
others demonstrate a faith that accountants have the ability to 
remedy, independently, any weakness that may arise.
It has been argued here that all of the theorists overstate 
the extent of the power of accountants. The limits to accountants' 
power has been explained through a comparison of the development of 
financial controls in the USA and Britain. In the former, 
Scientific Managers sought a holistic comprehension of the 
production process, whereas, in the latter, accountants only have 
financial understanding of manufacturing activities. This limits 
the power that accountants may exercise when technical change takes
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place at firms in Britain. Therefore, a detailed examination of the 
role of engineers in the process of technical change to FMS and the 
construction of accounting controls is necessary. This will be 
provided in Chapter Five below when consideration is given to hew 
the relationship of accountants' formal superordination over 
engineers, modified by their dependence on the latter for 
information, is manifest in the capital sanctioning route. First, 
the nature of IMS and the manufacturing benefits that it brings 
will be examined.
Footnotes.
(1) The classical explanation of the development of depersonalised 
formal organisations that aim to realising a given set of 
objectives has been provided by Max Weber. (See, Weber, 1946). 
However, the description of rule bound procedures in Weber's "ideal 
type" of formal organisation, bureaucracies, does not allow the 
organisation to adapt to changing situations (Merton, 1957; Blau, 
1963? Crozier, 1964). In Chapter Five it will become clear to the 
reader that, whilst the companies in this study had many of the 
features of formal organisations such as formal procedures, 
definitions of responsibilities of office holders, hierarchy of 
super- and sub-ordinate positions, rules were rarely so rigid to 
prevent innovation.
(2) See Weber (1949) for discussion of the content and uses of 
"ideal types".
(3) The average machinery manufacturing plant employed only 85 
people in 1871 (Hobsbawm, 1975: 526) and as late as 1895 less than 
200 companies had their shares quoted on the London Stock Exchange 
(Kitchen, 1978).
(4) See Loft (1988: 78 - 80) and Hopwood (1987: 214 - 218) who 
provide details of the cost systems installed at Boulton and Watt's 
ironworks and Wedgewood's pottery respectively.




Before the issue of accounting's representation of the 
financial benefits of FMS may be addressed it is necessary to 
identify the nature of IMS systems and the economic benefits that 
stem from their introduction. This is the purpose of this chapter.
Chapter One criticised those approaches that infer the most 
viable use and economic benefits of FMS by reference to the 
intrinsic qualities of the system or the long term trajectory of 
the economy. In the absence of any better method, this thesis 
proposes to use a company's own definition of their intended 
deployment of IMS prior to its installation as the best use of 
their particular system as long as such a deployment meets one 
condition: that is, that such a use is not precluded by the 
availability of an alternative, either conventional or new 
ccmputer-based, system more suited to the economic manufacture of 
the range and batch size of parts that each company was intending 
to machine.
It is not possible to define the economic benefits that arise 
from such utilisations of FMS, and which, accounting practices have 
to express and monitor, in an unproblematic way. As the different 
theories of long term trajectories discussed in Chapter One imply, 
there have been two types of production system that IMS may succeed 
in the manufacturing sector (1). Also, as was argued in the 
introductory chapter, FMS may be used to pursue different 
manufacturing strategies that offer some mutually exclusive 
benefits. The strengths of preceding production systems and the 
opportunity costs of not pursuing other manufacturing strategies
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with IMS will limit both the types of financial benefit that exist 
for accounting practices to monitor, and, by inference, the 
potential area of viability of the system.
This chapter will explain the area of batch production, in 
terms of range and batch size of parts, where deployment of IMS is 
viable. It will also explain the nature of the economic benefits 
that different deployments offer which accounting practices are 
then expected to express and monitor. This will be achieved 
through: (i) a description of the benefits and weaknesses of the 
preceding production systems, alternative computer based systems, 
and FMS; and, (ii) an identification of the types of economic 
benefits that are likely to materialise from the deployment of FMS 
in a given context.
#
3.2 Costs and Benefits of Preceding Production Arrangements.
The financial benefits of deploying FMS are relative to the 
extent to which a company's existing methods of production 
correspond with their markets. Further, as argued above, the type 
of gains that materialise after the installation of FMS are 
contextual and partly contingent on the preceding method of 
production that a company employs. The preceding methods of 
production, thus, provide a useful starting point for explaining 
the manufacturing strengths of FMS and the financial benefits that 
are likely to arise from their introduction.
Until recently, there have been only two forms of production 
organisation employed in manufacturing, mass production and 
conventional batch production (Gallagher, 1980). Therefore, 
regardless of their exact manufacturing requirements, companies
98
have been presented with a dichotamous choice. The nature of that 
choice has been the attainment of productivity by dedicating 
processes to single purposes or the realisation of flexibility by 
letting workers exercise control.
The system of mass production has offered the former. It is 
ccxnprised of single purpose machinery, flcwline organisation and, 
generally, semi-skilled operators. The nature of each constituent 
element has evolved out of the pursuit of increased productivity 
and reduced unit costs. The efficiency that stems from 
specialisation (see pp 26 - 27, above) has led to the fragmentation 
of the work process. At each stage in that process machinery 
dedicated to the same operation has been employed to facilitate 
maximum output. Companies have generally used the dedication in the 
machinery to employ lower paid semi-skilled staff to operate the 
machines at each stage of the work process. The machinery is 
ordered into a logical sequence that mirrors the chronlogical order 
of the operations that have to be performed in the manufacture of 
that product. This allcws work to "flew11 through the factory in a 
rationed and efficient order as raw materials are converted into 
finished products by increments at each successive stage.
A number of different methods may be used to transport the 
parts between the production stages. These include manual 
transportation and mechanised belts that allows the item to be 
removed whilst manufacturing operations are performed (Wild, 1974). 
However, the exemplary form of conveyance has been the mechanized 
flow line on which parts cue fixed. These may be introduced when 
the cycle times of each successive work station cure aligned with 
one another so that completion of the work on one part and its
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departure to a subsequent stage can be coincided with the arrival 
of another semi-processed part from the preceding workstation. The 
rationale for the use of mechanised flew lines that was offered by 
their pioneers was the increased output that arose because of the 
elimination of the time taken to move parts (Ford 1923: 80, 88? 
Arnold and Faurote 1972: 105 - 6, 245). Others have interpreted 
this as intensification of work by an enforced pacing of production 
workers (Gartman 1979: 201 - 2). Regardless of vhich interpretation 
is correct the mechanisation of flow lines has also increased the 
system's dedication.
m some factories only the main production processes have been 
organised along these lines. Subsidiary processes have sometimes 
employed general purpose machinery and skilled staff. Where demand 
was greatest the pursuit of efficiency through fragmentation could 
be extended to subsidiary processes. Thus, as the productivity of 
the system grows so does its capital intensity and its degree of 
dedication.
But the dedication in the system often meant rigidity. This 
carried a number of costs. Firstly, the combination of capital 
intensity and dedication in the system creates a high degree of 
risk in the capital investment. Purchase of mass production 
machinery is only justifiable when companies are sufficiently 
confident that the demand for their products will continue for the 
two to three year period that it takes to recover the initial 
investment (Shaiken, 1985). When markets cure either satisfied or 
lost, it is practically impossible to reconfigure the system and 
almost certainly cheeper to purchase new machinery. Yet it is often 
markets for mass produced goods that cure most volatile. Consumers
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discriminate between similar mass produced items on the basis of 
their relative price and availability (Murray, 1988).
Secondly, high inventory costs sure often incurred. Some of 
these costs may have been avoided. Companies have often pursued 
increases in the efficiency of production processes to the extent 
of neglecting to seek improvements to areas such as loading and 
unloading (Walker, 1989). This has created unnecessary bottlenecks. 
However, inventories have also arisen because it is difficult to 
keep all parts of a rigid system of production synchronised with 
one another (Oliver, 1990). Technical advance or breakdowns in the 
main areas of the production process are unlikely to take place 
simultaneous to such events in the subsidiary ones. Thus, cycle 
times of different processes will not always be synchronised with 
one another and this creates both the need for, and the source of, 
"buffer" stocks. Another source of inventory costs has been the 
disjuncture between demand and supply of products. Mass production 
ensures the manufacture of a single part at a continuous pace 
(Chapman, 1975: 470). However, the demand for some mass produced 
goods such as motor cars is not constant. This leads to stockpiling 
and ultimately to industrial conflict as companies seek ways of 
reducing inventories within the confines of rigid production 
systems (Beynon, 1984: 165).
Thirdly, there are a large number of hidden labour costs. The 
fragmented processes obviously require staff to co-ordinate them. 
This was anticipated by advocates of the division of labour such as 
Frederick Taylor. What was not anticipated was that additional 
auxiliary staffing costs would arise as a consequence of production 
operatives being denied the right to exercise discretion over their
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work. Shopfloor employees7 absence of job satisfaction reduced 
their affinity with the organisation to a simple instrumentalism 
(Littler and Salaman, 1984). This has resulted in low standards of 
work and the need for quality inspectors to ensure that sub­
standard goods are detected before despatch (Woodward, 1958: 210). 
What is more, the geographical concentration of a range of 
fragmented processes at large single site factories created the 
collective worker and afforded individuals a certain degree of 
anonymity. This facilitated trade union organisation, militancy and 
agitation when employment levels were high (lane, 1982), and 
created the need for specialist personnel departments to reconcile 
shopfloor workers with alienating work conditions in a way that did 
not disrupt production activity (2).
Mass production systems7 limitations have resulted in their 
use being confined to two types of work: The manufacture of large 
quantities of identical parts? and the assembly of identical or 
highly similar products from those mass produced parts (Gallagher, 
1980: 73). In other areas of manufacturing batch production systems 
have been employed.
When perceived in terms of its relationship to productivity 
and flexibility, batch production provides a mirror image of mass 
production. It employs highly versatile staff, machinery and 
organisational layout at the expense of inefficiency and high cost 
of unit output. For exarrple, 80 - 85% of the time that a part is on 
a machine is taken up by positioning, loading and guaging 
(Williamson, 1972: 142). Also unit costs for parts machined by 
conventional batch production methods are between 10 - 30 times 
higher than those for goods machined by mass production techniques
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(Cook, 1975).
The machinery that is used in batch production is general 
purpose. In other words, it is able to perform the same type of 
machining operations such as milling or turning on a range of 
different parts. This gives the system a high degree of flexibility 
(Turner, 1970: 88) and reduces capital risk (Gallagher, 1980: 74). 
Systems are staffed by highly skilled personnel who have to reset 
the machines as the shape, size and material of the required parts 
changes.
Batch production utilises the same functional layout that it 
has relied on since the start of the century (Williamson, 1967/8). 
Machines are grouped together in discrete areas of the factory 
according to the function that they cure able to perform, such as 
grinding or milling. The normal practice is for parts to be 
released into the factory in the exact quantity in which they are 
required. The same operation is performed on the entire batch 
before it is moved on to the next stage (Gallagher, 1980: 74). As 
there is no dedication in the form of conveyance employed between 
work stages, particular batches may bypass different functions, or 
follow different orders, depending on their manufacturing 
requirements. New batches may be prioritised and machined out of 
sequence despite other work being in process before them.
Despite its flexibility batch production is not without its 
diseconomies and unintended costs. Firstly, as in mass production, 
large inventories have been carried, albeit for different reasons. 
The completion of a whole batch before transportation, the time 
taken in set-ups and the holding of some batches when prioritised 
cnes are machined, all contribute to a part only being on a machine
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5% of the time that it spends in the shop (McBean, 1982). This in 
turn generates a second set of costs. Auxiliary staff are required 
to schedule, monitor and transport work as it progresses through 
the shop (Bessant and Heywood, 1985). Thirdly, and as was noted 
above, machine utilisation is extremely low because of the time 
taken in set-ups, loading and positioning of parts. Finally, and 
most importantly, direct labour costs are extremely high. Jaikumar 
reports:
"For custom and small batch production, the 
cost of a product is predominantly attributable 
to labour, and unit costs do not decline much 
with volume. Since each jcb is unique, the set­
up requires the active involvement of a skilled 
machinist.” Jaikumar (1984? 7)
Conventional batch production is, thus, most suitable for those
companies that build nothing but prototypes and who are able to
exploit the full extent of the flexibility of resources. The
restricted number of options, of either mass production or batch
production systems, has meant that firms have been confronted with
a straight choice of pursuing either flexibility or productivity.
However, markets have demanded a wider range of parts than that
which mass production and conventional batch production industries
have been able to supply when operating at optimal performance. The
greater variety in the size of markets for different products has
led companies to experiment with the organisation of systems. They
have attempted to align output fran their manufacturing system with
the demand for parts other than prototypes or mass-produced
standardized items. Most of these experiments have taken place in
the area of batch production because of the rigidity in mass
production systems. One such modification was the development of
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Group Technology (GT).
GT refers to the arrangement of groups of machines into self- 
contained cells in place of functional layout. The cells may be 
used to perform all the qperaticns necessary to manufacture a range 
of similar components that belong to the same family, as measured 
by their similarity in shape and size. GT's simplified flow of 
parts facilitates a reduction in inventories (Blackburn et al., 
1985).
The major advantage of this new arrangement, however, is the 
increased utilisation of labour and machinery: As tools, fixtures, 
gauging and inspection are all standardised the same operation may 
be performed on all of the parts in a family at a single point in 
time. This reduces the number of set-ups required and increases 
output from both machines and operators. In this respect Group 
Technology moved batch production towards the economies associated 
with mass production. Hcwever, Blackburn et al. (1985) warn against 
such a simple interpretation. There are a number of important 
variations between the integrated systems based on cellular 
organisation and the dedicated flowlines discussed above. In the 
former: (i) parts are produced in smaller batch sizes; (ii) a 
greater variety of pieces are machined; and, (iii) workers 
generally continue to exercise a wider range of skills and this 
facilitates continued flexibility.
The introduction of Group Technology did, hcwever, carry its 
own diseconomies which limited its appeal. It compounded the 
problems associated with scheduling by necessitating that different 
batches from the same family coincide with one another. So although 
it was initially adopted by about 10% of firms in batch production
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(Littler and Salaman, 1984) some of the companies subsequently 
reverted back to functional layout (Swords-Isherwood and Senker, 
1978).
Another way by which companies in batch production have sought 
to reduce the high levels of unit costs has been by the development 
of manufacturing strategies that aligned the deployment of their 
machine tools to the pattern of demand for their products. New and 
Myers (New, 1976; New and Myers, 1986) distinguish between systems 
that are used for "made-to-order” and ,lmade-for-stock" manufacture. 
"Made-to-order” refers to companies waiting until they receive 
definite orders from customers before producing each item. This is 
the conventional form of batch production. Whilst labour and 
machine utilisation are low and unit costs are high, these are 
subsidiary considerations for both producer and consumer. The key 
peformance criteria are how quickly a company can produce to their 
customers' specifications and whether or not they can be relied on 
to keep their promises.
In contrast, when a company adopts a "make-for-stock" 
manufacturing strategy, they aim to reduce unit costs by machining 
parts in larger batches to improve the levels of machine and labour 
utilisation. As New and Myers point out, companies pursuing these 
strategies do not fall into two distinct groups. A large number of 
firms pursue a combination of both strategies and use the same 
production facilities to "make-for-stock" and "make-to-order"; That 
is, they sometimes buy raw materials in advance and manufacture 
when receiving orders. Alternatively, they machine parts in advance 
and assemble when firm orders are received. However, such a 
strategy leads to a proliferation of inventories at key points in
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the company's manufacturing process.
One final modification that was made to conventional batch 
production was a change to the machinery employed. This involved 
the development of Numerical Control (NC) machine tools. Each 
conventional machine tool had been staffed by a highly skilled 
setter/operator. These were responsible for manipulating the 
numerous cranks, shafts and levers to guide the different tools 
along their different axes and machine each batch of parts into the 
desired shape. The operator would then reset the machine in 
preparation for the next batch. NC refers to a program in the form 
of a paper or plastic tape that contains coded numerical 
information. This is placed in the head of the machine tool and 
directs the different operations that have to be performed in the 
course of the machining of a part. Initial capital expenditure is 
increased because of the facility for storing a program but 
subsequent operating costs are reduced: levels of utilisation are 
ensured because the machine is directed by the tape which will have 
a more regular pattern than the operator. Thus, increases in 
productivity are achieved without jettisoning the flexibility in 
conventional batch production. However, flexibility has been 
compromised where companies have installed several NC machines and 
sought to reduce labour costs by introducing a division of labour 
between a small number of skilled setters and a larger number of 
lesser skilled operators. The overall impact of this development 
appears to have been minimal. For example, by 1976 when the concept 
of FMS was being developed, NC represented cnly 1.32% of all metal- 
cutting machine tools in Britain (Iredale, 1977).
The consequence of these developments in batch production has
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been to bring some modification to the preceding dichotomy of 
productivity exclusive to mass production systems and flexibility 
exclusive to batch production by making the latter more productive.
In summary, what has been explained here is that two forms of 
technical and organisational systems of production have preceded 
the development of computerised machine tools in the manufacturing 
sector. On the one side there have been Mass Production systems 
which used mechanised processes to guide production operations. 
This has offered companies the benefits of high productivity at the 
expense of high rigidity. The alternative has been conventional 
batch production which has relied on highly skilled personnel to 
guide production operations. Companies have only been able to 
benefit from the latter system's flexibility at the expense of 
inefficiency.
Rigidity and high capital risks or low levels of output and 
machinery have not been the only drawbacks of the respective 
systems. Both systems have, hitherto, incurred the costs of high 
inventories and indirect labour. Despite their weaknesses the 
systems are suited to the constant production of a single part or 
the machining of one-offs and prototypes respectively. But the 
pattern of demand for parts has been more varied than this. Thus, a 
degree of disjuncture has existed between the pattern of demand 
fran markets and a company's manufacturing facilities. Companies in 
batch production have tried to remedy this by re-organisation of 
their work systems, the employment of manufacturing strategies and 
the development of NC machine tools. These adaptions have not had a 
great impact in the economics of production systems and the choice 
confronting manufacturers has remained, largely, polarized.
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3.3 Alternative Computerised Production Systems.
The development of microprocessors allows information to be 
stored "artificially" on computer programs. lhis provides companies 
with a third option to the extant choices of building control over 
manufacturing processes into dedicated mechanized systems or 
allowing operators responsibility for direction of all operations. 
That is, the application of a microprocessor allows control of 
processes to be built into programs and stored and recalled when 
necessary to guide particular operations. The ability to adapt 
machine hardware to different purposes makes computerised systems 
more flexible than dedicated ones. The ability to co-ordinate 
effectively the use of different processes makes computerised 
systems more productive than conventional machine tools. Hcwever, 
microprocessors are not without their own diseconomies and 
drawbacks. Computer controlled systems are more expensive and less 
productive than single purpose machines. They are also more costly 
and less flexible than manually controlled systems. Humans employ a 
number of tacit skills (Kursterer, 1978) and are able to respond to 
contingencies as they arise whilst programs only follow 
instructions which are coded in advance (Dreyfus, 1972? Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986? Libetta, 1988). Thus, a space remains for the two 
preceding polars of conventional batch production and dedicated 
systems (3). Nevertheless, in the industries where companies have 
to machine a variety of parts and production conditions and demand 
are relatively predictable, computerisation offers a new and viable 
option.
Computerisation may be employed at different levels: machine 
level? system level? and, theoretically, factory level. However, it
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is not necessary to employ computers at sill levels. Companies may 
combine artificial intelligence with dedicated control or human 
intervention, to maximise either productivity or flexibility at 
particular stages of the manufacturing process, depending on their 
needs. The potential for different permutations has given rise to a 
range of computerised machine tools: Computer Numerically 
Controlled (CNC) machine tools; Flexible Manufacturing Cells (FMC); 
and, Flexible Transfer Lines (FTL); as well as FMS. These are more 
or less suitable for different companies depending on the pattern 
of demand for products from their markets. The availability of 
these other configurations limit the area of production where FMS 
may be employed economically. A brief description of the strengths 
and weaknesses of these different alternatives will illustrate this 
point.
CNC is a simple standalone system. It is effectively a NC 
machine with it's own computer attached. This allows the programs 
of machining instructions for different parts to be stored in the 
computer's memory. CNC is more expensive than NC because of the 
addition of a computer. However, ongoing savings are achieved 
through increased productivity: The system's computer allows 
amendments to be made to programs at the machine instead of 
returning the tapes to a central programming department. Also, 
local storage of a limited number of programs at the machine tool 
allows instant recall of the settings for the batches which sure 
machined most frequently. Both of these factors facilitate fast 
change-overs between jobs and higher levels of machine utilisation. 
Hcwever, as only sane of the setting and machining operations are 
under computer control, tasks such as monitoring of operations and
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loading and unloading have to be performed manually. Nonetheless, 
the degree of computerisation does make it possible for the 
operative to mind more than one machine. The presence of an 
operator and the limitation of programing costs to the part itself 
makes CNC suitable for machining small batch work that is required 
frequently.
The other new computer based systems link rachining centres to 
a wide range of other facilities and integrate a number of 
shopfloor operations. The flexible manufacturing cell (FMC) is the 
smallest of the integrated systems. It has only one general purpose 
CNC machine tool, but this is supplemented by a workpiece store, 
transport device and a tool change and storage facility. All of 
these are under the supervision of a computerised control system. 
Flexible manufacturing cells are more expensive to purchase than 
CNC because of their increased size and complexity. The main 
operational advantage that FMCs offer over standalone CNC machine 
tools is the ability to machine a limited number of different jobs 
in rapid succession to one another without any manual intervention. 
The impact of this is an estimated 50% improvement in productivity 
(Primrose and Leonard, 1985b). However, both the length of time of 
the system's unstaffed operation and the complexity of the parts 
that FMCs are able to machine is limited by the size of the cell. 
Thus, FMCs cue suitable for machining a relatively wide range of 
less complex parts, when there is recurring demand.
The system which mixes computerisation with dedicated 
processes is the flexible transfer line. (This is also known as: 
Direct Numerical Control (CNC) line (Browne et al., 1984); tandem 
type DNC (Hitomi, 1979); dedicated FMS (Groover, 1980).) It
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comprises:
"several automated universal or special purpose 
machine tools and further automated 
workstations as necessary, interlinked by an 
automated workpiece-flow system according to 
the line principle. It is capable of 
simultaneously or sequentially machining 
different workpieces which run through the 
systems along the same path. In order to 
balance differences in cycle time, setting 
times or short faults, buffers may be allocated 
between the stations.” (My emphasis. Wamecke,
1985: 4)
The advantages of FTL's are that they can utilise all of their 
constituent work stations to achieve high productivity and to 
machine complex parts. The scope of this complexity is determined 
by the aggregate of the machining capabilities of the machine tools 
in the system and is only restricted by their sequential order. The 
main weakness of FTL systems is the dedication which stems from 
their uni-directional conveyor. The range of parts that the system 
is able to machine is limited to those which undergo the same 
operations in exactly the same sequence. The only alternative to 
this is to bypass some workstations and lose the manufacturing 
capacity of seme of the system. As FTL's comprise a larger number 
of workstations than FMC their initial cost tends to be higher. 
This and their degree of rigidity makes them most suitable for 
large batch production of a limited range of parts for large and 
relatively stable markets.
The final configuration of computerised machine tools to have
been developed thus far is the flexible manufacturing system. The
DTI (1984) have defined FMS in the following way:
"Flexible manufacturing is a system which 
combines microelectronics and mechanical 
engineering .... A central on-line computer 
controls the machine tools and other work
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stations and the transfer of components and 
tooling. The computer also provides monitoring 
and information control.”
It is of value to elaborate on the constituent parts of FMS. 
This will highlight that, whilst it may be possible to employ IMS 
in all areas of production, the sophistication and cost of the 
system is likely to limit its application to areas not served by 
the systems already discussed.
Firstly, each system employs a number of the universal type of 
computer numerically controlled machine tool. These are able to 
operate along four or five axes which allows each workstation to 
machine the workpiece frcm a range of different angles. Secondly, 
each FMS will have a comprehensive range of tooling. The 
constituent machine tools are likely to have tool storage 
facilities of their own which may in turn be linked to the tooling 
stores of the other machines in the system and/ or a central 
automated tool store. The range of tooling will allow different 
parts to be machined in different ways. For example different sizes 
and depths of holes may be drilled.
Thirdly, a system's transport facility will either have the 
capacity to move parts frcm any machine to any other in any order, 
or along a given route to groups of machines performing similar 
functions such as milling or grinding, bypassing stages if 
necessary. The design of the transport system may also embody 
storage areas or buffer zones so that a batch may be held whilst 
one centre finishes machining the previous batch or, alternatively, 
to allow prioritised batches to bypass less urgent ones.
Finally, there is the degree of computerisation in the system. 
Each constituent element of the FMS will have its own ccnputer that
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transmits and receives information to and from the host computer 
that co-ordinates and supervises the whole process. The host 
ccnputer will analyse and transmit information such as schedules, 
machining operations to be carried out, tools required, etc. to 
ensure that parts arrive at the right time, at the right machining 
centre with the correct tooling. However, it will react to 
information frcm the system's sensory devices that warn of the wear 
on tools, breakages and other malfunctions. It should, therefore, 
be possible to load the raw castings of a range of different parts 
onto the system and the IMS should then be able to carry out all of 
the constituent processes before delivering the finished part to 
the unloading station.
Whilst it is possible to design FMS systems that have the 
technical capabilities of machining parts in pemutations of range 
and batch sizes, FMS is not economic for machining either 
prototypes and some small batch work or a limited range of parts 
desired in large batch sizes. Avlaritis and Parkinson (1981: 77, see 
also, Bessant and Heywood, 1985; 33) have argued that the other 
systems discussed above are more suited to small and large batch 
production. Thus, financially viable deployments of FMS are limited 
to mid-variety/ mid-volume production range. That is to say that 
they are best suited to the machining of a range of between 4 - 5 0  
parts that are required in volumes of between 50 - 2,000. Avlantis 
and Parkinsion (ibid.) claim that the other computerised systems 








1 - 1 0  
4 - 5 0  
30 - 500
200+
1,000 -  10,000 
50 - 2,000
20 - 500
1 - 5 0
In summary, this section has described hew the development of 
microprocessors allows a third option for the control of production 
processes. Instead of the preceding alternatives of building 
control into dedicated processes or making labour responsible for 
direction of work operations companies may use the information 
stored artificially on programs to direct production. This third 
option has given rise to a range of computerized machine tool 
configurations. Each of these have their own respective drawbacks 
and strengths vis-a-vis the preceding production systems of 
conventional machine tools and dedicated systems. Whether it is 
more beneficial for companies to elect computerised systems will 
depend on the extent to which the potential demand frcm a company's 
markets correspond with the range and variety of parts that each 
system is able to machine economically. Generally, FMS is only 
viable when a company caters for markets that demand a mid-sized 
range of parts in medium sized batches.
3.4 The Costs and Benefits of FMS.
If after considering the other manufacturing options a 
company's staff considers that FMS constitutes the system that 
corresponds most closely with the demand for the company's 
products, they still have to justify their investment in that 
system. Hcwever, because of their degree of complexity, IMS systems 
are expensive. When the majority of the systems surveyed in the 
course of this study were purchased in the early and mid-1980s,
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American estimates put the cost of a full-scale FMS encompassing 
computer controls, five or more machining centres and the 
accompanying transfer robots, at around $25 million. In comparison, 
a rudimentary flexible manufacturing cell built around a single 
machine tool was priced at around $325,000 and a conventional 
turning NC machine was priced at about $175,000 (Bylinsky and 
Moore? 1983) . In effect FMS can be more than 75 times more 
expensive than the former and over 140 times more expensive than 
the latter. It is, however, possible to purchase more cheaply. The 
cost of FMS systems covered by this study ranged from about 
£500,000 to £10 million.
Yet despite the system's high cost, the continued existence of
the preceding systems and the availability of alternative
computerised machine tool configurations a number of authors have
claimed that the potential constituency for economic deployment of
FMS will grow because of the system's capacity to exploit the
strengths and remedy the weaknesses of both conventional batch and
mass production. For example, Meegan (1988) has argued that FMS
will bring the benefits of batch production to mass production
systems. He says:
"With flexible manufacturing systems firms can 
shift production scale without any significant 
impact on overall operating costs - enjoying in 
the process what have come to be called 
economies of scope.These economies thus augment 
the economies of scale (the reduction in cost 
per unit of output) that the manufacture of 
standardized products in long production runs 
offer." (Meegan, 1988: 167. Original emphasis.)
Conversely, the DTI (1984) have argued that the use of FMS 
will spread not by bringing the advantages of flexibility to mass 
production but because the "combination of flexibility and overall
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control11 in IMS "makes possible the production of a wide range of 
products in small numbers" and brings "economies of scale to batch 
work".
Both of these claims tend to embody assumptions akin to those 
in theories of long term trajectories. Meegan's arguments, like 
those put forward by Jaikumar and Piore and Sabel, suggest that 
opportunities for economies of scale are in same way safe or no 
longer relevant. By contrast, the DTI, like the Neo-Fordists and 
Labour Process theorists are suggesting that there is something 
inherently superior in the principles of mass production. Any 
movement in their direction, thus, outweighs any costs incurred. It 
is these types of assumptions that this thesis objects to. As 
indicated above, regardless of any change in the direction of the 
economy, parameters to the areas where FMS may be employed 
economically are set by the availability of other computerised 
systems, more suited to machining economically parts that are 
required in particular range and batch sizes. What is more there 
are opportunity costs incurred when FMS is deployed. As intimated 
above, computerised systems may be more flexible than dedicated 
machinery and more productive than conventional machine tools, but 
they are also less productive than the former and less flexible 
than the latter. Further, some gains may not materialise as a 
consequence of a company pursuing a particular manufacturing 
strategy with their FMS. The limited benefits that may arise frcm 
the deployment of FMS may be understood through a detailed 
disaggregation of the types of financial advantage benefits that 
have been claimed for the system.
One employee of a major machine tool company (KLahorst, 1983)
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has proposed the following 14 point checklist of the potential 
savings which stem from the installation of FMS.
* Direct labour costs: These are reduced because of the greater 
number of personnel that are needed to staff conventional systems.
* Machine-setup costs: Reductions are achieved because it takes a 
greater length of time to reset a conventional machine after each 
batch has been machined.
* Tooling costs: More time is taken in locating tooling in 
conventional machine shops which also incur greater costs because 
tools are stored in separate areas in conventional machine shops.
* Materials handling costs: Conventional shops incur more costs in 
moving parts between conventional machines and also have to 
maintain the equipment used for this purpose.
* Part-inspection costs: Automated part inspection with FMS 
eliminates the need for separate inspection.
* Equipment-maintenanoe costs: Automated systems give early warning 
signs of such factors as tool wear and, therefore, reduce the need 
for subsequent repair.
* Shcp-supervision costs: The larger size of conventional shops and 
the greater number of machines necessitate a large number of 
supervisors. This is reduced with FMS.
* Producticn-control costs: Ihe integration of operations reduces 
the need for shop scheduling and part dispatch.
* Manufacturing-engineering costs: The incremental tooling and 
machine costs involved in changing equipment to new uses are 
reduced.
* Plant-facilities costs: The smaller size of integrated systems 
reduces the amount of space that is required.
* Inventory costs: Ihe integrated nature of new systems reduces the 
number of intermediate points where inventories accumulate.
* Fixturing costs: The large number of machines required in 
conventional shops means that there are more fixtures to be stored 
and maintained. These are reduced with integrated systems.
* Prototype and new-part costs: The staffing and machine costs 
incurred in introducing new parts are reduced with FMS because of 
the increased ease of transferring synergies.
* Rework and scrap costs: These are reduced due to the greater 
reliability of computerised systems.
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Other advocates for deployment of FMS have suggested other gains 
will also be achieved. These advantages include:
* Reduced Capital Costs (Primrose and Leonard, 1984; ILO, 1983): 
The higher levels of machine utilisation that are obtained from 
integrated systems and their adaptability to new uses leads to a 
reduction in the number of machines required and a reduction in 
overall capital costs.
* Faster Payments (Shevchuk, 1984): The reliability that stems from 
the introduction of FMS leads to customers paying up earlier and 
improves a company's cashflow and liquidity.
* Increased share of markets: Companies ability to vary the range 
of goods which they machine (Jaikumar, 1984) and their earlier 
delivery times due to the reduction in lead times allows them to 
capture new markets (Shewchuk, 1984).
In addition to the benefits that the systems bring, national 
Governments have introduced schemes which provided financial 
assistance to those firms that have introduced FMS (3).
In the light of the description given above of conventional 
batch production and mass production systems, it is easy to see hew 
the cost of prototypes are reduced where mass production systems 
had been enplcyed previously. However, this seems a less convincing 
proposition when considering conventional batch production. 
Whatever synergies sue transferred, some changes will have to be 
made to seme machining processes and scheduling of parts, etc. and 
some new programming costs will have to be incurred. These are 
unnecessary in conventional batch production. Similarly marry of the 
other gains such as direct labour, fixturing costs and capital 
costs may fall if conventional batch production had been employed 
previously, but are likely to rise if the companies had utilised 
mass production techniques.
The extent of some of the advantages that accrue to FMS may 
also be limited by the objectives which the company seeks to
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realise when deploying their system. It will be recalled from 
Chapter One of this thesis that three manufacturing philosophies 
were outlined. These were "Mass Production", "Flexible 
Manufacturing" and "Just-in-Time". The qualities of FMS allows 
pursuit of all three of these objectives to varying degrees. The 
speed at which FMS may be changed ever to produce different parts 
allows high levels of machine utilisation and reductions in direct 
labour costs which are associated with "Mass Production" 
objectives. Ihe computerised nature of FMS allows it to be used to 
machine a wide range of parts which is associated with "Flexible 
Manufacturing" objectives. Finally, the integration of processes 
and the ease of changeover to machine different parts allows the 
company to machine in the batch size that it requires parts and 
prevents the build up of stocks between different processes. This 
leads to reductions in inventories which are compatible with "Just- 
in-Time" objectives.
As explained in Chapter One, there is a tension between each 
of the three philosophies. At a given point there will be a trade­
off between the gains realised from pursuing one objective and loss 
of gains associated with one or both of the others. For example, 
inventory reductions will be compromised if companies want to 
utilise their system at all times in pursuit of "Mass Production" 
objectives regardless of levels of demand. Flexibility gains are 
compromised if companies only carry the materials that are 
necessary to machine the parts in their existing range and for 
which they have firm orders. There is a similar trade-off between 
realising a strategy of "Mass Production" which entails maximising 
machining time in pursuit of high production output and the
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possibility of realising "Flexible Manufacturing" objectives and 
producing the widest range of goods. Yet seme advocates of FMS have 
claimed that marked gains in all areas may be realised. For 
example, the Institute of Production Engineers (1986) have claimed 
that new parts may be introduced onto systems which realise 73% 
reductions in inventories and a system utilisation of 95%. This is 
not bourne out by this research. To anticipate the discussion in 
the subsequent chapters, companies that either introduced new parts 
onto their systems, or sought marked gains in inventories, rarely 
expected or achieved levels of utilisation of 90% or above.
It should also be stated the scale of many of the claimed 
advantages of IMS have often proved optimistic and difficult to 
realise in practice. For example, capital and plant reductions may 
not be that significant. One survey found that 66% of installing 
firms overspent on their initial capital cost projections (Kbchan, 
1984). Space reductions are often immaterial because companies do 
not have alternative uses for the area (Bessant, Bcwen, Dickson and 
Marsh, 1981, cf. Littler and Salaman 1984: 97). Furthermore, 
anticipated levels of machine utilisation of the new systems assume 
ideal conditions. Ihe likelihood is that "this will be compromised 
by breakdowns, resetting requirements and problems in planning and 
organisation" (Ebel: 1985). It is also likely that using the same 
hardware for different purposes will not have a significant impact 
on overall costs as software costs will continue to rise. The 
application of microelectronics to devices suitable for industrial 
uses, such as batch production machine tools, tend to be user 
specific, concentrating programming and development costs at 
individual firms. As a consequence software costs may eventually
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outstrip hardware costs by a margin of 8:1 (Bessant, Bowen, Dickson 
and Marsh; 1981).
In summary, FMS systems are expensive. Despite this, some 
authors claim a potentially wide constituency for these systems 
because they promise the original benefits while alleviating the 
costs of both mass production and conventional batch production 
systems. It has been argued here that these gains are often 
overstated. Practical problems often prevent gains from being 
realised. Most importantly, advocates also fail to recognise that 
the potential for any economic benefits are bound within limits by 
the preceding production arrangements, cheaper alternative computer 
based systems and a company's manufacturing strategy when 
introducing FMS.
3.5 Conclusion.
The objective of this Chapter has been to describe the area 
where FMS systems may be employed economically and to detail the 
advantages that such deployments offer. It has been explained that, 
generally, it is only possible to realise economically viable 
production with FMS when machining a mid-variety range of products 
in medium sized batches. The financial gains that arise from such 
uses are relative to the weaknesses in the preceding production 
arrangements and the possible pursuit of a particular manufacturing 
strategy. Now that the issue of the financial benefits of FMS has 
been explained it is possible to assess the criticisms that 
accounting practices are failing to recognise those benefits. This 
is the objective of the next Chapter.
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Footnotes.
(1) It is appropriate to reiterate here what was stated in Chapter 
One. lhat is, that theories of the long term trajectories present 
accurate accounts of the merits and drawbacks of the two systems. 
Ihe objection raised in this thesis is not that these two forms of 
production have not existed butbhow their existence has been used 
to theorize the trajectories.
(2) Ihe employment of semi-skilled workers is by no means a pre­
requisite of mass production. It is just more likely. In the course 
of the 1970s the problem of disaffected workers in mass production 
industries did lead to some experiments in re-organisation of the 
line and the extension of shopfloor operatives responsibilities. 
However, such experiments were confined to a small number of 
companies. (See, Littler and Salaman, 1984: 81 - 90, for details.)
(3) What is being argued here is that economists' notions of 
economies of scale are still applicable in some circumstances. It 
is not the view of this author that any type of moral case can be 
made for the de-humanising forms of work that have often 
accompanied the pursuit of such economies. Ihere are also strong 
eccncxnic arguments against "Fordist” types of methods. As explained 
above, they are often accompanied by many diseconomies.
(4) In Britain, the AMT scheme, which allowed companies that were 
installing any type of computer based systems to apply for grants, 
was succeeded in 1981 by the FMS scheme. Ihis directed Government 
support at those companies that installed FMS. It allowed companies 
to claim grants towards the development costs and costs of all 
necessary capital equipment associated with installing a brand new 
system or towards the incremental costs of reconfiguring existing 
equipment (Sims, 1983). From 1981 the amount available was 25% of 
the costs incurred and in 1982 this was increased to one-third. Ihe 
Government made available £60 million for the scheme and announced 
that no new funding would be made available after that money had 
been spent (FMS Magazine, 1985). By the end of 1987, 98 companies 
had been offered assistance under the scheme and 87 firms had taken 
up the offer. At that point £40 million had been committed by 
offering companies assistance although another £20 million had been 
offered to companies that had proposed to install industrial 




The main objective of this research is to investigate whether 
cost control discourages the best use of FMS by its failure to 
recognise the expenditure and output profile associated with that 
deployment. This thesis has argued that the deployment of FMS must 
be perceived as the culmination of a process of technical change 
and that pre-investment justifications are employed earlier in this 
process. These provide a forecast of a company's future economic 
behaviour that cost control is then expected to enact. As biases 
are reported to exist at the pre-investment stage (Primrose and 
Leonard, 1984a; 1984b; Primrose, 1988) their impact must be 
investigated if the influence of cost control is to be isolated.
The objectives of this Chapter are to describe how the 
qualities of accounting practices are alleged to discriminate 
against the introduction and deployment of FMS for given types of 
purposes and to assess the validity of these claims by reference to 
the hitherto evidence. This chapter does not challenge the 
arguments that there is a divergence between the logic and 
categories in accounting practices, as explained by their critics, 
and the patterns of expenditure demanded for certain types of 
deployment of IMS. Thus, there may be the potential for IMS to be 
misused if accounting practices were to be employed in the way 
described. However, it will be argued that the validity of these 
arguments are undermined by their advocates failure to: (i) explain 
hew it is possible for accountants to inpose inappropriate criteria 
on a new system that they have no knowledge of; and, (ii) identify 
how the actual use of FMS differs from that which was initially
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intended by the installing companies. This chapter will progress 
from a brief discussion of the nature of accounting through an 
examination of the mechanics of specific practices, their alleged 
biases and a report of the existing evidence of their impact cn the 
deployment of FMS. Once the nature of accounting practices and 
weaknesses have been addressed it will then 'e possible to turn to 
the findings of this study.
4.2 The Nature of Accounting,
In her history of cost accountancy in Britain, loft describes
the practice of accounting as:
"the translation of records concerning diverse 
objects and events into a common terminology, 
that of money" (1988: 39 - 40)
In effect, it is a system of representing objects and events by 
their financial values. The medium used, money, has value inside 
and outside of a company. This allows a company's personnel to 
convert objects and events from the outside vrorld into the firm and 
vice versa. The company is, thus, able to conceptualize a scenario 
that entails the purchase of a system and its use to manufacture 
parts for sale in the market. The rules of mathematics and binary 
algebra can then be employed in advance of that scenario taking 
place to calculate whether the positive values of the anticipated 
changes in the company's performance outweigh the cost of 
purchasing the system. The calculations provide the bases of pre­
investment justification techniques. If a decision is taken to 
enact a change the initial calculations can be used both to 
communicate to staff the financial or physical standards of 
performance that are expected from them and, to subsequently
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measure hew well they are performing. This provides the essence of 
cost control. However, different authors have argued that: (a) pre- 
investment evaluation techniques fail to express accurately the 
existence and extent of some of the dimensions of performance of 
FMS systems? and (b) post-installation cost control makes 
inappropriate assumptions of proportional relationships between the 
different dimensions of performance of FMS systems. Hus results in 
FMS either not being introduced in the first instance or, if 
installed, not being deployed for their most advantageous purposes. 
The mechanics of the different practices and the validity of the 
criticisms made will be examined in turn.
4.3 Pre-investment Justifications (1).
There were two main types of pre-investment appraisal 
technique used at the companies visited in the course of this 
research: Payback and Discounted Cash Flow (DCF). Of the two 
methods payback is the oldest, easiest and least expensive to 
employ. Its application entails quantifying the gross savings that 
stem from the introduction of a new system over the time allowed 
for recovery of the investment or "payback period”. This is 
generally two years. If the savings, or incremental gains over 
other alternative new systems, are greater than the cost of 
purchasing and installing a new system, or the incremental cost of 
purchasing the alternative system, the purchase goes ahead. If no 
such returns are promised, the investment will be rejected. The 
merit of employing payback to assess the value of a prospective 
investment is that if the proposed system meets the payback 
criteria rapid recovery of the initial expenditure is realised.
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This is essential when there is an element of risk to the 
investment (Robson, 1979).
Payback originates from a time when companies were only 
involved in one line of business. The different effects of 
competing investments on a company's overall profitability 
corresponded with the respective levels of improvement which each 
brought to the single production process. Directors' comparisons of 
different payback periods were, thus, an adequate measure of the 
value of the investment to the company as a whole. Since that time 
there has been the development of corporate forms of organisation 
and companies have multiplied their product range. It is now more 
difficult to measure the relative effect on overall profitability 
of alternative items of expenditure in the different areas of a 
company. As a consequence, criticisms have been made of payback 
techniques from within accounting circles.
The general drawbacks of payback methods are: (i) they do not 
examine the opportunity cost of an investment as payback ignores 
the benefits that might have been realised had the same sum been 
invested elsewhere in the company; (ii) the true value of competing 
investment proposals are not calculated as payback ignores the 
period after the initial two years when returns are likely to be 
generated; and (iii) the changing value of money over time will 
distort the value of the cost of the system vis-a-vis the returns 
generated up to 24 months later. Uiese weaknesses in payback led to 
accountants developing DCF techniques, after they had first 
assimilated economists' concepts of inflation and opportunity costs 
(Parker, 1969: 17 et seq, 59).
DCF is considered to be a superior method to payback because
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it embodies the concept of the opportunity cost of pursuing one 
investment rather than another and recognises the changing value of 
money (Sizer, 1975). The application of DCF demands that the 
company estimates the future cashflows that stem frcm investment in 
a particular piece of equipment over the course of its assumed 
lifesp>an. This should include the total incomes for each year 
including revenues from sales, tax concessions, investment grants 
and any scrap value that remains after the equipment has exceeded 
its useful life. The present value of the returns that accrue in 
future years is determined by multiplying the current value by the 
discount rate (2). The firm can calculate the sum of profit by 
deducting the cost of the initial investment from the aggregate of 
incane generated. The rate of profit is calculated by dividing the 
aggregate profit by the sum of investment. Where alternative 
proposals are being considered the firm will decide which 
investment promises the best return and invest accordingly. It is 
the comparisons of potential rates of profit that embodies the 
notion of opportunity costs. DCF appraisals are more expensive to 
conduct than payback and yet they often offer no marked differences 
in recommendation (Robson, 1979). This is an important reason for 
the continued use of the latter method.
There are clearly variations in the methods of p>ayback and 
DCF. However, the initial calculations in each should include 
determining the value of the output that a system's capacity can 
manufacture, quantifying any additional advantages that accrue from 
employing the system and assessing whether the total of these over 
the system's lifetime outweighs the cost of it's purchase. Broadly 
speaking there are three typ)es of criticisms that are made of how
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such an assessment discriminates against FMS systems. Firstly, 
accounting techniques tend to understate the potential capacity of 
FMS. Secondly, pre-investment appraisals do not recognise the full 
range of the benefits that FMS brings. Thirdly, pre-investment 
appraisal techniques understate the FMS system's lifespan. The 
authors that put forward these arguments claim that these 
weaknesses discourage companies from introducing FMS. Hcwever, this 
thesis is concerned with explaining the influence of accounting 
practices on the eventual pattern of deployment of FMS. It will, 
therefore, extend these arguments to show that as the pre­
investment justification generates expectations of the post­
installation performance of systems, the alleged weaknesses in pre­
investment justifications may also be perceived as having the 
potential to direct FMS towards large volume production of a 
limited range of parts, if systems cure installed. The nature of 
each of these alleged failings will be considered in turn.
(i) Definition of capacity of FMS used in pre-investment 
justifications.
New production equipment is generally installed to provide 
either replacement or additional capacity for known markets. The 
pre-investment justification, therefore, assumes the system to have 
a specific and consistent use. Ihe value of the system is assessed 
with that use in mind. Capacities of conventional, dedicated 
systems are known but, as was explained in Chapter Three, these may 
be rendered redundant by changes in markets because the system 
cannot be adapted to new uses. FMS, by contrast, are plastic 
systems. They may be adapted to the specific needs of individual
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firms and their potential uses may be proliferated over time. As a 
consequence IMS have a more pronounced learning curve and are 
unlikely to realise their full potential capacity for a number of 
years (Charlish, 1983). This particular weakness in pre-investment 
justifications is most likely to discourage the deployment of 
systems that are introduced to manufacture the widest ranges of 
parts. This is because this type of deployment is most likely to 
have the highest cost, realise lowest capacity at the outset when 
development work is conducted, but will also enjoy the greatest 
additions to capacity in the long term. Alternatively, by setting 
expectations that returns will be constant throughout a system's 
life, this weakness in pre-investment justifications may encourage 
a company to use whatever system they do introduce for large batch 
production of a limited range of goods, regardless of the company's 
intentions when introducing the system, as it is this use which is 
most likely to facilitate realisation of constant levels of output 
from the outset.
The definition of capacity espoused by pre-investment
justifications is also deemed to be biased against the introduction
of FMS because it fails to recognise the systems capability of
gaining physical capacity. Extra machine tools may be added to the
oonfiguration and, unlike with conventional machinery, the existing
computer facility allows these additions to take place without a
parallel increase in the price of the system (Charlish, 1983).
Hayes and Jaikumar express this in the following terms:
"factories are often modernised through a 
series of independent projects, each 
justifiable in its own dollar terms until, 
eventually, a way is found to link these 
individual islands of automation into a
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profitable whole.
Unfortunately, this approach is often not 
appropriate when moving toward computerised 
autanaticn. No cne caponent of a CTM network - 
a parts rationalisation system, a CAD system, 
an FMS, a plant-floor data collection and 
information system, or a customer communication 
system - may be able to meet a company's 
profitability requirements. Ihe desired returns 
materialise only when all these advances are in 
place.” (Hayes and Jaikumar, 1988? pp 81.)
This weakness in pre-investment justifications is likely to affect
all proposed FMS systems regardless of their intended use.
With reference to the first argument, it is difficult to 
perceive any logical reason why the personnel responsible for 
composing pre-investment justifications cannot report gains in the 
range and value of parts produced. However, as there is no 
empirical evidence to support or refute this argument it will be 
given further consideration in the latter part of this thesis.
It is possible to offer a more conclusive rebuttal of the 
second argument. Disproportionate increases to the sum of physical 
capacity vis-a-vis the cost of purchasing the hardware are unlikely 
to materialise. Many firms are organised hierarchically with 
investment initiatives originating from a number of separate 
departments (Jones, forthcoming). Thus, systems are introduced as 
discrete projects rather than as a movement to CIM (Bessant and 
Haywood, 1985: 1987). No-one in the firm has a perspective on how 
benefits could stem from integration (Finnie, 1986). The absence of 
such a perspective from the cutset often leads companies to install
*
potential components of CIM that are incompatible with cne another. 
They cannot be integrated subsequently (Bessant and Haywood, 1985; 
54) .
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(ii) Benefits of FMS that are recognised by Pre-Investment 
Justification Techniques.
It was reported in Chapter Three that there are a range of 
systems which may be used to machine a variety of goods in batches 
of various sizes. These are often less expensive than FMS. 
Historically the purpose of introducing machinery was to increase 
efficiency by reducing, labour. (See, for example, Whitmore, 1906.) 
The extra expense of IMS cannot be justified cn the basis of labour 
savings alcne. As reported in Chapter Three, there are a wide range 
of other gains that may accrue to companies after their 
installation of FMS. However, locating a new system in a specific 
area, or cost/ budget centre, encourages personnel to concentrate 
their attention on advantages that arise in that area when 
conducting the pre-investment appraisal. Such a myopic focus is 
inadequate for articulating many of the gains associated with FMS 
as these arise elsewhere in the enterprise. Most notably pre- 
investment justifications fail to express: reduced inventory which 
arise through the integration of different processes and the 
machining of goods in smaller batches (Hutchinson and Holland, 
1982? Hutchinson, 1984; Kriegler, 1984; Primrose and Leonard, 
1985a) ? faster cash turnover due to more reliable delivery dates 
(Shewchuk, 1984) ? reduced floor space, better quality and improved 
response time (Kaplan, 1986)? increased market share due to 
improvements in efficiency (Skidmore, 1986) ? and the ability to 
machine a new range of goods or the present range in a new mix as 
the markets change (Jones and Scott, 1986).
Primrose and Leonard (1984a? 1984b? 1985a? 1985b; 1986? 
Primrose, 1988) anticipate that unless these "intangible" benefits
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are quantified and represented in investment appraisals companies 
will not invest in an FMS when it offers the best financial 
returns. Alternatively, they will invest speculatively in an FMS 
when another type of configuration would be more suited to their 
needs (Primrose and Leonard; 1984a: 131).
It may also be argued that this failing in pre-investment 
justifications leads companies to use their systems to produce a 
limited range of goods in large batches regardless of their initial 
intentions. In other words, as labour savings are most likely to be 
realised when large batches are produced the expression and pursuit 
of reductions in staffing will create a tendency towards the large 
volume production of a limited range of goods which is not 
countered by the pursuit of other gains.
There are, however, a number of reasons for questioning the 
extent to which pre-investment justifications are not representing 
accurately the potential benefits of FMS. Firstly, some authors may 
be overstating the potential benefits that arise following the 
introduction of FMS. It was argued in Chapter Three that some 
advantages associated with FMS may be mutually exclusive of one 
another. Ihe realisation of scxne advantages depends on the extent 
to which a company intends to use its system for one the three 
manufacturing philosophies of "Mass Production", "Flexible 
Manufacturing" and "Just-in-Time". It was also argued that the 
extent to which any advantage of FMS appears as a gain is relative 
to the company's preceding production arrangements. Therefore, any 
inability of pre-investment justifications to articulate certain 
types of advantages that are associated with FMS must be located in 
the context of the company's preceding production arrangements and
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objectives in deploying FMS. Secondly, there is some evidence that 
new advantages associated with the manufacturing philosophy of 
"JIT” are being reported in companies' pre-investment 
justifications. Jones and Scott (1985) report that in their study 
of firms that have introduced FMS inventory gains outweighed labour 
savings in importance. Thirdly, sane of the costs, and particularly 
those associated with "Flexible Manufacturing" objectives, may be 
being understated in pre-investment evaluations. T.C. Jones (1990b) 
observes that conventional accounting practices often underestimate 
the post-installation costs such as software that are associated 
with CIM. He suggests that this may be perceived as compensation 
for any tendency to understate benefits.
Clearly, the relationship between the deployment of FMS, 
manifestation of costs and benefits and their subsequent 
representation in pre-investment appraisals is a more complex one 
than critics suggests and requires further investigation.
(iii) Concept of lifetime used in pre-investment justifications.
Most British firms use non-discounting investment appraisal 
methods such as payback (Parker, 1969? Primrose, Bailey and 
Leonard, 1984). These lead companies to expect recovery of an 
initial investment to take place within a limited number of years. 
As a consequence, payback methods favour less expensive systems 
which promise easier recovery of the initial investment and 
discriminate against all expensive systems including FMS. Payback 
also discriminates against FMS more specifically because FMS 
possess a number of interactive interfaces that need to be aligned 
with one another and this takes time. The long gestation period
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delays the point from when recovery of the investment takes place, 
thus, making appear not viable when assessed by payback methods 
(Primrose and Leonard, 1984a; 1986). This factor can also be 
perceived to discourage using any system that is introduced for the 
machining of a wide range of parts regardless of the company's 
initial intentions because such deployments require the longest 
gestation period due to their greater complexity.
Authors disagree on whether firms build sufficient length of 
time into DCF calculations. Primrose and his colleagues (Primrose, 
Baily and Leonard, 1984; Primrose and Leonard, 1984a; 1984b; 1986.) 
argue that DCF techniques could be used to redress the problem of 
the limited life afforded to IMS by payback methods. In contrast to 
this, Jones (1988; forthcoming) suggests that DCF techniques also 
understate the amortisation period of FMS. It does not appear 
unreasonable to argue that as DCF methods calculate returns over a 
longer period than payback they discriminate less against FMS than 
do payback methods. However, it may be that DCRs are being set too 
high (Kaplan, 1986).
International comparisons give prima facie support to the 
argument that western companies are understating the potential 
lifespan of FMS. Companies in Japan do not use such short term 
methods of appraisal as those in the West (Kaplan, 1986). More FMS 
systems have been introduced into Japanese firms than into 
companies in Britain or the USA (Bessant and Haywood, 1985: 20; The 
Economist, 30/5/87: 10). However, there are other possible 
explanations for national variations in the number of 
installations. The Japanese system of "Zaibatsu" encourages long 
term development and investment whilst western style free trading
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encourages pursuit of short term goals (Hill, 1981: Jones and 
Graves, 1986). Any variation in the amortisation period allowed by 
accounting practices may, therefore, be epiphenomenal 
manifestations of deeper structural differences.
British studies that have examined the influence of 
justification techniques on the introduction of new systems have 
rarely been addressed directly at FMS. Nonetheless, their findings 
tend to suggest that companies' use of appraised techniques that 
measure returns over a short period do not always deter companies 
from investing in computer based manufacturing systems. Bessant and 
Haywood (1987) investigated the methods of appraisal that small to 
medium sized firms in Britain used to justify FMC. They found that 
7 cut of the 8 companies had been able to justify their investment 
using payback of three years or less. Woods et al. (1985) 
researched the techniques used by firms to evaluate the wide range 
of systems that fall under the umbrella title of CAD/CAM. They also 
found that over one third (ie, 16 companies) were able to justify 
their investment using payback. What is also significant about 
Woods et al. 's findings is that a number of companies introduced 
their systems without conducting a financial appraisal. (See also: 
Arnold and Senker, 1983; Arnold, 1985.)
Woods et al. 's findings that accounting criteria are often not 
deployed as an effective evaluation technique receives sane support 
fran two studies that address directly the introduction of FMS. The 
first is that conducted by New and Myers (1986). They found that 
two-thirds of the firms that had introduced FMS had received 
negative payback. New and Myers do not make it clear whether this 
had been anticipated at the cutset or simply materialised after the
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system had been installed. Thus, different interpretations may be 
put on their findings. Firstly, payback methods would be 
prohibitive if they were employed effectively before the investment 
took place because sufficient returns cannot be earned over a short 
period and so payback methods do lead companies to view systems as 
not viable. Such an interpretation would support the arguments of 
Primrose and his colleagues. An alternative interpretation of New 
and Myer's findings is that payback techniques were used prior to 
the investments taking place but they are of little relevance 
because companies ignore their conclusions and still invest. If the 
latter interpretation is correct, accounting would appear to have 
minimal influence within the enterprize. Ihe findings of the second 
study are more conclusive. Finnie (1986) reports that some of the 
companies that introduced FMS using traditional financial 
justifications were only able to achieve this by managers 
submitting spurious figures in order to win accountants' approval 
for the investment. This suggests that accountants have minimal 
influence in the decision of whether or not to invest. A discussion 
of the influence of accounting on FMS must, therefore, investigate 
both the content of the accounting calculations and whether the 
people responsible for composing those calculations believed them 
to represent FMS and were capable of using them as such.
Summary and discussion.
Management accounting entails attributing money values to 
different dimensions of a firm's performance as a means of planning 
and controlling a firms expenditure to ensure that a profit is 
obtained. Ihe pre-investment evaluation techniques of payback and
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DCF entail: estimating both the quantities of additional parts that 
a new system can machine and the nature of other changes to a 
company's manufacturing performance; representing these by the 
financial values that will accrue to a carpany over the lifetime of 
the system; and, calculating whether these offset the cost of 
purchasing the machinery. Critics have argued that financial 
appraisal techniques discourage investment in FMS by 
misrepresenting the system's value by systematically understating 
it's capacity, potential manufacturing advantages and lifetime.
It has been suggested here that if these criticisms of pre­
investment evaluations are correct, the profile of expected system 
performance that is projected, may result in any IMS system that is 
introduced being used to machine a relatively limited range of 
parts, regardless of the company's initial intentions. There is 
certainly prima facie evidence to support such an argument. For 
example, FMS systems have been introduced primarily for the 
machining of large batch vrork in Britain (Jones and Scott, 1985) as 
well as in a number of other countries including Italy (Rocca, 
1988) and the USA (Jones, forthcoming). But this evidence 
indicates, at most, a correlative relationship rather than a causal 
one. Empirical research to support arguments about the weaknesses 
in pre-investment evaluations is limited. As indicated above, the 
evidence that is available is rarely located in a context that 
allows insights into the improvements that new systems offer over a 
company's preceding manufacturing facilities when deployed for a 
company's specified purposes. Chapter Six will aim to provide such 
an account by investigating the motives that companies had for 
introducing FMS and whether they were able to employ pre-investment
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justifications that expressed these objectives.
What is clear from the available evidence is that the 
composition of some pre-investment evaluations are either 
consciously (Finnie, 1986) or unconsciously (Jones, 1990b) 
representing FMS more favourably than is warranted. As the 
representation of the lifetime of the system, the benefits that
r'
materialise from the system's introduction and the capacity of the 
system are locked together in a single equation, overstatement of 
one may compensate for underestimation of the others.
This overstatement of the manufacturing strengths of IMS, and 
accountants' failure to realise this, confirms what was argued in 
Chapter Two above that management accounting is neither as 
pervasive nor as omnipotent as the criticisms of accounting 
practices imply. Indeed, Finnie's arguments suggest the opposite. 
That is, accounting is actually powerless. However, Finnie's 
claims, like the arguments of accounting's critics, suggests a 
clear disjuncture between the content of accounting calculations 
and the reality that they attenpt to represent. Chapter Two above 
suggested that such a dis juncture was unlikely as engineers who 
proposed the introduction of new systems and accountants who 
supervise the application of accounting techniques perform roles 
that are integral to one another in the process of technical 
change. Accountants are reliant on engineers to provide them with 
information about the system that is to be evaluated. As Finnie 
recognises, this provides engineers with the opportunity to 
hoodwink accountants. However, that information is then used to 
compile standards by which the system and engineers are monitored. 
This should provide protection against deliberate subterfuge.
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Chapter Five will elaborate on how this relationship between 
accountants and engineers, and any divergences frcm it, is manifest 
in capital sanctioning route.
4 .4  P o s t - in s ta l la t io n  c o s t c o n tro l.
Cost control monitors the performance of manufacturing systems 
against appropriate standards to ensure that financial performance 
is as anticipated. When new systems are introduced those standards 
are derived from the projections in pre-investment justifications. 
Thus, whatever uses companies expressed for their system in the 
pre-investment justification, and any biases in the techniques 
used, would be embodied in standards of cost control.
There are two main forms of cost control, audits and ongoing 
cost monitoring. Audits provide a single retrospective picture of 
the performance of a system over a long term period. Ongoing cost 
monitoring is the everyday husbanding of resources to ensure that 
in each short-term period, expenditure and manufacture is at the 
rate anticipated. Critics argue that ongoing cost control practices 
assume a constant relationship between expenditure of resources and 
output. It then seeks to ensure that that relationship remains 
constant. This is alleged to introduce new biases at the stage of 
post-installation cost control. These claims will be explained in 
more detail below. First the influence of post audits will be 
considered.
P o s t-a u d its .
The post-audit is used at a single point in time to measure 
and report the performance of a system along the parameters built
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into the initial appraisal. Far example, the levels of staffing and 
tooling costs will be compared with those anticipated at particular 
levels of operation. Audits may be carried out by the staff 
responsible for introducing the system, or by others as a form of 
combined check on the performance of the machinery and the 
individual who initiated its introduction. The time and the farm of 
an audit will vary according to the purpose that it is expected to 
meet. For instance, if the objective is simply to check that 
expenditure has not exceeded the original budget or to identify the 
area where expenditure did exceed forecasts, the check may be 
performed immediately after the system's installation. If the aim 
is to assess whether the rate of return or the length of payback 
matches that which was originally anticipated, the audit would be 
carried out at the end of the project's useful life. Regardless of 
the designated goals, once any form of audit or appraisal has been 
conducted, and the systems peformance is perceived as satisfactory, 
further audits are unlikely (Gadella, 1985).
The critics of current accounting practices have not subjected 
post audits to the same close scrutiny as other forms of cost 
control. This may be because, as several authors have argued, post 
audits of FIS have only rarely been performed. Several reasons have 
been given for this including: FMS are too recent an innovation for 
audits to have been performed on them (Yates, 1986) ? the project 
champion whose status and career may be at stake has a vested 
interest in post-audits not taking place (Bessant and Haywood, 
1987); and, companies do not have the mechanisms for recording the 
non-productivity gains. Finnie (1986) reported that 20 of the 22 
companies in his study had not developed any techniques for
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assessing the non-prodnctivity gains of FMS. Nonetheless, audits 
could highlight where actual performance diverges from that which 
was projected and whether this has been to the advantage or 
disadvantage of the company. This could provide valuable 
information for both advocates and sceptics of the merits of FMS. 
Ihe failure to evaluate the inpact of audits on FMS is, therefore, 
a notable omission which this thesis will seek to remedy.
C ost C o n tro l.
Chapter Two explained that budgets of different types play an 
important role in ongoing cost control: Companies identify their 
anticipated output for a given year and the resources that each 
department would require to meet those objectives. The money 
required to purchase these resources is then allocated to a 
department's budget. Although this sum is likely to be linked to 
projections of the pre-investment evaluation, in subsequent years 
the determination of the budget will be a subject of negotiation 
(Otley, 1989? Roberts and Scapens, 1990).
One of the ways that companies can seek to ensure that 
departments keep within their budget is by defining what the 
expenditure of one of the inputs should be to obtain given output 
levels. Both the level of expenditure of that input and the volume 
of output are then monitored on a regular bases to ensure that they 
remain reconciled with one another. It is this practice which is 
alleged to result in FMS being directed towards the undesirable end 
of large volume production of a limited range of goods (Jaikumar, 
1984? 1986? Jones and Scott, 1986? Skinner, 1986) The tendency 
towards productivity is often accentuated by payment systems that
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reward workers for high output (Wheatley, 1989). The validity of 
each of these claims will be examined in turn.
( i )  In p u t-O u tp u t M easurem ent.
Although there is some variation in the criticisms made of 
cost control, the general argument of the different writers is as 
follows. The input-output measurement assumes a constant 
relationship between the two. Input is measured in terms of either 
labour hours employed (Jones and Scott, 1986: 7? Skinner, 1986; 
57), or level of machine utilisation (Jaikumar, 1984: 23; 1986: 
71). Output is measured in terms of volume of output (Jaikumar, 
1984: 26; Jones and Scott, 1986: 7). A quotient which gives an 
indication of the performance of a system is determined by dividing 
the output by the input. Any variance fran that level is considered 
unacceptable (Skinner, 1986: 57). The consequence of this is an 
emphasis on high levels of productivity from a system (Jaikumar, 
1984: 26; 1986: 71). In the absence of any development of 
flexibility measures (Kaplan, 1983: 693) systems are directed 
toward the production of a limited range of goods in large batch 
sizes.
There is a clear logic in this argument. Accounting 
calculations that assume a constant relationship between resources 
are likely to lead to undesired consequences if no such 
relationship should exist in the deployment of IMS. Jaikumar offers 
a comparison between the use of FMS in USA and Japan to support the 
above arguments. In the former, the restrictive cost control 
practices are employed, whereas, in the latter, cost control 
practices do not concentrate on minimising labour costs or
143
maximising machine uptime. Jaikumar found that: on average, only 
ten parts were machined on US FMS systems ccnpared to 93 in Japan; 
the annual volume of each part produced in the US on an FMS system 
was 1727 compared with 258 in Japan; and, the number of new parts 
introduced onto an existing FMS each year was one in American firms
compared with 22 in Japan (Jaikumar, 1986). Other surveys of IMS
/?
confirm Jaikumar's findings that Japanese systems are generally 
more flexible them those in the US (Bessant and Haywood, 1985? 
Jones, Forthcoming).
But, again this evidence only indicates a correlative 
relationship rather than a causal one. The latter would require 
evidence that western canpanies had intended machining a ccnparable 
range of parts to that machined by Japanese systems but had not 
done so because of cost control practices. Jaikumar fails to 
establish this. Further, the case of Japanese ccnpanies can be used 
as supportive of alternative arguments. As reported in Chapter One 
Jaikumar's research found that Japanese systems were not only more 
flexible than those deployed in America they were also more 
productive. Finally, like their counterparts who criticise pre- 
investment j ustifications, critics of cost control methods claim a 
disjuncture between accounting practices and engineering systems 
that this thesis has suggested may not be possible. If such a 
disjuncture did exist these authors would have to address 
themselves to a number of other issues which they have not done 
hitherto. For example, if accounting discourages flexible 
deployment of FMS how was it possible for FMS systems to be 
introduced in the first instance? How do accountants define what 
are low, acceptable and high levels of output frcm FMS? What effect
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do biases in pre-investment justifications have on this? There is 
clearly a need far research that locates the impact of cost control 
within the context of a company's motivations for introducing FMS 
and a more detailed account of the organisation of accounting 
protocol at a firm.
( i i )  Reward s tru c tu re s  and em ployee com m itm ent.
The second criticism of cost control practices is that 
proposed by Wheatley (1989). He has argued that piecework forms of 
payment are aligned with volume of output. This leads operatives to 
actively discourage the use of any system vhich threatens to reduce 
aggregate total output and the level of their bonus. Reduced 
aggregate output may be perceived as a likely outcome if companies 
were to employ FMS systems for purposes other than the large volume 
production of a limited range of goods. “Flexible Manufacturing” 
purposes lead to loss of system time and contingent reductions in 
output due to the increased number of changeovers necessary to 
obtain flexibility. Similarly pursuit of "Just-in-Time" objectives 
might lead to the sacrifice of machining time to protect low 
inventories.
Wheatley does not address FMS specifically and so does not 
provide any relevant evidence on the relationship between employee 
rewards and the deployment of FMS. However, evidence of work 
organisation in the past suggests reservation of judgement on 
Wheatley's claims for three reasons. Firstly, workers' responses to 
performance related payment systems is more complex than simply 
increasing or decreasing their efforts according to potential 
levels of bonuses. Ffcney rates for setting and mchining operations
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generally vary according to the complexity of the process. 
Operators are aware of this and devise their cwn strategies to make 
up time on particular operations to compensate for any unjustified 
stoppages or lack of speed when machining more difficult work. In 
this way they ensure attainment of the maximum performance related
element of their wages. Even when changes are made to the rates of
//
payment for different parts, workers are adept at achieving 
aggregate maximum performance over the medium to long term whilst 
reporting consistent levels of performance over each short term 
period. By doing this they earn maximum bonus at all times (Roy, 
1954: Burawoy, 1979). If workers are able to manipulate 
representations of their output fran earlier generations of machine 
tools it is possible that they can adjust their strategies to any 
changes which are caused by different utilisations of FMS.
A second reason for suggesting reservation of judgement on 
Wheatley's claims is a more straightforward one. Integrated systems 
such as FMS require fewer staff than earlier generations of machine 
tools. This is likely to compensate for any reduction in output 
that might occur from pursuing flexible objectives.
Finally, there does not appear to be any reason to believe 
that companies cannot adjust their bonus payment systems so that 
output targets are set less high and other criteria are used to 
reward workers. Piecework systems in conventional machine shops 
have generally provided ways of compensating workers for loss of 
output when set-ups were taking place (Roy, 1954; Burawoy, 1979).
Nonetheless, it is of value to investigate the validity of 
such arguments by reference to empirical evidence. This issue will 
thus receive further consideration in the subsequent chapters.
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Summary.
Cost control practices cure used to ensure that departments 
perform at levels that sure acceptable to the company. When new 
investments are made these levels are defined in the pre-investment 
evaluation. There are two main methods for monitoring and 
controlling the performance of new systems, post audits and ongoing 
cost control. Writers have either ignored the impact of post audits 
on the deployment of FMS or simply reported that they have not been 
conducted. Ongoing cost control techniques have been criticised 
because they allegedly discourage the use of FMS for providing a 
range of goods in small batches. Their assumptions of: a constant 
relationship between the resources of labour or machine time and 
system output; high productivity being a positive attribute; and, 
the rewarding of workers for their volume of production? all lead 
to FMS being used for high volume production of a limited range of 
parts. International comparisons between the use of FMS in Japan 
and in western nations are often used to support these arguments. 
But this evidence does not control for other factors. It views the 
influence of cost control in isolation rather than explaining its 
influence in the context of the preceding stages in the process of 
technical change. Further, it fails to explain how inapproporiate 
standards are defined when novel systems are introduced. This 
thesis will aim to explain the full significance of these other 
factors at the firms in this study before discussing the separate 
influence of cost control on the deployment of FMS.
4.5 Conclusion.
It has been reported in this Chapter that accounting
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represents events and objects by their financial values. The 
specific accounting practices of pre-investment justifications and 
post-installation cost controls use the rules of mathematics and 
binary algebra to (i) calculate how pursuit of events and the 
employment of different resources will affect the wellbeing of the 
company and (ii) attempt to enact those projections once choices 
have been made. This chapter has explained hew a number of authors 
have criticised the constitution of accounting calculations for 
introducing a systematic bias into perceptions of FMS. As a 
consequence firms are prejudiced against installing IMS or cure 
encouraged to use vhatever systems they do introduce for the large 
batch production of a limited range of parts even though this is to 
their detriment.
There have been three recurrent themes in the critical 
evaluation of these ideas that this chapter has offered. Firstly, 
this thesis has contended that the deployment of IMS cannot be 
understood simply by focusing on the impact of cost control. The 
eventual pattern of deployment of IMS is the culmination of a 
process of technical change. That process includes the accounting 
practice of pre-investment evaluation of a system. The impact of 
this earlier stage must be accounted for if the influence of post­
installation cost control is to be isolated.
Secondly, that process of change is contextual. The failure of 
accounting practices to represent and monitor accurately the 
advantages of IMS can only be understood by identifying the motives 
that a company had for introducing IMS. Finally, it has been 
questioned where accounting standards come from. The argument of 
many of the authors discussed in this chapter is that accounting
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practices do not recognise the new dimension of Fie. What they fail 
to explain is hew accountants recognise unacceptable levels of the 
system's performance when measured along conventional criteria 
without also recognising the system's strengths and weaknesses.
This thesis will attempt to avoid these weaknesses when 
reporting the findings of this research in the next three chapters. 
Chapter Five explains the organisation of engineering and 
accounting functions around the capital sanctioning route. This 
will illustrate the opportunity that engineers, who propose the 
purchase of new systems, enjoy to influence the accounting 
standards by which FMS is assessed. Chapter Six reports a company's 
motives for introducing FMS and the success or otherwise they have 
in overcoming the alleged biases in pre-investment justifications 
when articulating the benefits that arise from pursuing such 
objectives. Chapter Seven will then be able to concentrate on 
investigating the impact of post-installation cost monitoring on 
FMS.
N o te s .
(1) The description of the different accounting practices draws chi 
information from a number of accounting textbooks, in particular: 
Drebin and Bierman (1978)? Robson (1979)? Sizer (1975)? and, 
Thornton (1978).
(2) Discount tables are available for firms to employ to establish 
this. Alternatively the discount figure can be calculated using the 
formulae 1 + (1 + i)n where i is the rate of discounting and n is 
the number of years from the time of investment when the income is 
generated/ received.
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C hapter F iv e .
5 ,1  In tro d u c tio n .
It is the contention of this thesis that the eventual 
deployment of a system is the culmination of a process of technical 
change. The preceding Chapter has explained that accounting 
interventions are made at two stages in that process: pre- 
investment justifications and post-installation cost controls. The 
former provides the projection which the latter is expected to 
enact. The arguments made in Chapter Two of this thesis suggest 
that the ability of accountants to impose their analysis on an 
engineering system in an inappropriate way at either of these 
stages is limited by the nature of the accountant's relationship to 
engineers. That is to say that, whilst accountants enjoy a position 
of fornal superordination over engineers, they are dependent on the 
latter to provide them with information.
The objective of this chapter is to describe how this 
relationship between accountants and engineers materialised in the 
capital sanctioning route at the firms in this study. The chapter 
falls into two halves. In the first, the normal capital sanctioning 
route at the firms in this study is described and the nature of the 
opportunity for engineers to influence the standards by which 
systems are assessed is discussed. In the second half the specific 
routes by which FMS systems were introduced are explained and 
consideration is given to the consequences for the application of 
accounting criteria of any divergence from the normal sanctioning 
procedures. The chapter concludes that those who performed the 
engineering function at the firms in the study enjoyed the 
opportunity to influence the criteria by which IMS were evaluated
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and subsequently monitored. Thus, there was the possibility that 
accounting criteria would reflect whatever the engineers had 
defined as the best use of FMS.
5 .2  The Normal C a p ita l S an c tio n in g  R oute: The In je c t io n  o f  
A cco un tin g  and E n g in e e rin g  C r i t e r ia .
The superordinate position of accountants ever engineers which 
was described in Chapter Two above, was contingent on the 
separation of ownership from control of a company and the 
devolution of management responsibility to a number of occupational 
groups. However, of the 19 firms visited in the course of this 
study only 15 belonged to large corporate groups where a clear 
separation of ownership fran control had taken place. The remaining 
four were independent companies. At these firms the owners still 
played a role in the management of the company, responsibilities 
had not been devolved to occupational groups to the same extent and 
the type of opportunity to influence the process of technical 
change that the accounting and engineering functions enjoyed was 
different to that described in Chapter Two. Within the group of 
companies that belonged to corporate groups there were two firms 
who were distinguishable from the others because of the conscious 
way in which the engineering function had been promoted. This made 
easier the introduction of novel systems. In short, the 
relationship between those who conducted engineering and accounting 
functions tended to vary between the three different groups. The 
capital sanctioning process at each of the groups of the companies 
will be described in turn as a means of highlighting the extent of 
the opportunities for those responsible for the engineering
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function to adapt accounting criteria to reflect the idiosyncracies 
of particular engineering systems.
( i )  The Division o f labour between Engineers and Accountants a t the  
m ain group o f  C o rp o ra te  F irm s .
At the main group of companies that belonged to corporate 
groups, the process of technical change had been instituted into 
the companies' rules and structures. At a given point each year, 
production departments would be invited to submit requests for new 
pieces of equipment. The requests could be for either replacements 
or additions to existing plant if it was anticipated that demand 
would rise in the succeeding year. New investments could take place 
at other times in the year. However, proposals for machinery that 
required heavy investment were less likely to receive approval if 
they had not been included amongst the annual investment proposals. 
All of the FMS systems were reported as forming part of the 
company's annual investment plan although, as will be reported 
below, not all of the systems originated from shopfloor management 
or production engineering.
The amount of funds that were available to purchase new 
equipment varied enormously between different companies. At the 
time when the case studies were carried out some companies had 
insufficient funds to buy new systems for replacement capacity. One 
respondent reported that purchase of equipment was a "last resort" 
if current plant could not be "botched up". At other firms sums 
that would facilitate an increase in the rate of capital invested 
were available. The case studies were conducted sane time after the 
FMS systems had been justified and the state of liquidity may have
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changed by that point. Nonetheless, it might be believed that those
with the largest sum of investment funds would find it easiest to
justify large investments such as FMS. However, the indications
were that this was not the case. The personnel at one company
reported that they had never known a year when more than 75% of the
annual investment budget had been spent. At another company which
often failed to spend all of its investment funds the accountant
commented:
"It's alright to have a big budget but we're 
the ones that cue going to have to manage the 
projects."
This suggests that the application of accounting criteria has 
an equalizing effect on the sums of capital invested at different 
firms. The weight of the accountants' influence was greater in this 
group of firms that belonged to corporate groups than it was in the 
other two groups of companies. The nature of the capital 
sanctioning route approximated that which was described in Chapter 
Two with both engineers and accountants contributing to the process 
of change but with accountants making their interventions after the 
engineers. The general course of a proposed for capital expenditure 
was for it to originate either from the shcpfloor manager and then 
be passed to the production engineer. Alternatively, the production 
engineer would draw up the proposed himself (1). At this stage the 
purpose of the machine would be outlined, details of its capacities 
would be provided and an initial evaluation of the financial 
consequences of purchasing the system would be made by the 
techniques outlined in Chapter Four. At some ocxrpanies the proposal 
would then be passed to the technical director and subsequently to 
the local board, the divisional board if there was one, and finally
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to the corporate board. Each intermediate level tended to be 
entrusted with the right to authorise sums of expenditure 
incrementally greater than the board beneath. Annual capital 
investment plans were generally composed initially by a production 
engineer and intermediate boards could make amendments to the plan. 
However, the final draft had to receive approval from the highest 
authority in the organisation. The interception of the accountant 
would come immediately prior to, or at the level of, the local 
board. The company accountant would be responsible for checking the 
engineers' reports of the financial costs and benefits of new 
systems and locating the impact of these in the context of the 
firm's overall financial performance to enable the board to make 
the necessary financial decision and prioritise the different 
investments when necessary.
In many instances the superordinate position of accountants 
over engineers in the capital sanctioning route appeared to be 
reenforced by the physical layout of firms. Hie geography of the 
factory at Diesel Engine Co. was not untypical of other 
corporations in the study. At the site visited, which is also the 
location of the company's head office, the production facilities 
were situated in a large single storey concrete building. Different 
stages of the manufacturing process were separated from one another 
by alleyways. Hie production engineer's office formed part of a 
single complex in the middle of the large manufacturing building. 
Shopfloor management, including the factory superintendent and 
shop supervisors, also shared this complex. The accountants' 
offices, on the other hand, were situated in the main office block 
about 100 yards away. This was separated from the production
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departments by buildings accomodating stocks and vehicles. Capital 
investment proposals would be drawn up by the production engineer 
and then passed to the accounting office via a number of 
intermediaries. Accountants vrould, therefore, receive the proposals 
some time after the engineer had drawn them up. This physical 
separation of accountants and production engineers made interaction 
less likely when queries arose about peculiar capacities of new 
systems, such as IMS, which were outside of the accountant's normal 
frame of reference. The accountants would use a computer package 
with pre-defined parameters to generate figures on the viability of 
the investment and would make recommendations to the board 
accordingly.
Accountants' position of greater authority in the capital 
sanctioning route and its re-enforcement by the distance in time 
and space between when they and engineers make their respective 
interventions in the investment decision making process would 
appear to make it possible for accountants to impose an 
inappropriate set of accounting categories and calculations on 
engineering proposals. However, as explained above, it is the 
contention of this thesis that the engineers' greater knowledge of 
the mechanics of shcpfloor processes and the accountants' failure 
to gain access to the intricacies of that knowledge militates 
against such a scenario. Engineers' greater knowledge of shcpfloor 
processes affords them the power to make three important 
interventions in this part of the process of technical change. The 
first is to initiate change; the second is to define the contours 
of that change; and the third is to translate the nature of that 
change into financial terms for accountants. This provides
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engineers with the opportunity to articulate to accountants the 
nature of the financial benefits of a new system.
The annual capital investment budget provides the trigger for 
the submission of proposals for capital investment. Engineers are 
responsible for providing the initial draft of these proposals. The 
capital sanctioning procedures puts the onus on engineers to be 
proactive and places accountants in a situation where they are 
sinply reacting to whatever the engineers suggest. Engineers, thus, 
set the parameters for the subsequent financial decisions. This, in 
itself, would be insignificant if not for the second factor; that 
is the separate nature of the engineers knowledge base and the 
ability which this gives to engineers to define what are and are 
not feasible engineering solutions to given manufacturing problems.
Engineers in Britain have their own specialist body of 
knowledge. As was explained in Chapter Two, accountants have not 
gained access to the engineering intricacy of the shopfloor 
processes. Thus, any decision which is made after the engineers' 
intervention is contingent on their earlier formulations and 
assumes that the earlier decisions were valid. What is assumed to 
happen at the pre-investment stage is that the production engineer 
articulates the system that has the technical capacities to 
facilitate the optimum level of improvement to the performance of a 
department and the accountant is expected to corroborate that 
selection. But accountants do not have any means of verifying that 
the systems proposed is the best that is available. They can only 
say whether or not the alleged levels of performance can generate 
sufficient income to earn the levels of returns that the company 
expects from new investments. One accountant expressed the
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dependency of accountants on engineers in the following terms:
"When it comes to us there is one engineering 
option for evaluation. We highlight areas where 
the project falls short. Certainly an amount by 
which it falls short. We may go back and trim 
it? we may go back and say: "Can you save 
another person here?" There is a large amount 
of that done. But, regrettably we've got to 
rely on others, not to do the accounting for 
us, but, to give us the simulations on 
production."
At another point the same person commented:
"I'm not sure it's for the accountants to say:
"Well, have you engineered it properly? Could 
you cane up with another way of doing it?" It's 
an engineering problem. Vfe take the engineering 
knowledge as given. In fact we always do."
The dependency of accountants on engineers is increased when 
the company has no prior experience of the proposed equipment as 
was the case with FMS systems. When the company introduces systems 
that are similar to those that they are currently using they have 
the benchmark of past experience when assessing the validity of 
claims about the magnitude of the parameters of performance. When 
new systems are introduced accountants are completely dependent on 
the information that engineers provide.
The engineers, thus, had sufficient influence in the course of 
the process of technical change to select which system to buy if 
any system was going to be purchased. However, it is the next 
factor which determined whether or not new parameters were 
articulated in the accountants mode of analysis. The engineers 
utilise one form of discourse; that which describes the operations 
of technical and mechanical processes. The accountants use another: 
money. Dialogue between the two different groups, thus, necessitate 
a process of translation. At all of the firms visited it was
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engineers who were responsible for the initial interpretation of 
the manufacturing capacities of systems into financial values.
The potential number of new manufacturing systems that 
engineers could propose is extremely large whilst, in the words of 
one accountant, "the engineering resource is scarce". Any selection 
that the engineer makes must, therefore, be purposive. That is to 
say that the proposed system mist, at the very least, offer a level 
of profit that the company finds acceptable. This makes it 
necessary for engineers to be informed of the financial criteria 
that must be met, as a precondition to accountants and executives 
giving any proposal further consideration, in advance of their 
search for systems. Otherwise, the scarce engineering resource will 
be wasted on the provision of investment appraisals of machinery 
that have no likelihood of being accepted. This type of scenario is 
supportive of King's (1975) arguments who found that only one or 
two alternative investment options are ever given serious 
consideration.
Their responsibility for selecting new engineering systems and 
their general awareness of acceptable financial criteria placed 
engineers in a position where, as Jcnes (1990b) describes, they may 
apply engineering and then accounting criteria alternatively in the 
course of their cwn considerations of a potential purchase. In this 
way they are able to align engineering and financial criteria 
before presenting the formal translation of the economic merits of 
engineering systems for consideration by accountants. As Finnie 
(1986) found, if the engineers, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, overstate the manufacturing capacities of new 
systems prior to the final translation and presentation of
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proposals taking place, the accountants have no way of detecting 
the deception at that stage. Deliberate subterfuge did take place 
at one company in this study, Diesel Engine Go. (See section 5.3 
below.) However, Finnie does not give due consideration to the 
consequences of such subterfuge for both the company and the 
perpetrator. The financial appraisal is supposed to be purposive; 
it is expected to provide an indication of whether or not a 
proposed investment protects a company's level of profitability. 
The claims made in the pre-investment justification provide the 
standards by which the systems performance is measured at the cost 
control stage. If it is found that the promised levels of 
performance cure not realised when the system is operational, the 
company's profitability may be threatened and questions are likely 
to be asked of the competence of the person who submitted the 
proposal. The stage of cost control should, therefore, act as a 
check against engineers making extravagant claims at the pre- 
investment stage. See Chapter Seven below for the consequences of 
the deceit at Diesel Engine Co.
Responsibility for translation does not only provide the scope 
for engineers to exaggerate the manufacturing capabilities of a 
system in order to ensure its compliance with accounting criteria, 
it also allows them to seek a legitimate two-way reconciliation of 
engineering systems with accounting criteria. That is to say, 
engineers may reject engineering systems or non-essential qualities 
of systems because they do not promise acceptable financial 
returns. At the same time they can identify weaknesses in current 
accounting practices which do not allow expression of benefits that 
arise from a new engineering system and when necessary articulate
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new categories to express those benefits in financial terms.
There were indications that there were variations in the point 
at which translation took place between the different companies and 
this influenced the engineers' ability to articulate successfully 
changes to accounting criteria. Put simply, the shorter the time 
period between when translation took place and when the investment 
was scheduled to be made the greater was the influence that the 
engineers appeared to have in the choice of system purchased and in 
the adaption of accounting criteria to reflect that choice.
The most clear example of an increase in the engineers'
influence was provided by one innovative accountant at one of the
companies in the study. He was experimenting with sensitivity
modelling and risk analysis as a means of allowing the financial
calculations to be made in advance of the engineers' selection of
systems. His hope was that eventually engineers would be able to
assess and express the manufacturing merits of a system in
financial terms simultaneous to examining their engineering
strengths. He said:
"I think what we should do is do, is to take 
engineering models and apply £ notes to them, 
and drive it the other way around by 
accountants asking, by saying: "Here are the £ 
notes, tell me how you're going to spend it, 
tell us what you want to do in engineering 
terms." You can't do more than that. But in 
practical terms it can only be done through 
these simulation models."
There was no timescale for introducing this practice and so it 
remained just an intention. Nonetheless, it does provide a contrast 
with two other companies in the study. At the companies alluded to, 
the engineers held the responsibility for translating manufacturing 
parameters into financial terms, but they were asked to provide
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details of the systems which they expected they wsuld need at least 
one year in advance. For example, at Boiler Co. a "Long Term 
Forecast" document was written annually by the production engineer 
at each of the companies within the group. These documents 
comprised proposals for new equipment for the ensuing three year 
period. Each year the local and corporate boards would exclude and 
include items for further consideration in subsequent years 
depending on whether the proposals fitted in with the groups 
overall strategy. It was only in the final year that the 
suggestions were given full consideration and engineers were 
expected to provide a financial appraisal. Hie group accountant, 
whose offices were situated at the same site as the FMS, had 
detailed knowledge of the major investments at all of the ccxipanies 
in the group. He described the initial list of items as engineers' 
"dreams" and he inplied that they were simply germinations of ideas 
that were not commercially viable and would be sifted out as the 
years passed. The group accountant, thus, received early warning 
signs of what type of systems were being considered and he could 
precipitate initial costings of new systems. This initial 
evaluation could influence the inclusion and exclusion of systems 
in subsequent years plans in advance of the final economic 
appraisal being submitted.
The most cannon scenario was for engineers to be made aware of 
the general hurdle figure that the proposals had to clear if a 
system was to be given further consideration. An example of the 
formal justification sheets which engineers had to fill in is 
reproduced as exhibit 5.1 (below). The above would tend to confirm 
the findings of others (King, 1975? Pinches, 1982) that the
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emphasis put on the formal approval stage when explaining the 
patterns of investment is misplaced.
It is not, however, the intention of this thesis to infer that 
engineers' responsibility for initiating change, selecting systems 
and providing the initial justification preempts the exercise of 
the accountants' authority and the conduct of their 
responsibilities. For example, if the engineer proposed new 
parameters of savings the accountants might rule the categories as 
impermissable. To anticipate the discussion in the ensuing 
chapters, same accountants expressed reservations about whether 
inventory savings should be included in the justifications of FMS. 
They argued that their realisation were contingent on similar 
improvements being made to the speed at which other departments 
processed parts. It was thought that this might entail an increased 
investment in other departments in order to realise the same 
savings. Similarly, the engineers' submission of a proposed for a 
system that cleared the desired hurdle figure did not guarantee 
that the proposal would be accepted automatical ly. The engineers 
were aware that executives made decisions on strategic and 
financial factors other than the hurdle figures that they were 
given and accountants often contributed to the compilation of the 
information that was employed in these choices. The accountants 
were, thus, in a position to reccmmend rejection on criteria other 
than one simple hurdle figure. But they could not do so without 
good reason. The aim of the capital sanctioning procedures was to 
ensure that the company possessed the plant that allowed them to 
continue to produce their wares at a cost that protected that 
company's profitability. Any unreasonable rejection of engineers'
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proposals by accountants could act as an obstacle to this.
Engineers were not always happy with their subordinate 
position in the capital sanctioning route and there were instances 
where they did seek to overcome this. For example, at Goal GO. the 
engineer had tried, but failed, to pin down the managing director 
to a definite DCR hurdle figure at which systems would be accepted 
automatically. The engineers, therefore, had to accept the 
accountant's role in analysing financial data and the degree of 
malleability about such factors as hurdle figures.
In summary, the relationship between accountants and engineers 
at the main group of companies in this study was described in 
Chapter Two. Accountants held a formally superordinate position to 
engineers but were also dependent on the latter for information 
about shcpfloor activities. The practical manifestation of this in 
the capital sanctioning route was that engineering proposals were 
evaluated by, and had to gain the acceptance of, accountants. This 
created the possibility that inappropriate accounting criteria 
could be imposed on engineering systems. However, engineers' 
greater knowledge of shcpfloor activities and processes casts them 
in the role of initiators of change. It is they who select what 
systems possess the engineering capacities to meet the companies' 
manufacturing objectives. Engineers also translate these 
engineering capacities into financial terms so that personnel in a 
company's higher echelons can make the decisions of whether or not 
to invest. At this stage engineers may exclude some engineering 
systems for further consideration because they do not meet desired 
hurdle figures but they also have the opportunity to explain how 
accounting criteria needs to be adapted to represent accurately the
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advantages of a proposed system. It is only after engineers have
performed this act of translation that accountants generally
intervene. As financial staff do not have the engineering knowledge
to propose alternatives they have to trust that engineers have made
the best selection in the first instance and give credence to
engineers claims of the financial merits of engineering systems.
Therefore, the emphasis on the restrictive influences of
accountants and accounting criteria may, in some instances, be
misplaced. As one manufacturing director in Bessant and Haywood's
study explained this is often a legitimation for someone else's
inactivity:
"The excuse has too long been made that it is 
the accountant's fault for not extending 
investment horizons. This is often used as an 
excuse not to do anything.” (Quoted in Bessant 
and Haywood, 1985: 45.)
( i i )  Some Exceptions amongst Corporate Groups: Two Companies' 
Prom otion o f  th e  E n g in e e rin g  F u n c tio n .
The above discussion has highlighted how, at the majority of 
companies that belonged to corporate groups, the opportunity 
existed for engineers to articulate novel accounting parameters 
when proposing new manufacturing systems. In the course of this 
study two other companies that had introduced FMS and which 
belonged to corporate groups were also visited. At these firms the 
likelihood of accounting criteria being adapted to facilitate the 
introduction of new systems were increased by the relative 
promotion of the engineering function. The two companies were Nat 
Air CO. and Alloy Corp. Alloy Corp. was a British subsidiary of a 
foreign multinational. The corporation had a special "Technical 
Division11 that was responsible for research into, and development
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of, new systems. This division selected specific sites for 
pioneering the use of a new piece of machinery which might be of 
use to other divisions within the corporation. The FMS was 
introduced through this route.
The Technical Division's brief was to develop systems that 
would be econcxnically viable once operational. They knew in advance 
the budget which they were working to. Engineers at this division 
could construct systems with new parameters of manufacturing 
performance and then explain to the recipient company how these 
would materialise into financial benefits. Ihous, whilst the systems 
that were introduced were expected to conform to the company's 
normal payback and DCR criteria the existence of the Technical 
Division provided legitimation for any new dimensions of 
performance that were included in the installing company's 
financial calculations.
At Alloy Corp. it was only specific systems that were 
introduced through this engineering dominated route. At Nat Air 
Go., hcwever, all investment plans progressed through a route where 
engineers had been specifically instructed to express the financial 
benefits of new dimensions of manufacturing performance.
The attitude of people at Nat Air Co. to the traditional 
accounting calculations detailed in Chapter Four above was 
illustrated by a cartoon on an office wall in the department that 
was responsible for overseeing the investment in, and installation 
of, new systems. A slogan at the top of the cartoon derided 
accounting for holding back engineering and manufacturing. Below 
this was a picture of three beings. The one furthest to the left 
had "21st Century Engineering" emblazoned cn its chest. It also had
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a rope going off over its shoulder. Ihe writing on the chest of the 
middle one read "20th Century Manufacturing". Hiis also had a rope 
which was tied to its waist and went off behind. Ihe third being 
which, despite its resistance, was being dragged by the ropes from 
the other two had tattooed an its chest "19th Century Accounting11.
Nat: Air Co. had a history of being in the forefront of 
technological development. The company's financial analysis when 
justifying new systems was primarily and deliberately focused on 
quantifying any reductions in work-in-progress that were achieved. 
This policy had been adopted in the mid-1980s. A director had 
observed that lying around the factory were large volumes of stocks 
that had high added value. He ccmmissicned a survey which estimated 
that the interest costs on the stock was in the region of £ 2  
million per annum. The company responded to these findings in two 
ways: they set up a new separate department to justify and 
supervise the installation of all new systems that were required by 
any production department; and, then, they gave the personnel in 
the new department a brief to introduce only those systems that 
reduced work-in-progress costs, even if this resulted in the 
systems standing idle for part of the time. Although the new 
department was comprised of engineers, one of the managers reported 
that they had "poached a couple of chaps from the accounts 
department" to "beef up" their ability to carry out financial 
justifications. Hiis provided the (department with the capability to 
express in financial terms the sought after manufacturing 
capacities. Investments were expected to meet the company's normal 
DCRs. Nonetheless, engineering criteria had been specified in 
advance and accounting was expected to follow suit.
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In short, Alloy Corp. and Nat Air Co. had promoted the 
engineering function in different ways and empowered the engineers 
to include financial expression of novel manufacturing capacities 
in their investment appraisals.
(iii) Capital Sanctioning Procedures at Small Firms.
It was explained in Chapter Two that the accountants' position 
of formal superordination over engineers evolved out of the 
separation of ownership from the control of a company and the 
devolution of management responsibilities to a number of 
occupational groups including accountants and engineers.
In the course of this research four small independent 
companies were visited. The owners of each company were still 
involved to varying degrees in the management of their respective 
firms. As a consequence the division of functions had not taken 
place to the same extent as in the larger corporations, hierarchies 
of super- and sub-ordinate positions with engineers located below 
accountants were less evident and accountants, when employed, had 
less authority to intervene in the capital sanctioning process.
It is of value to discuss in some detail the course of the 
capital investment proposal of IMS at each of these firms. Their 
example serve to illustrate the importance of the owners presence, 
and a company's independence, to the ability of proposers of new 
machinery to adapt financial criteria to the contours of 
engineering systems.
At the time when the respective IMS systems were introduced 
into the four independent firms each carpany was still owned by its 
founders. Also, all owners were of an engineering or technical
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background and all played some role in the capital sanctioning 
procedures. In some instances they had intimate knowledge of the 
shopfloor and, thus, knew the likelihood of a particular investment 
improving the company's performance. As a consequence accounting, 
engineering knowledge and consideration of a company's 
manufacturing strategy were immediately focused on individual 
investment decisions more or less simultaneously through the medium 
of particular individuals. This point is best illustrated by the 
example of Small Machine Tool Co.
The ocnpany was owned by a single family. A father and son sat 
on the board along with other personnel. The father who had 
established the firm had remained actively involved from its 
inception and held the position of chairman. He had trained as a 
production engineer and it was this technical background and the 
small structure of the company that facilitated his continued, 
albeit less frequent, involvement in the everyday production 
management of the firm. The company's production engineer reported 
that the chairman was "never happier than when he's actually in at 
the sharp end and looking at ways in which we can manufacture our 
products better”. The only person with detailed accounting 
knowledge was the company secretary. His role was limited to 
keeping records of contracts and contributing to the evaluation of 
proposals which came from shopfloor management. However, these 
proposals did not take the form of itemised expenditure. Instead, 
when a new system was being considered a process of negotiation 
took place between the chairman, his son, the other directors and, 
at times, the production engineering staff.
In the course of these discussions various scenarios were put
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forward by different personnel who used engineering and other types
of formalised knowledge along with what might appear to the casual
observer as instinctual feelings. Remarks about "gut feelings" and
something having the "right feel" or "feeling right" frequently
punctuated the discourse of the company's personnel. The chairman
was reported to have had a "gut feeling" about the merits of FMS.
When the production engineer was asked to describe what he meant by
"gut-feeling", he explained it as a rationed method of addressing
questions, even though, the questions are never asked explicitly,
and, the logic employed in their resolution is never fully
articulated. He said:
"Most people do interpret a gut feeling as 
being sort of irrational but I often wonder 
whether it is rational; whether there is 
something sub-consciously that you've gone 
through. Everybody has a different thought 
process and you've gone through this and you've 
seen one or two things that you might not 
associate with the actual problem that you're 
looking at. For example a customer would 
probably come round here and he might be 
looking at a machine. He's talked to the old 
man (the chairman). He likes the way the old 
man had been chatting. They've probably got on 
well together and he likes this company's 
commitment to product and one or two other 
things, and he gets this gut feeling that the 
products going to do him well. He may not feel 
he has gone through a sub-conscious question 
and answer routine but he has. So I often feel 
with a gut feeling there is some 
rationalisation, it is rational."
What is actually being explained here is that a single 
individual performs a number of different functions; each with 
their own system of analysis. These are separated in larger 
companies into, for example, production engineering, product 
design, marketing, tender evaluation and cost analysis. As, in this 
instance, the functions are conducted by one person who either has
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the power to override objections to his decision, or is 
sufficiently attuned to the thinking of the other important 
personnel to be able to incorporate their objections into his 
considerations, the full logic of the decisions need not be 
articulated or recorded in any great detail. This is demonstrated 
by the installation of the FMS.
The germination of the idea of FMS originated in the mind of
the chairman and was gradually developed as his experience of the
world in which his company existed unfolded and he persuaded his
fellows of the need for them to pursue a particular engineering
option. The production engineer described this process in the
following way:
,rWell the conception was quite remarkable, TC 
(the chairman), he conceived this many years 
ago. We're going back probably ten years. But 
he was fighting a tradition within the ccnpany.
There are a lot of people vho are frightened to 
commit the company to that sort of expenditure.
And he was adamant that he wanted an FMS type 
principle based on what we call the Small 
Machine Tool Oo. five faced machining centre.
And he had to fight quite hard with the senior 
managers, with his son, to actually win them 
over this way. So there was a lot of sort of 
convincing he had to do. Although, he's the 
chairman of the company, he likes to think that 
at the end of the day it's a collective 
decision. He was quite concerned quite a few 
years ago that we had to go this way. He could 
see the Japanese coming up over the horizon.
And it was that vhich sort of spurred them into 
redesigning the product range, and the bedtype 
of machine became of age, and reemphasise the 
need for us to get smarter for the way that we 
manufacture our components in-house. And it 
gave more power to his belief in building an 
FMS.”
The company secretary also explained the key role which the 
company's chairman played in assessing the financial viability of 
the system:
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MWe never did a sort of discounted cashflow 
sort of thing. TC got it (the FMS) and that's 
how he thought it was going to run. We did 
various exercises to see hew much we were going 
to save on it. Because the whole thing has been 
built up over nary many years. He's bought that 
and said he's going to modify that machine and 
then he bought that and gone away and modified 
that. And bought various things. We set down an 
overall project of vhat we thought was going to 
be the final aim of it. We did a cost analysis 
of it, how it would affect the rest of the 
factory, and how it would affect the end 
product. 'Specially on the major castings and 
TC had an idea on this himself. I mean, give 
him full due, he knew within a spit of vhat he 
was going to save, and he has cut down the 
overall machine times by, I think, seme of them 
in the region about 100 to about 30 hours, 
almost by a third. We analysed the whole of the 
costing and broke it down and then we did the 
savings, obviously to the DTI to shew them that 
it would be a good project, and, well we never 
linked the two together. Your may say that that 
is unfortunate because that would have 
completed the ring but we never did.”
It may be that a logical process was not followed and 
financial considerations did not correspond, totally, with 
engineering ones. However, the important point is that engineering 
criteria remained central to the investment decision. These are 
computed with all other information instead of being subordinated 
to financial criteria at any earlier stage by the organisation of 
functions into an hierarchy of offices.
The owner's failure to participate in the day-to-day 
management of a conpany and the devolution of responsibilities to 
separate functional groups does not necessarily lead to engineers' 
formal subordination to accountants. If the cwner continues to play
$
a role in sanctioning the capital investment decision, engineering 
and financial criteria may receive equal consideration. This is 
demonstrated by two of the other independent companies visited in
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the course of this study.
At the smaller of the two ccnpanies, Trans CO., the owner had 
left control of the firm's everyday functioning to his employees 
immediately after he had established the firm. However, the firm's 
small size, recent inception and the structure of its buildings had 
made it easy for engineering criteria to be put alongside financial 
calculations. The ccntpany had been set up on a greenfield site in 
the late 1970s. There was a family link between Trans Oo. and the 
larger company discussed here, Industrial Vehicles. Industrial 
Vehicles, was Trans Oo. 's major customer, purchasing 95% of their 
products at the time of Trans Oo. 's introduction of FMS. The whole 
of Trans Oo. was housed in one large building. The production 
facilities were situated in a large factory and the office block - 
which was mainly open plan with few physical divides - formed a 
higher level that overlooked the factory so that production 
facilities could be seen from the office. The normal practice for 
capital renewal was for the firm to establish demand for the 
forthcoming period via telephone conversations with Industrial 
Vehicles ltd. and to plan its manufacturing capacity accordingly. 
This generally involved the owner, the systems manager, production 
manager, and accountant. In the instance of the FMS they had also 
invited a supplier of machine tools along to discuss the firm's 
objectives and it was the suppliers who, after listening to the 
demands of the coarpany, suggested that Fie provided the most viable 
option for Trans Co.
Any engineering proposals that were put forward could be 
rejected if they did not offer a sufficiently high financial 
return. However, the involvement of engineering personnel at the
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outset, along with the suppliers of machine tools in this instance, 
provided the forum where technical knowledge was analysed in 
conjunction with accounting information. This meant that engineers 
shared in the decision vhether or not to reject a system and could 
put forward a range of scenarios, such as suggesting different 
systems or identifying the areas that had been overlooked if the 
initial proposal did riot clear the investment hurdle figure. Also, 
the physical organisation of the office allowed discussions to be 
carried on throughout the justification and pre-installation stages 
so that problems and financial obstacles were resolved by mutual 
consent as they arose.
Size and age of company appeared to have little independent 
impact on the standing of the engineers and their opportunity to 
influence the investment decisions. Industrial Vehicles Ltd. was 
the oldest and largest firm amongst the independent companies in 
this study. It had been established in the 1940s and employed 
approximately 1000 people. Moreover, the original proprietor had 
retired abroad and his son, who was also the owner of Trans Oo., 
was now the head of the organisation. He had experienced a period 
of separation from the firm and had not been an omnipresent lynch 
pin in the functioning of the company. Even if there had not been 
this patrilineal transfer of control it is debatable whether the 
original owner's son would have been able to exercise control over 
all operations given the company's size. Thus, here, more so than 
at Trans Co., there had been the introduction of some of the 
practices of the larger firms, including annual budgets and formed 
capital sanctioning routes. Nonetheless, there remained regular 
contact between the production engineers, who spent most of their
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time on the shopfloor, and the accountant who was situated in the 
offices. What is more, the limited echelons of higher management 
and the fact that all investment funds were generated internally 
meant that it was possible for the accountant and the engineers to 
discuss the financial and engineering merits of a new system and 
agree on a proposal for investment in a particular piece of 
equipment. They could' then obtain from the proprietor telephone 
authorisation for the expenditure in minutes rather than days or 
weeks. As a consequence, engineering considerations were computed 
simultaneous to accounting analysis and remained central to the 
final investment decision.
Collaboration and mutual consensus of different functional 
groups in the selection of new systems becomes less possible when 
there is a change to corporate status’ , as this often entails a 
relative demotion of the engineering function. Hie example of the 
remaining small independent company, Small Motor Go., demonstrates 
this. At the time of the introduction of their IMS, this firm did 
not employ any accountants. The company had initially been set up 
by two people with engineering backgrounds. A member of staff 
explained that one had provided "the brains" and the other had 
provided "the backing". It was these individuals who had proposed 
the introduction of IMS to cater for a new contract for parts from 
a major customer. The method of computing and analysing information 
in the decision making process appeared to be akin to that which 
took place at ShelLI Machine Tool Oo. Thus, whilst the production 
engineer reported that a financial appraisal had been carried out 
it appears most likely that the directors advocating the purchase 
of FMS would seek to apply accounting criteria to what they
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perceived as the contours of the engineering system rather than
applying inappropriate financial categories. Another member of the
staff described the introduction of the IMS as an "engineering-led
exercise" and reported the method of assessing the value of a
particular system in the following terms:
"The historical method was that the engineers, 
and it would normally be John Dennis and Alan 
Tatlock (the individuals who had established 
the firm) who did the bulk of the research.
They would, in fact, evaluate all the 
alternatives. We would then convene a meeting 
of the senior general managers and the thing 
would be debated and at the conclusion of that 
debate a decision would then be taken as to 
whether in the opinion of that forum of 
managers that investment decision should be 
given approval."
However, this procedure was to change following the company's 
takeover by a British-based multinational corporation. An executive 
board was established and given the responsibility for financial 
decisions. The only members of the company who had been invited to 
join the board were John Dennis and Alan Tatlock. The corporation 
provided a standard form for presentation for all investment 
appraisals, stipulated the hurdle figures to be observed and, more 
importantly, put ceilings on the capital sums that could be 
sanctioned without reference to the entire board of small Motor Oo. 
and to the corporate board. Also, a company accountant was employed 
for the first time to oversee the conduct of capital investment 
justifications and to install a new computerised system of 
monitoring of production flow. This led to the employment of a 
whole entourage of financial staff. One long term employee 
commented:
"You knew our accounting department has more or 
less trebled since they took over. If someone
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starts on the shopfloor that's another 
accountant up here to look after him.”
As was explained above, the installation of accounting personnel
and an accounting function does not produce accountants'
omnipotence in the capital sanctioning route. Engineers are still
able to articulate novel advantages of systems. Nonetheless, it
does mean a new set of. rules were introduced and engineers have to
comply with these. Accountants are provided with the means to rule
engineering solutions as unacceptable on financial criteria. What
is more, in this instance engineers appeared to lose their
opportunity to determine the outcome of the final decision making
process. Whilst two key individuals with engineering background had
been given places on the board of small Motor Oo. and the corporate
board they were in a small minority on the latter as engineering
had not been a prominent feature of the corporate group's interests
prior to their takeover of Small Motor Co. Thus, any proposed
investment that exceeded the sum which the local board had the
authority to sanction was likely to be evaluated in the final
instance by non-engineering personnel.
The examples of the small firms that introduced FMS 
demonstrate how private ownership of firms by personnel with 
engineering backgrounds and simplified capital sanctioning routes 
led to engineering considerations being centralised. Financial 
criteria were either considered simultaneous to engineering 




The separation of ownership from control of a company leads to 
a division of labour and hierarchy of offices with accountants 
holding a formally superordinate position to engineers. This 
separation creates the need for a discourse between these two 
managerial groups. At firms in Britain accountants have only a 
limited view of shopfloor operations. As a consequence they cure 
dependent on engineers to provide them with information when the 
pre-investment evaluation of new systems is carried out. This gives 
the engineers the opportunity to express in financial terms the 
novel benefits of new systems such as FMS. At some firms this 
opportunity has been increased by a company's deliberate promotion 
of the engineering function. At other companies there has only been 
a limited movement towards separation of ownership from control and 
a division of labour amongst management personnel. Consequently, 
accounting and engineering criteria are easily reconciled when new 
systems are purchased, evaluated and monitored. Thus, the examples 
of the firms in this study suggest that the criticisms that imply 
the imposition of accounting criteria on FMS systems understate the 
potential of those responsible for the engineering function to 
influence the composition of financial criteria.
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5*3 Production of Justifications and Standards for FMS.
It was acknowledged in Chapter Four that biases in accounting 
techniques could prejudice companies against certain types of 
deployment of FMS. However, the preceding section has contended 
that those responsible for the engineering function have the 
opportunity to articulate the financial merits of new parameters of 
performance of novel machinery thus equalizing the impact of 
accounting techniques on different manufacturing systems. Not all 
of the FMS systems investigated in the course of this study were 
introduced through the respective company's normal capital 
sanctioning route and, as a consequence, their normal accounting 
criteria was not always applied. The objective of this section is 
to describe the routes by which the FMS systems ware introduced and 
to explain the implications of any divergence from normal 
procedures for the application of financial evaluation criteria and 
the provision of standards for monitoring the subsequent 
performance of the system.
Of the companies in this study the majority - ie, the 12 
companies that had introduced 13 systems including the four small 
independent companies that introduced five systems - the FMSs were 
proposed and justified by the normal capital sanctioning route. 
This left seven companies amongst those that belonged to corporate 
groups, including Alley Corp., where the introduction of FMS only 
took place after there had been seme adaptations to the company's 
normal capital sanctioning procedures.
The nature of these changes may be understood by reference to 
two criteria: the level at which the idea of FMS emanated - that is 
whether it was from management, local board or outside of the
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immediate company - and, whether a company's normal modus cperandi
provided the stimulus for the installation. Hie level influenced
whether or not the pre-investment justification was given the
emphasis normally afforded to it. Hie relationship of the proposed.
to the modus operandi of the company was significant because it
provided an indication of the likelihood of a similar route being
pursued in the future. Hie possible permutations of origin and the
numbers that fall into each group are summarised in Table 5.1. Each
of these changes will be discussed in turn.
Table 5.1 Origins of proposal to purchase FMS at 15 Corporate 
firms.




initiated Internal (Number) External (Number)
Outside of Technical Special Govt.
Immediate Division: 1 Grant: 1
Company
Directors Directors appoint Director instructs
member to investigate engineer to revise
system installation: 1 plans to include FMS: 1
Production Project team set up: 2 Production Engineer
Engineering engages support from
Production Engineer other departments on
puts plans through ad hoc bases: 1
normal route: 8
At three of the firms where some modification had been made to
the capital sanctioning route the initial proposal of FMS
originated from the level of production engineering. Thus,
accountants' recommendation of support for the investment remained
important to the proposal's chances of success. It was reported
above that accountants, and the personnel of a company that held a
position above them, were able to exercise a degree of discretion
in the recommendations and decisions which they made. In the
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instances where the appraisal originated from the level of the 
engineer the modifications to a company's general capital 
sanctioning procedures may be interpreted as the means by which 
support fran several departments were placed behind the proposal of 
FMS. This served to add to the legitimacy of the proposed and, in 
turn, increase the pressure on the accountant to exercise any right 
of discretion they enjoyed in favour of FMS. For exairple, at one of 
the companies, Gear GO., the corporate accountant accepted that the 
normal payback period would have to be extended to facilitate the 
introduction of FMS. The nature of the modifications made to the 
normal processes in these three instances were as follows.
At two of the companies, Gear Oo. and Ooach Oo., the impetus 
for the modification to the normal capital sanctioning procedures 
came from the companies' respective needs to increase output. In 
each instance a project team comprised of representatives from a 
number of production departments was established. At Gear Oo. the 
owners wanted to shift production of seme of their range frcm their 
headquarters in North America to their site in Britain. They 
instructed their subsidiary company to investigate methods for 
making these parts. The works manager, who was generally 
responsible for initiating the introduction of new machinery, 
established the project team. The result was a synthesis of ideas 
and the development of a shared factory-wide perspective on the 
advantages of FMS. A collective decision that an FMS would best 
suit the company's needs then ensued and was presented to the 
corporate board.
A similar scenario preceded the introduction of FMS at Ooach 
Oo. The company planned a new range of vehicles and a project team
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was set up to investigate methods of producing these. The idea of 
FMS was put forward by the production engineer who had encountered 
it elsewhere. The importance of such a "Project Champion" to the 
introduction of FMS was implicit at a number of companies in the 
study and is a phenomenon which has been observed by other 
researchers in this area (Gerwin and Blumberg, 1981; Bessant and 
Haywood, 1985). The project team compiled a short list of potential 
FMS purchases that fell within their budget and invited the 
suppliers of these systems to give presentations. After this, each 
department identified their first three preferences of systems. The 
aggregated scores indicated which system the company should invest 
in. The normal investment appraisal was conducted and the proposed, 
proceeded through the normal capital sanctioning route.
The proposed increases in output at both Gear Oo. and Coach 
Oo. helped to create the conditions for the merger of viewpoints 
from personnel from different departments. A synthesis of ideas 
could also take place through the active campaigning of the 
production engineer. This is demonstrated by the example of Motor 
Oo. Here, the production engineer solicited unofficial reports fran 
other departments. For example, the marketing department was asked 
to report cn the effect cn sales of the reduction of cycle times by 
three weeks. The engineer also sought an accountant's help in 
preparing an initial appraisal. In this way the accounting 
categories that would be accepted as legitimate were identified in 
advance of the formal submission of the proposal and any potential 
opposition of the accountants was avoided by their incorporation 
into the preparation of the investment proposal.
In all of the corporations discussed up to now it has been
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explained hew the potential existed for accounting standards to be 
adapted to the contours of engineering systems despite the formally 
superordinate position of accountants over engineers.
In the remaining instances the introduction of FMS was 
prompted by those above the accountants. This raises a number of 
important issues. Firstly, were the financial criteria too
A*
stringent and applied too rigidly to deter the proposal of FMS by 
engineers, and was this the reason why FMS emanated from executives 
or above? Secondly, if accounting analysis had to be jettisoned to 
facilitate the introduction of FMS, vhat were the implications for 
the subsequent legitimacy of the company's prevailing accounting 
criteria? Thirdly, what was put in the place of the accounting 
criteria when the decision was made and vhat were the implications 
of this for the cost monitoring stage? The remainder of this 
section will aim to provide answers to these questions whilst 
outlining the different routes by which FMS were introduced into 
the companies not yet discussed.
At two of the firms in this study members of the board had 
initiated the introduction of FMS. In both instances FMS could not 
be justified if each company's normal accounting criteria had been 
rigorously applied. There was a divergence between the two 
companies, however, in the extent to which the directors acted 
overtly and in a way that could be perceived as remaining within 
the bounds of legitimate activity allowed by the company's 
procedures. At Miner CO., there was an open attempt by directors to 
assess different forms of information simultaneously at board level 
as a means of identifying the full range of advantages which FMS 
could bring to the company's performance. The manufacturing
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director at Miner Oo. explained how this horizontal merger of
insights from different analyses was facilitated by the initial
decision by the group board - there was no individual carpany board
- to invest in FMS:
lfWe didn't say to a bunch of engineers: "Go and 
reccmnend something and we will accept it or we 
will knock it down." We looked at it from the 
point of view of a fairly fundamental piece of 
strategy. You'll have glimpsed at the back end 
of the machine shop down there a whole of a 
clutter of machines looking more like 1930 than 
1990. New that's where we were with the entire 
shop in 1982. And we said: "Well, vhat are we 
going to do? We can just leave it to the normal 
course of events and the production engineers 
will come along and say: ’Well that machine's 
worn out now and we need to replace it. The 
right thing to do is to buy this sort of 
machine to do it."" We said: "No. That's not 
the right sort of approach." So we need to have 
sane mare specific and sane mare sort of global 
input into it. So we identified a project 
leader if you like or a senior man involved. We 
said to the technical director of our company,
Bob Warren: **You are responsible for developing 
our new technology."
After the technical director had put together the proposal, he
approached the manufacturing director and they then took the facts
and figures of the appraisal, which did not meet their normal
financial criteria, to the financial director to enlist his
support. They then presented the proposed to a full board meeting.
This manoeuvre was to ensure that the proposal would be passed by
the six-man board despite the poor payback offered by the system.
The assent of the full board was obtained and the investment went
ahead. The manufacturing director explained the firm's moderation
of the accounting criterion in the following way:
"Now it didn't take very long in looking at 
vhat we looked for and looked at to say that:
"We are going to have to spend upwards of £1 
million, ... and if after grants it's a net
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bill of between £450 - 500,000 worth of 
expenditure and we are going to get something 
like £130 - 140,000 benefit from it we are 
looking at between a three and four year 
payback." Now, this is where the act of faith 
comes in and you/ re beyond the realms of 
financial judgement. If we had have only had 
this thing to consider. I don't think we would 
have done it, even at that. Because we don't 
normally go in for paybacks of four years. New 
we are looking at one that we knew intimately 
as part of the life blood of our business. So 
we are saying here that: "This is a poor 
return. We would normally look for three years 
or better return on capital. This m e  looks as 
if it is worse than that. This one looks as if 
it is three and a half to four rather than two 
and a half to three." .... We had to make a 
judgement, and we made it intuitively rather 
than calculated it."
It does not appear unreasonable to suggest that, had the 
proposal come up through the normal capital sanctioning route, the 
investment would not have gone ahead. The "global view" of the 
board, their awareness of exceptional circumstances surrounding the 
investment, and the strength of half of the board speaking in 
support of the FMS, made it possible for the investment to go ahead 
without the normal hurdle figures being realised.
Yet, despite this direct challenge to that validity, the 
normal accounting criteria were left largely intact. The directors 
had plotted the levels of performance they anticipated to realise 
with the system, assessed the value of such performance by their 
normal accounting criteria, and rendered those as inappropriate 
measures, but only for the special circumstances which only they 
were in a position to perceive. The validity of the accounting 
analysis within the enterprise was, thus, protected even though it 
had been found wanting (2 ).
The suggestion for IMS had also ccme from executive level at
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Diesal Engine Oo. However, unlike at Miner Oo. the director had 
acted in a clandestine way through the proxy of the production 
engineer. As a result the FMS was subjected to the normal financial 
evaluation procedures and accounting criteria. This was to cause a 
number of problems at the cost monitoring stage. The proposal of 
the FMS arose at the time of the preparation of the annual capital 
investment plan. The production engineer submitted his proposals 
for the plant that he thought would be necessary for the ensuing 
year. These did not include the introduction of FMS. His 
suggestions were passed to his immediate superior. The normal 
practice was for the supervisor to familiarise himself with details 
and then pass the proposals on to the accountant and the board of 
directors. However, his supervisor subsequently returned the 
submissions to the production engineer and told him to incorporate 
plans for one FMS in his proposals for that year and to suggest the 
introduction of three systems as part of the long term development 
of the company.
This directive was reported to have originated from the 
managing director. The production engineer was not versed in the 
merits of FMS but he knew that the proposal would have to conform 
to the company's normal investment criteria. As a consequence he 
made extravagant claims about the performance of the system along 
traditional dimensions of machining times and system utilisation. 
This included proposals for seven-day shift working even though the 
introduction of such "continental” shifts had not been seriously 
considered: The accountant reported that seven-day working was 
never raised with the Trade Unions and had not been introduced. It 
was only after the plans were redrafted that the proposals were
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seen by the other directors. The consequence of this was that no 
consideration was given to the way in which FMS might bring new 
advantages. FMS was justified and sanctioned by the company's 
traditional accounting criteria.
It is not clear in this instance whether the company's FMS 
systems were viable options. What is clear is that they could not 
be used for the company's intended objectives and justified by the 
company's traditional criteria. Hcwever, the subterfuge involving 
the managing director, the production engineer and his supervisor 
led to the systems being introduced only as a consequence of their 
capacity being overstated, and this provided the standard of 
performance to be monitored at the cost control stage. These, of 
course, were not reached. (See section 7.5 belcw for discussion of 
consequence of this point.)
At the final two corporations the drive for FMS originated 
outside of the immediate company. This contributed to the financial 
evaluations not being salient in deciding whether the companies 
invested in FMS. Instead, the pre-investment financial calculation 
served to define the standards of performance that were to be 
realised once the systems were operational. It has already been 
reported that at Alley Corp., a small number of projects emanated 
fran a separate Technical Division, and this was the route by which 
the FMS was introduced. As a consequence the company did not have 
to provide a financial justification for the system prior to its 
introduction, although they were expected to realise recovery of 
the investment. Thus, clear expectations of performance were placed 
on the system once introduced. It is not clear whether a proposal 
for IMS would have been sanctioned if it had been proposed by the
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production engineer as the system may have proved more expensive to 
purchase from an outside body. However, accounting criteria should 
not have proved an obstacle in the future: Implicit in the 
Technical Division's development of the system was the desire for 
Fie to have a more widespread application within the corporation.
At the remaining company the FMS system would not have been 
introduced via the normal capital sanctioning route. One director 
reported that their system would not have paid for itself over 15 
years if the company had not received a high level of Government 
assistance. The impetus for the introduction of FMS at this 
company, Brit Machine Tools., arose from an open invitation by the 
then labour Government. All engineering companies had been asked to 
submit ideas for installing advanced manufacturing systems. The 
respondent firm was one of the few to do so and they negotiated a 
special deal with the Government. The terms of this agreement were 
that the company would not incur any costs over their existing 
production methods as a consequence of installing FMS. A grant 
would be provided as recompense for the additional expenditure. The 
size of the grant was determined by the company taking a random 
selection of 50 parts from the range which they produced, 
calculating the costs of installing a system capable of producing 
these and the cost of producing the parts with their present system 
and assessing the difference. This amounted to 70% of the cost of 
the FMS which the Government provided. The role of the accountant 
at the pre-investment justification stage was simply to calculate 
the additional costs of producing with the FMS. However, implicit 
in these calculations was the standards of performance that was to 
be realised once the system was installed.
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In summary, the pre-investment justification is generally 
conducted in the course of a company's capital sanctioning 
procedures. This provides both an indicator of the likely 
profitability of a new investment and the provision of standards of 
performance by which the investment may subsequently be monitored. 
It has been reported that in the four independent companies and 
eight of the companies that belonged to corporate groups, normal 
capital sanctioning procedures were pursued when FMS was 
introduced. Thus, in all bar Small Machine Tool Oo., a full pre- 
investment justification was carried out. In seven of the other 
firms that belonged to corporate groups, changes were made to the 
company's normal capital sanctioning procedures to facilitate the 
introduction of FMS. It has been explained that whilst this 
sometimes involved modification of accounting criteria, it did not 
lead to their jettisoning altogether. The extent to which the 
content of these pre-investment justification appraisals reflected 
the strengths of the FMS systems that companies introduced and the 
companies' ability to monitor the realisation of those strengths 
are the subjects of the next two Chapters.
5.4 Conclusion.
The concern of this thesis is whether inappropriate accounting 
standards sure being imposed on the machine tool configuration of 
FMS, resulting in the latter's deployment for undesirable ends. 
Ihis chapter has sought to investigate the potential of engineers 
to articulate financial parameters that reflect the strengths of 
the novel engineering systems that they propose, or whether they 
have to accept the imposition of accounting criteria by others. It
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was explained in Chapter Two that, whilst engineers tend to hold a 
formally subordinate position to accountants at firms where the 
separation of ownership frcm control has led to the devolution of 
management responsibility to occupational groups, accountants are 
dependent on engineers to provide them with information about 
shopfloor processes.
This Chapter has reported the details of 19 firms that were 
successful in introducing a total of 21 FMS systems. It has been 
explained that at 15 of the firms, where 16 systems have been 
introduced, there has been a separation of ownership fran control. 
At these companies the engineers' access to information about the 
organisation of the shopfloor resulted in them having the 
responsibility for preparing the initial financial evaluation of a 
system. Engineers did, at least, have the opportunity to articulate 
novel strengths of new systems when appropriate. The remaining four 
firms were small independent companies. As a consequence, there had 
been less pronounced developments in the division of labour between 
managerial groups and accounting and engineering criteria tended to 
be afforded parity with one another. This limited the likelihood 
that inappropriate standards would be imposed on engineering 
systems. Thus, at all of the companies in this study, the normal 
capital sanctioning procedure provided the opportunity to those 
responsible for the engineering function to express the ways in 
which accounting criteria should be contoured to reflect the 
strengths and weaknesses of particular engineering systems.
The route by which IMS was introduced at the firms in this 
study has also been examined. It has been reported that at twelve 
of the companies, including all four of the independent firms, IMS
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was introduced through the normal capital sanctioning procedures. 
This does not mean that accounting criteria were necessarily 
altered to reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the respective 
ocnpanies' IMS. Uiis is the topic of the next chapter. What it does 
mean, however, is that, where the company generally employed 
accounting criteria they continued to do so. At the remaining seven 
companies, their respective FMSs were introduced by a different 
route. In some instances this did involve companies employing other 
rationales to legitimate the introduction of their systems and 
either waiving or relaxing the financial criteria used for 
evaluation purposes. Nonetheless, scenarios of activity were still 
projected as standards of performance that the FMSs were expected 
to attain when they were operational.
Footnotes.
(1) Masculine terminology is used in this instance because all 
engineers in this study were men. No normative inference is 
intended.
(2) Such a scenario is clearly analogous to Thomas Kuhn's (1970) 
scientific community's provision of ad hoc explanations that 
protect the validity of a paradigm even when that paradigm is 




C h a p te r S ix .
6 .1  In tro d u c tio n .
It is a ocnbention of this thesis that the eventual pattern of 
deployment of FMS should be seen as the culmination of the process 
of technical change. Accounting practices are used at two key 
points in that process: At the pre-investment evaluation stage and, 
subsequently, at the cost control stage. Chapter Four explained 
that a large number of critics have argued that there are biases in 
pre-investment justifications. Whilst these biases might prevent 
the introduction of FMS they could encourage certain types of 
deployment that are contrary to a company's best interests. 
Hcwever, Chapter Five has explained that the same engineering staff 
that are responsible for selecting new systems also prepare the 
initial financial justification. They are in a position to contour 
the pre-investment justification to reflect the manufacturing 
strengths of the FMS. Thus, there is the potential for any 
variation in the deployment of FMS to be either the outcome of a 
conscious and deliberate choice expressed in different financial 
justifications, or the unintended consequence of the application of 
biased accounting techniques at the pre-investment stage. In order 
to determine hew the pre-investment justification influenced the 
subsequent pattern of deployment of FMS this chapter will: (i) 
detail the motivations which led to the introduction of FMS; and, 
(ii) identify the extent to which each company's personnel were 
successful in contouring their pre-investment justifications to 
reflect their stated manufacturing objectives. From this point it 
will be possible for the next chapter to address the main concern 
of this thesis: that is the independent inpact of cost controls on
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the deployment of FMS.
6 .2  Com panies9 M o tiv e s  fo r  in tro d u c in g  FMS.
It has already been explained that, generally, IMS are most 
viable when deployed for the machining of a mid-sized range of 
parts of between 4 - 5 0  that are required in medium sized batches 
of between 50 - 2,000 (Avlantis and Parkinson, 1981; 77; Bessant 
and Haywood, 1985: 33). However, Chapter Three has argued that the 
benefits of such a manufacturing facility will be particular to a 
company's situation. That is to say, that they will vary according 
to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the company's preceding 
production arrangements and the specific range of parts and batch 
sizes that the company's markets demanded.
The companies in this study had previously used comparable 
machining systems. All had employed stand-alone machines for batch 
production of a range of parts. They did, however, want to realise 
different types of improvement to their existing performance by 
introducing IMS. The personnel at the nineteen companies that had 
introduced a total of twenty-one FMS configurations were asked to 
explain their motives for purchasing their system or systems. Table 
6 . 1  provides a summary of the responses.
Despite the wide variety of motives that are apparent from the 
table, there is a dear pattern in the responses given. Whilst the 
staff of seme companies offered only one reason for purchasing IMS, 
all firms expressed at least one of the three objectives of: "To 
improve or maximise machine utilisation”; "To reduce costs by 
carrying less stocks"; or, "To respond to an increasing range of 
goods". Each of these ends correspond with one or another of the
193
Table 6.1: Summary of companies' motivations 
for introducing IMS and the number of systems 
that were introduced as a consequence of each 
motive.
M o tiv a tio n  g iv e n . Number
Improve or maximise m/c utilisation: 13
Reduce costs by carrying less stocks: 5
Reduce number of operations: 1
Introduce some unstaffed operation: 2
Bring work,'back in-house: 3
Respond to diminishing range of goods: 2
Have a demonstration tool: 1
Shift production to Europe: 1
Improye market Response by 3
reducing lead times:
Improve quality by tighter tolerances: 2
Respond to increasing range of goods: 4
three manufacturing philosophies identified in the earlier 
chapters of this thesis. Hie advantages of 'Hass Production" are 
maximisation of output from the resources of labour and machinery. 
The main benefits of "Just-in-Time" is minimisation of stocks 
held; whilst proliferation of parts machined is facilitated by 
"Flexible Manufacturing". This comparability did not appear to be 
a randan coincidence. Conversations with personnel at the firms in 
the study suggested that the variations in objectives overlaid 
different perceptions of the economics of manufacturing with IMS.
At the firms where personnel had expressed "Mass Production" 
aligned objectives, the most advantageous quality of FMS was 
believed to be its ability to machine each part in rapid 
succession to one another. This facilitated high levels of machine 
and labour utilisation and a consequent reduction in unit costs. 
The accountant at Far Machine Tool Go. explained the benefits of 
FMS, thus:
194
"I mean the FMS is really built largely on mass 
production. That's where the big benefits of 
FMS are? where you've got a large batch size 
going through. You can set your machine 15). You 
can use that one control and you can put a lot
of components through of the same. Now if
you're doing one-offs the benefits come a bit 
limited. You've got the speed and you've got 
the sort of reliability but you've got to keep 
changing your workstations and your pallets and 
your whatever."
This view of IMS was not confined to accountants and did not
represent a manifestation of an accounting-engineering divide.
Whenever the idea of "If it's not turning, it's not earning." was
expressed at a particular firm it appeared to be an opinion that
was shared by both engineers and accountants. For instance, at
Industrial Vehicles, the production engineer explained his decision
to exploit the potential gains of productivity in FMS in preference
to adding to the system's cost to acquire flexibility. He said:
"the spindle is obviously the thing that is 
going to cut the metal and everything that 
supports the spindle is called flexibility 
isn't it? And the more you put in there is 
going to expand the cost .... That's why it's 
always easier to justify things on the high 
volume than it is on the low volume."
By contrast the personnel at companies where FMS had been
introduced to realise "Just-in-Time" objectives perceived the
economic strengths of FMS arising from its capability to process
parts speedily at all stages of the manufacturing process,
including the machining and intervening stages. The Production
Engineer at Small Machine Tool Co. said:
"The benefits of FMS is the reduction of 
cutting times and the reduction of lead times."
This capability allowed the ccarpany to machine parts when required
instead of in anticipation of orders. As a consequence the firm was
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able to carry lower inventories.
Elsewhere at the companies where the systems had been
introduced for reasons aligned to "Flexible Manufacturing"
philosophy the personnel perceived FMS to offer a wide range of
financial benefits. This included the capability of switching
production to machining different parts without having to invest in
a new system. The Production Engineer at Coal Co. explained the
full ambit of the benefits of FMS in the following terms:
"When we did the FMS, the project started as a 
manufacturing idea and then we suddenly 
realised that we're talking about company 
profitability. We're talking not just about 
direct costs, but indirect costs, on total 
costs, the lead time of getting a part through 
the factory, being able to change production 
and being more competitive in a range of 
different ways is very important."
The clusters of motivations given by companies, and the 
differing perceptions of the underlying economics of manufacturing 
with FMS, suggest that it is appropriate to classify the systems in 
this study by whether they were introduced for reasons that were 
consistent with "Mass Production", "Just-in-Time" or "Flexible 
Manufacturing" philosophies. Table 6.2 provides a summary of the 
number of firms that fall into each category. (1) When it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the findings of the firms in 
this study it is this categorization that will be used.
If the process of technical change is a deliberate one, it is 
to be anticipated that the form of the pre-investment 
justifications of FMS will vary according to a company's stated 
motivations for deploying their systems. The extent of any 
variations at the companies in this study is the subject of the 
next section.
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Table 6.2: Categorization of FMS systems introduced by philosophy 
that motivation of company coincides with.
Mass Just in Flexible
Production Time manufacture





Aligned & 5 3 3
Other
Motives
Totals 13 4 4
nb: This is not intended to infer that the companies concerned were 
adopting company wide philosophies. It is merely that the 
advantages which companies sought to realise with FMS corresponded 
with the advantages associated with the different philosophies.
6.3 Companies# Use of Pre-Investment Justifications.
Chapter Four explained that pre-investment evaluations involve 
assessing whether the cost of a new system is outweighed by: (i) 
the extra output that arises from the additional capacity that a 
new system offers; and (ii) any savings or improvements over 
existing methods of production that accrues over; (iii) the 
lifetime of the system. Critics have claimed that each element of 
this calculation prejudices companies against introducing FMS. It 
was suggested above that, if the critics' arguments are correct, 
pre-investment justifications are likely to generate expectations 
of subsequent performance that lead to any system that is 
introduced being used used for ends aligned to "Mass Production". 
However, this thesis has argued that engineers and other personnel 
who propose the introduction of FMS generally have the 
responsibility for composing the initial pre-investment evaluation. 
This provides them with the opportunity to contour accounting 
categories to reflect their perceptions of the manufacturing
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strengths of the system that they proposed. It is the objective of 
this section to investigate: whether the aforementioned bias in 
pre-investment justifications did constrain companies in their 
evaluations of IMS; or, whether the engineers were successful in 
adapting their appraisals to reflect the strengths of their 
intended systems.
Companies' D e f in i t io n  o f  C a p a c ity .
Capacity determines the output and, thus, the revenue that 
arises from the introduction of a system. Chapter Four explained 
that the pre-investment justification's assumption that the 
capacity of a system will remain constant throughout its lifetime 
is alleged to discriminate against FMS. The evaluation calculation 
recognises the system's high cost, but it does not acknowledge the 
increases in the value of the system that arises when the company's 
personnel has accumulated knowledge of the full range of machining 
options that the system's capacity may be put to (Charlish, 1983).
A suitable definition of the capacity of FMS is necessary 
before the validity of this argument may be assessed. It was 
reported above that perceptions of the essential qualities of FMS 
vary according to a company's manufacturing objectives. Firms that 
wanted to obtain ends aligned to "Mass Production" philosophy, 
sought the ability to machine large numbers of parts at speed, in 
order to realise high levels of system utilisation. Companies that 
had objectives compatible with "JIT" philosophy wanted the ability 
to process a batch speedily when they required it. Firms with 
objectives aligned with "Flexible Manufacturing" philosophy saw FMS 
offering the capability of machining an increasing range of parts.
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The levels of system utilisation, batch size and range of parts 
that systems were justified against provide a suitable definition 
of the capacity of FMS with which to evaluate arguments about the 
biases in pre-investment justifications.
Respondents were asked to report the batch size, range of 
parts and levels of system utilisation which they used to justify 
their respective systems. Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 categorises their 
replies according to each company's motives for introducing FMS.
Table 6.3 levels of System Utilisation Desired.
"Mass "Just-in- "Flexible




90 - 94% 6
85 - 89% 1 2  1
80 - 84% 4 2
75 - 79% 1 1
70 - 74%
Others 2
The pattern in the tables shews that the types of expectations of
financial performance that are being generated at the pre-
Table 6.4 Batch size of parts intended for 
system.
"Mass "Just-in- "Flexible
Production" Time" Manufacturing 
(including (including
hybrid) hybrid)
1 (1) 4 3
2 - 5 
6 - 1 0
11 -  20
21 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50 6 1
51 - 100 5 
101 -  200 1 
Above 1
()indicates capability not economically 
applicable to whole of range.
investment justification stage vary between different companies
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and tends to reflect accurately, different manufacturing 
objectives and perceptions of the economic strengths of FMS. That 
is to say, at the companies where FMS had been introduced to 
realise "Mass Production" aligned objectives, the systems tended 
to be justified against high levels of system utilisation and a 
more limited range of parts machined in larger batch sizes. By 
contrast, the systems introduced to meet "Flexible Manufacturing" 
aligned objectives were justified against a lower level of system






11 - 20 5
21 - 30 4
31 - 40
41 - 50 2
51 - 75 1
76 - 100 1
101 - 200
200 +
utilisation and the machining of a wider range of parts in smaller 
batch sizes. At firms where "JIT" aligned objectives had been 
expressed, FMS was justified against the production of a more 
limited, albeit higher value, range of parts machined in batch 
sizes of one, even if this meant a less clear definition of the 
levels of system utilisation that would be obtained. For example, 
the Production Engineer at Snail Machine Tool Go. reported that the 
focus of the pre-investment considerations was not on levels of 
system utilisation and that once the system was operational this 
had ranged from 20% to 90%. The company were happy to accept this 
as the important objective was to process parts as speedily as 
possible. Elsewhere at Scot CO. the Production Engineer reported
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that the system had been justified against 800 units being machined 
per annum rather than against a level of machine utilisation.
lhe definition of capacity in the pre-investment justification 
could, therefore, be varied to reflect a company's manufacturing 
objectives. The precondition of the system's purchase was that it 
generated sufficient revenues? not that it had capacity consistent 
with that of dedicated systems.
It is of value to note at this point that systems introduced 
to meet "JIT" and "Flexible Manufacturing" aligned objectives were 
justified against ranges of parts required in batch sizes that fall 
outside of that which is deemed to be economically viable. (See, 
Avlantis and Parker, 1981; Bessant and Haywood, 1985.) Although, 
the availability of grants may have helped to expand the 
constituency of FMS, it is also likely that Avlantis and 
Parkinson's formulations are applicable only as a general rule. It 
will be reported below that IMS systems were justified, in part, by 
inventory savings and reductions in sub-contracting costs, when 
introduced to meet the respective objectives of "to reduce costs by 
carrying less stocks" and "to respond to demand for a wider range 
of parts". It would appear that where the costs of these are high 
the constituency where FMS may be employed will be expanded.
To return to the main theme of this discussion, the definition 
of capacity that each company used to justify their respective 
systems appears to have been more fluid and less fixed at the time 
of the pre-investment justification than writers such as Chariish 
(1983) suggest. It will be recalled from Chapter Five that the 
engineer or other personnel who conducted the initial pre- 
investment justification moved between two types of discourse. On
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the one hand, they use engineering knowledge to elaborate a 
production system with the capacity to machine a range of parts in 
particular sized batches at a given level of system utilisation. On 
the other, they attribute financial values to that production 
output to assess whether a profit will be realised. What this 
involves when a system is not dedicated to a single use is the 
identification of the permutation of different processes that 
facilitate the range of production required. The time necessary for 
changeovers and set-ups, development work, retooling and machining, 
all have to be quantified and then aggregated into a scenario that 
the company anticipates will take place. The projections provide 
the bases for estimating the revenue generated from output for 
inclusion in the pre-investment calculation. However, that scenario 
might not materialise exactly as the engineer had originally 
envisaged when conducting the pre-investment justification. Changes 
in the the pattern of demand may lead to a contraction of 
production of one part from the range and an expansion in the 
production of another. Despite this, the constituent numbers of 
set-ups, machining, etc., may remain comparable to those that were 
articulated in the initial scenario. This may or may not entail a 
retreat from one or another of the dimensions of performance that 
have been used here to define capacity. Nevertheless, it is the 
company's personnel who know whether it is range of parts, batch 
size or system utilisation that is most important to realise the 
financial returns. They are able to schedule work for the FMS to 
ensure pursuit of the dimension that promotes the best possible 
scenario. Thus, what the definition of capacity in the pre­
investment justification tends to represent is not a fixed
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capacity. It is the parameters of capacity.
Obviously, this is not a total refutation of Charlish's
claims. The parameters in the definiticn are fixed at the time when
the pre-investment evaluation is carried out. This is not
unrealistic. Any potential proliferation of uses of FMS takes place
within a context of the finite machining time offered by a system.
This was machining time which had already been purchased to meet
some purpose. As the engineers themselves pointed out,
proliferation of the potential range of uses might not increase the
value of the output when the potential volume was limited by the
finite system time, but it would increase the costs of production.
The Production Engineer at Miner Co. said:
"There is a limit to hew many things you could 
make at the end of the day, as well, of course.
It might be desirable to make 150 different 
items but it's impossible if you've used your 
120 hours per week. You make one thing at the 
expense of another then. In fact, its even less 
well because you're only going to be making 
something now and then, having spent £20,000 on 
tooling for it, you know. So you will reach a 
saturation point from a production capacity 
point of view as well."
Also, companies continued to employ other types of machine
tool configuration. As was explained in Chapter Three these are
more suited to machining some types of new work depending on the
potential scale and regularity of the demand for the new part. This
also serves to limit the parameters of potential uses of FMS. The
Production Engineer at For Machine Tool Co. spoke in the following
terms of the relative merits of putting new work onto IMS and CNC:
"It takes us longer to put a part into 
manufacture on the FMS in its normal stages 
than it does on a normal CNC machine. The 
reason being there are a lot more restraints 
that we have to abide by. Like, we've got a
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tool management package. That means that a man 
in this department here has got to do all the 
work necessary to put it into production. He 
can't leave the supervisor or the operator to 
do anything. It has got to be rigidly followed 
from the start to the finish. Now with normal 
work going through the shop we expect that a 
supervisor and the operator and the pre-tooling 
guys all contribute, but they can't with the 
FMS without ballsing it up."
This raises questions about the division of labour between
programmers and operators. These are outside of the competence of
this thesis. The important point is that the carrpany's possession
of other types of engineering systems places financial limits on
the batch sizes of particular parts that may be machined on an FMS
and limits the eventual range.
In summary, the capacity of a system determines the number and 
types of parts that a system may machine and, thus, the sum of 
revenue that is generated. Pre-investment justifications are 
allegedly not suitable for evaluating investment in FMS because 
they assume that the capacity of a system is constant throughout 
its lifetime and may be defined when the machinery is purchased. It 
has been argued here that the definition of capacity embodied in 
pre-investment evaluations are not as fixed as critics suggest. 
Engineers have been successful in aligning the definition of 
capacity that they use to justify their systems with their stated 
manufacturing objectives. In all instances, this has entailed 
specifying the parameters of the system's use rather than providing 
an absolute and rigid definition of capacity. This may not be an 
unrealistic representation as the potential manufacturing options 
offered by FMS are not as wide as some writers claim. They are 
limited by actual financial constraints.
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Savings Expected from FMS.
Hie pre-investment justification does not only examine the 
income generated from the additional output capacity of a system. 
It also assesses whether the proposed system offers either savings 
in resources, or other improvements to performance over the 
existing methods of production. Critics have argued that pre- 
investment justification techniques focus on the location where the 
new system will be introduced and generally detail only the 
reductions in direct labour that are achieved (Primrose and 
Leonard, 1984b; Shewchuk, 1984). FMS offers a wide range of other 
advantages including inventory savings (Primrose and Leonard, 
1984b? Hutchinson, 1984; Hutchinson and Holland, 1982), ability to 
vary production (Jones and Scott, 1986), space reductions (Littler 
and Salaman, 1984), tooling and a host of other gains (Klahorst, 
1983) that fail to materialise when other systems are introduced. 
As FMS systems are expensive and cannot be justified by reductions 
in direct labour, the failure of pre-investment justification 
techniques to quantify other gains prejudice companies against 
installing F*MS (Primrose and Leonard, 1984) .
To allow the validity of these arguments to be assessed each 
of the companies in this study were asked to provide details of 
their investment appraisals. Whilst all respondent firms were 
prepared to indicate what types of savings they sought to quantify, 
only seme were prepared to divulge details of the actual values of 
the gains and savings in each category. The responses received are 
summarized in table 6.6. Reading from the left, the first thirteen 
systems are those introduced for "Mass Production" aligned 
objectives, the next four are those that were intended for "JIT"
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Table Summary of factors built into the financial justification of FMS based on exact figures supplied by the
company of the justification or (*) information of alternative expenditure which the company reported they would
have incurred had they not invested in FMS.
Mar. Coa. Dual Brit Tran Smal For Moto Ind. Ind Gear Boil Dies Mine Scot Smal Prin Nat Alio Dies Coal
Co. Co.
*
Air Mach Co. Moto Mach Co. Vehl Vehl Co. Co. Engl Co. Co. Mach Co. Air Corp Engl Co.
Grants 11% 12.5% 30% 70% 22% 33% 33% No No No 46% 33% 33% 46% 60% 33% 10% 33% 33% 26% 26%
Labour# 4% 3% 20% Yes 2% 3.5% 6% 6.25% Yes 10% 17.5% .5% 3% Yes Yes 18%-
M/nery 8% 60%+ Yes Yes 44% Yes Yes 25%
M/c tim Yes Yes Yes 8% pa
Set-ups - Yes 3% pa
Tooling l%pa
O’head 17% pa 3%
B’dings 20%
Sub-con Yes Yes 20% pa Yes Yes Yes Yes 15% pa
Output 6% pa 5% pa Yes Yes Yes
V
Yes Yes Yes
WIP 2.5% Yes 1.2% pa 7.5% 7% Yes 14.5% 13% Yes Yes Yes 3%
Int’est 1.12% pa 3% pa 1.5% pa Yes
IndLab 3% pa
Energy l%pa Yes
Service .5% pa 3%
Scrap 3.5% pa Yes Yes
Intan’s 8%
Notes # Labour Figures = pa. except at Coal Co.
~ Figure includes labour but is wider category of direct costs.
types of objectives, and the last four are those that were 
purchased to meet "Flexible Manufacturing” aligned ends.
The table shows that there are a wide range of savings and 
advantages included in the pre-investment justifications of 
different systems. However, there is a pattern to the responses. 
This suggests that the engineers are enjoying some success in 
expressing the benefits and advantages that might be expected to 
arise frcm their respective firm's particular deployment of FMS. It 
was reported above that different ccxrpanies perceived the essential 
qualities of EMS in different ways and sought different types of 
improvements to their manufacturing performance when introducing 
FMS. Hie improvements sought were: greater exploitation of machine 
and labour productivity; more effective use of materials used; and, 
a proliferation of the range of parts that may be produced on the 
same system.
The table shews that at firms where systems were proposed for 
"Mass Production" aligned objectives, expectations of improved 
machining times and/ or reductions in labour were expressed in the 
financial justifications. For example high levels of labour 
reductions were expected to accrue annually at Dual Air, Boiler 
Co., Gear Go., Motor Go., Far Machine Tool Go. and at Industrial 
Vehicles Ltd., although exact figures were not provided at the 
latter firm. It can also be seen from the table that other 
productivity related savings such as reduced machining times and 
reductions in set-ups also figured prominently in the financial 
justifications of this group of companies.
At the firms where FMS was introduced to realise the "JIT" 
aligned obective of reducing the inventory carried, savings in
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work-in-progness featured prominently in financial justifications. 
The table ^nows that the savings at Soot Go. and Miner Go. were 13% 
and 14.5% respectively. My own calculations based on the 
information provided by Small Machine Tool Go. and Print Co. 
suggest that inventory reductions accounted for somewhere between 
20 - 33% of the cost of^ystems.
There was one group of companies - ie, the firms that had 
introduced their systems for the “Flexible Manufacturing" aligned 
objective of "responding to demand for an increased range of goods" 
- where FMS tended to be evaluated without a category of financial 
advantages that corresponded with the companies' stated objectives 
for introducing their respective systems.
An obvious explanation of why companies tended not to express 
the merits of flexibility in their financial appraisal is the 
nature of their preceding production arrangements. All of the 
companies had previously used standalone systems. These are suited 
to the economic production of a wide range of parts in small 
batches. Thus, the companies were not actually gaining the capacity 
to manufacture flexibly when purchasing FMS. Their expression of 
motives of "responding to demand for an increasing range of goods 
would therefore appear to be a mixture of factors including pro-FMS 
rhetoric, a relative absence of stable markets and an increase in 
the range of parts machined in-house due to the added capacity of 
FMS: Three of the companies used their introduction of FMS to bring 
back in-house work that had previously been sub-contracted out. 
Thus, reductions in sub-contracting costs figured prominently in 
their pre-investment evaluations.
There was one company, amongst the group that had introduced
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their system far "Flexible Manufacturing4' purposes, where there had
been a conscious attempt to articulate, in their pre-investment
justification, a new category of financial advantages that was
intended to represent the flexibility of their system. At Goal Co.,
the engineer had included a category of " intangibles". Although
this included financial values attributed to factors such as a
percentage of a last order and improved company image, the company
had no clear formulae far determining these. Instead the sums were
the subject of a process of negotiation by, and with, a number of
directors. In reply to a question of whether there had been any
objections to the "intangibles" being included in the appraisal the
Production Engineer said:
,4Well, obviously there were people who did'nt 
agree. At the end of the day it was our 
manufacturing executive, chief executive and 
marteting director who agreed cn these figures, 
and so any other member, he sort have had to 
really argue. There was no strong enough 
argument against it, because it/s really a 
matter of if someone said it was £10,000, 
somebody else might have said it was £50,000.
We may have struck a point in the middle. But 
we had about eight items [These included such 
factors as company image and the ability to 
respond to changes in demand] and that totalled 
to about £200,000. That was the intangible 
benefits."
When asked about accountants' willingness to accept such
advantages as legitimate, the Production Engineer claimed that the
engineering department had seized the initiative by selecting IMS.
Worrying about the means of justifying the system was a subsidiary
issue. He said:
"The time we did the FMS 1 we realised our 
present manufacturing was completely out of 
date, we just could not cope in terms of 
investment appraisal to our present system, and 
really it's a chicken and egg. We wanted to go
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ahead with the investment and if we waited for 
accountants to get their house in order and to 
agree on a system for costing we would never 
have got the projects off the ground.”
Whilst systems installed for "Flexible Manufacturing” aligned
objectives were introduced to machine a wider range of parts than
other systems in this study, no additional gain of flexibility over
the companies' preceding production arrangements had been achieved.
r *
Thus, no company had any systematic way of expressing such an 
advantage.
The table also shows a large number of savings which appear 
particular to different companies. Seme of these almost certainly 
do reflect the idiosyncracies of different companies' situations. 
For example, at Motor Oo. the company would have had to rebuild the 
roof to a building to accommodate the alternative replacement 
systems that required a much larger physical space than FMS. 
However, other advantages such as service, scrap and tooling which 
appear in cnly a small number of pre-investment j ustif ications may 
have been more generally accessible. The criticisms made of the 
focus of pre-investment justifications may, therefore, have some 
validity. Hcwever, the appearance of such savings in seme financial 
justifications indicate that this is not a weakness intrinsic to 
the evaluation. It is a consequence of how they are employed.
It is interesting to note that where such savings were 
included in the pre-investment evaluation of systems it was at 
those corporate firms, for example, For Machine Tool Oo., Motor Oo. 
and Goal Oo. where the pre-investment evaluation had been composed 
by engineers. This tends to confirm the arguments made in the 
preceding chapter: engineers do have the opportunity to articulate
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new gains when proposing FMS. There may be a nurrber of reasons why 
other engineers did not include additional savings in the pre- 
investment justifications. The availability of grants, see pp 212 - 
3, and the relaxation of other criteria used in the same 
calculation, such as the length of time allcwed for amortisation, 
may have made this unnecessary.
There was also some evidence to suggest that engineers' past 
experience of accountants' unwillingness to accept certain 
categories of savings may have discouraged engineers from 
attempting to quantify some gains. The group accountant at Boiler 
Oo. reported that he was generally unwilling to include any savings 
that could not be monitored by the company's existing financial 
apparatus. However, there was only limited evidence to suggest that 
accountants were actually ruling that certain categories of savings 
were not legitimate after engineers had proposed their inclusion. 
It was only in the instance of Dual Air 00. where there was a clear 
disparity between the accountant's and engineer's view of what 
benefits of FMS were legitimate. The engineer reported that he had 
included inventory savings in his financial justification of FMS. 
The accountant reported that stock reductions did not figure in his 
calculations and the general rule was not to allow such savings. 
But this firm was the exception. Engineers did not generally 
propose savings other than those in the table. This suggests that, 
whilst engineers may not include certain types of benefits of FMS 
because they anticipate that they will be ruled as illegitimate by 
accountants, in other cases any failure to provide a financial 
justification that mirrors the strengths of a manufacturing system 
may be a consequence of engineers' lack of understanding of
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accounting techniques.
The final factor to note from the table of advantages that 
were categorised in the pre-investment justification is the 
presence of grants. Grants fall into two types: those that 
discriminated in favour of a company's introduction of FMS; and 
those that did not. The former are awarded only to those ccnpanies 
that introduce FMS. These include grants allocated under the FMS 
scheme and Brit Machine Tool Oo.'s special award under the MAPOQN 
scheme. The latter sets of grants offers recompense along some 
other criteria for the investments made by companies and are 
allocated when any capital investment meets the relevant criteria. 
These include Regional Development Grant (RDG)s and European 
Development FUnd (EDF) awards. All but four of the systems in this 
study were introduced with the assistance of grants that prejudiced 
companies towards FMS. The exceptions were the systems that were 
introduced at Trans Co., Motor Co. and the two FMS systems 
installed at Industrial Vehicles ltd. While Trans Go., Miner Co., 
Gear Co. and Soot Oo. received RDG grants, Soot CO. also received 
an EDF award.
The importance of grants to investments in FMS may be 
interpreted in various ways. First, as same authors have argued, 
systems would not have been introduced without the Government's 
provision of financial assistance (Jones and Scott, 1985). Given 
the scale of awards, it would not be tenable to argue that grants 
were not essential to some investments taking place. For example, 
at Brit Machine Tool Co. one director reported that their 
investment in FMS would not have been recovered within 15 years 
without the 70% grant that the company had received. However, a
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question of more salience to this discussion is, whether there were 
instances where FMS constituted a viable investment without grants 
but would not have appeared as such because the pre-investment 
justification failed to represent accurately the advantages of the 
system. No straightforward answer can be given to this question. A 
number of production engineers did report that they believed their 
boards of directors interpreted the receipt of grants as, the 
Government providing a vote of confidence in the FMS system that 
the firm intended to purchase; and this was of equal significance 
as the cash itself. This is, perhaps, indicative of financial 
evaluation techniques leading boards of directors to have a 
conservative approach towards investment.
It is also of note that four of the systems introduced for 
"Mass Production" aligned objectives - three of which were at 
independent companies - were installed without the assistance of 
FMS grants. Given the easier merger of engineering and accounting 
ideas at small independent firms, the less ocnplex systems required 
for such purposes, and the aforementioned ability of pre-investment 
justifications to report advantages associated with "Mass 
Production" aligned objectives, it is possible to suggest a 
tentative conclusion. That is, it might be that grants have helped 
to overcome biases in pre-investment justifications at the 
corporate firms where systems have been introduced for motives 
aligned to philosophies other than "Mass Production". However, it 
is also possible that in other instances, FMS was a viable 
investment because of the provision of grants when it otherwise 
would not have been, regardless of the success of the company in 
deploying the system to realise its optimal performance.
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In summary, critics have argued that the myopic focus of pre- 
investment justifications leads companies to seek to justify the 
introduction of new machinery against the savings that accrue at 
the location of the new installation. This prejudices companies 
against the introduction of FMS. It has been argued throughout this 
thesis that as the personnel responsible for proposing new systems 
also prepare the initial financial justification, they have the 
opportunity to contour the pre-investment appraisals to the 
parameters of FMS. However, the existence of gains are context 
bound and limited by the strengths of a company's preceding 
production arrangements and their manufacturing objectives when 
deploying FMS. It has been reported in this section that the 
initiators of change have been relatively successful in expressing 
the major financial benefits that were likely to arise from their 
stated manufacturing objectives. Thus, where FMS has been 
introduced for "Mass Production" aligned objectives improved 
machining times and reductions in labour featured prominently in 
the financial justifications of systems. Similarly, inventory gains 
were evident in the financial appraisals of systems introduced to 
attain reductions in stock. The failure of firms that reported 
their objective as "to respond to markets for an increasing range 
of parts", to express such a desire in the financial justification 
might be attributed to their prior employment of conventional batch 
production systems. This meant that the attainment of flexibility 
was not a new quality.
It has also been reported that there were a number of minor 
savings that might have appeared in pre- investment j usti f ications 
but were not expressed. There appears to have been a number of
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reasons for this including engineers failure to identify the gains 
when conducting the initial financial appraisal. However, in the 
majority of films in this study any failure to do so was offset by 
their receipt of grants.
U s e fu l l i f e  o f  system s.
The two preceding factors determine the income that a system 
will generate at any particular point. It is this sum, multiplied 
by the useful life of the system, that determines the total income 
that a company will receive from their investment. It is total 
income which is used to evaluate the potential for any investment 
to increase the company's profitability. Pre-investment 
j ustification appraisals have been criticised for understating the 
potential advantages of investment of FMS by misrepresenting the 
useful life of the system. (See Primrose and Leonard, 1984a.) The 
reader may recall from Chapter Four that there are two criticisms 
made of the notion of lifespan in pre-investment justifications. 
First, the financial evaluation assumes that the system's useful 
life commences immediately following its installation. As a 
consequence returns are expected from that point even though FMS is 
comprised of a number of constituent elements that have to be 
aligned with one another. Second, pre-investment evaluations only 
recognise the returns that are generated in the first two to three 
years after a system has been installed. Each of these alleged 
weaknesses in pre-investment justifications will be examined in 
turn.
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I n i t i a l  P e rio d
The type of contract that companies used to purchase IMS fell 
into two broad categories. Turnkey packages and non-turnkey 
packages. When systems were purchased as turnkey packages a company 
contracted with a supplier who was responsible for installing the 
whole system. Non-turnkey packages were purchased piecemeal often 
from different suppliers and the company took responsibility for 
operationalising the system. When a system was purchased as a 
turnkey package the vendor sold their customers the promise of a 
system complete with levels of performance if the system was 
deployed for the purposes for which it was purchased. In these 
instances payments for systems, and potential financial penalties 
on the vendor, were related to the actual performance of the system
(2). Therefore, any failure to express a gestation period in pre­
investment justifications should not have constituted a problem. 
Effectively, purchase of the system was not completed until it had 
reached the levels of performance in its financial appraisal. 
Eleven, or just over half, of the systems in this study were 
purchased as turnkey packages.
The need to represent a period for debugging in the pre- 
investment justifications of the remaining systems did not prove an 
obstacle to other companies introduction of FMS. Extra time was 
allowed before recovery of the investment was expected to commence 
when eight of the remaining ten systems were justified. Of the two 
companies not already accounted for, one was the firm that had not 
used any financial justification. It was not established whether 
the remaining company allowed extra time for debugging when 
conducting their initial appraisal.
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Thus, the need to represent a gestation period for debugging 
of IMS when the financial justification was carried out did not 
pros/e an impediment to the installation of systems at the companies 
in this study. Firms either purchased systems on contracts where 
they did not make payments until desired levels of performance were 
attained, or they adapted their appraisal techniques so that the 
period of recovery'of the investment was deferred.
U s e fu l l i f e  a t t r ib u t e d  to  FMS.
The use of appraisal techniques, such as payback, that expect 
recovery of an investment over a short period, may discourage 
investment in expensive manufacturing systems such as FMS 
(Primrose, Bailey and Leonard, 1984). However, FMS are not the cnly 
expensive systems. Therefore, it is likely that companies would 
have been confronted by this weakness in the past and adapted their 
pre-investment justification accordingly, prior to their 
installation of FMS.
All of the respondent firms were asked which techniques of 
appraisal they generally used to evaluate new systems and any 
changes that they had to make to their normal methods in order to 
be able to justify FMS. Table 6.7 categorises the responses (3) 
according to the company's general motive for introducing FMS.
The table shews that there were clear variations in both the 
techniques and the amortisation period used by companies to assess 
the merits of an investment prior to, and at the time of, the 
proposal of FMS. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a number of 
general points about the pattern of responses. Firstly, regardless 
of whether payback calculated over two years is a prohibitive
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technique per se, when used to evaluate FMS its effect appears to
be limited in practice. Hie majority of firms in this study were
using other evaluation techniques before they decided to invest in
FMS. Only six companies, that were responsible for introducing a
total of seven systems, were using payback calculated over periods
of less than three years when evaluating large investments
immediately prior to their purchase of FMS.
Table 6.7: Method of appraisal used by companies to appraise the 





Normal FMS Normal FMS Normal FMS
Payback:
Under 3 years. 5 2 1 - 1 1
3 - 5  years. 3 6 - 1 1 1  
Contract length. 3 2 - - - -
DCF:
7 - 9  years: - - 1 1 - -
10 years & above. 2 2* 1 1 2 2
Criteria not
articulated. - - 1 1 - -
Criteria
waived for FMS. 1 - -
* DCR figure reduced.
Secondly, the majority of companies, ie, four out of six, that 
had to change their evaluation techniques generally used payback 
calculated over two years. The success of two other companies that 
were responsible for introducing three FMS systems indicates that 
local factors can ameliorate the debilitating effect of payback 
calculations. Nevertheless, the general pattern of change in 
techniques suggest that these methods are prohibitive.
In summary, whilst payback calculated over less than three 
years may generally be a prohibitive method of appraisal, it was
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not problematic at the firms in the stud/ because: (a) the majority 
of firms did not generally use this technique prior to their 
installation of IMS; (b) seme firms modified their use of payback 
when evaluating FMS; and (c) where firms did persist with payback, 
local circumstances served to militate against the restrictive 
inpact of amortising capital over periods of less than three years.
Summary
The overall picture presented by this section is that the 
biases in pre-investment justifications are not intrinsic to the 
practices themselves. Hie definition of capacity of a system, the 
quantification of benefits, and the notion of lifetime that 
companies enplcy when conducting their pre-investment evaluation of 
FMS are all being modified. These modifications have facilitated 
the introduction of FMS at the firms in this study. The evidence 
suggests that the modi f ications that are being made are purposive 
and reflective of the gains that can be anticipated from the 
particular contexts of the different companies preceding production 
systems and respective intentions when introducing FMS. It is 
possible that further modifications could be made. However, it 
appears from the available evidence that the initiators of change 
must take scene responsibility for any failings. It does not appear 
to be that accountants are simply ruling that attempts to adapt 
pre-investment justifications are illegitimate.
6.4: Conclusion.
The argument of this thesis is that the eventual pattern of 
deployment of the new machine tool configuration of FMS can only be
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understood as the culmination of a series of stages. These stages 
encompass the whole process of technical change. This chapter has 
examined the role of accounting practices in the early stages of 
that process. It has been reported that companies generally 
selected their system to meet one of three types of objectives. 
These motivations reflected different perceptions of the economic 
strengths of FMS and conformed with one or other of the 
manufacturing philosophies of "Mass Production", "JIT" or "Flexible 
Manufacturing". They are also manifest in the different range and 
batch sizes of parts that the systems were expected to machine. 
Contrary to what a number of critics have argued there is evidence 
that pre-investment justifications are being contoured to express 
companies' aspirations for introducing their systems. These should 
provide the standards by which FMS are monitored at the cost 
control stage. Whether this was the case is the topic of the next 
chapter.
Notes
(1) The motivations expressed by personnel at two of the companies 
were in some ways hybrids of two philosophies. Miner Go. wanted to 
reduce the amount of stocks carried. They also selected FMS because 
the local trade unions had resisted successfully the introduction 
of three-shift working. FMS offered the possibility of operating 
through part of the night with a skeleton staff when, hitherto, the 
factory had been closed. In this sense it allowed the company to 
increase the productivity of their machinery. Thus, their 
motivations were a hybrid of both "Mass Production" and "Just-in- 
Time" philosophies. The other company that had introduced FMS for 
reasons that were compatible with more than one philosophy was Nat 
Air Co. It will be recalled from Chapter Five that Nat Air Co. 
generally selected systems that facilitated reducing WIP. Whilst 
FMS was expected to satisfy this end it was purchased because the 
company wanted to machine an increasing range of goods. The 
companies' objectives were, therefore, compatible with both 
"Flexible Manufacturing" and "Just-in-Time" philosophies. However, 
the main motivation of Miner Co. was to reduce stocks and the 
primary motivation of Nat Air Co. for selecting FMS rather than 
seme other system was to respond to demand for an increasing range
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of parts. For the purpose of simplifying the analysis and 
discussion, when it is necessary to categorise these different 
systems they will be classed according to the firms primary 
motivations. It should also be stated that Diesel Engines, had a 
clear strategy of linking the type of their IMS system to the 
particular batch sizes and ranges of parts. The second system did 
in fact fall between the first system introduced for productivity 
reasons and the third system which is not included in this study 
which was intended for flexibility purposes. The second system is 
included in the flexibility group both for reasons of simplicity 
and because its inclusion in this group leads to a fairer 
representation of the ^ motivations and systems at the companies in 
this study.
(2) Interviews with purchasing companies and with a supplier of 
FMS.
(3) At a number of companies where payback was used the accountants 
reported that other methods such as DCF or ROI were used to 
corroborate payback findings. However, as successful payback tended 
to be a pre-requisite for subsequent calculations the firms are 
categorised as using payback. The firms where this was the case 
were Dual Air CO., Motor GO., Alley Corp. and Diesel Engine Go. The 
generation of extra information also had the added function of 
serving to legitimate the accountants' position and buffer 
directors \for\ requests for all types of equipment that might be 




7 .1  In tro d u c t io n .
It is new possible to address directly the claims that the 
application of post-installation cost control is resulting in FMS 
systems being deployed for purposes that are detrimental to the 
user companies. It will be recalled fncxn Chapters One and Four of 
this thesis that other writers (Jaikumar, 1984; 1986; Skinner, 
1986; Jones, 1989) have explained the pattern of deployment of IMS 
systems for the manufacture of a small range of goods, in large 
batches, by reference to the biases in cost control. Cost 
monitoring, allegedly, emphasises maximisation of system 
utilisation and volume of output and this discourages companies 
from using FMS for the more profitable purpose of manufacturing a 
wide range of parts in small batches.
The notion of a single best use of FMS has been challenged in 
Chapter Three. It was argued that it was more appropriate to 
establish the best use of a system by reference to a firm's own 
manufacturing intentions, if that company is deploying FMS to 
machine a range of parts in batch sizes not suited to economic 
manufacture on the alternative systems that are available. The 
preceding chapter has found that there was not one definition of 
the best use of FMS shared by all firms. Instead there were three. 
These were: machining of a wide range of different items in small 
batches to reap the benefits of being able to manufacture new parts 
without purchasing new machinery, or "Flexible Manufacturing” 
aligned objectives; only machining parts when demanded by the 
market in order to realise reductions in the cost in inventories 
carried, or "Just-in-Time" aligned objectives; and, the machining
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of a limited range of goods in large batches as a means of reducing 
unit costs by increasing the levels of utilisation of machinery, or 
"Mass Production" aligned objectives. These different aspirations 
were manifest in different range and batch sizes of parts that 
companies hoped to put onto their respective FMS systems. The 
engineers, who were responsible for identifying the company's 
manufacturing objectives when deploying systems, also composed the 
pre-investment just if at ions and, enjoyed sane success in expressing 
the financial advantages that were likely to arise from their 
respective firm's particular deployment of FMS. It is to be 
expected that the claims in the pre-investment justification should 
then provide the standards of performance by which the system is 
monitored.
Hie objective of this chapter is to examine the actual 
mechanisms of cost monitoring and its success, or otherwise, in 
allowing a company to realise its initial manufacturing objectives 
when introducing FMS. In the course of this investigation the 
validity of other writers' criticisms of cost control will be 
examined. It will be recalled from Chapter Four that the rewarding 
of workers for high output, and the pursuit of high quotients of 
output per unit of labour or machinery expended, allegedly result 
in flexible systems being deployed for the large batch production 
of a limited range of goods. Thus, the first section in this 
chapter will report briefly the extent of the presence of 
performance related payment systems at the companies in this study. 
The second section will detail the strengths and weaknesses of 
flexible budgets, the main technique used for cost monitoring at 
the firms in this study, and investigate whether they encourage
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pursuit of productivity as suggested by critics of cost control. 
The third section will investigate the impact of cost control on 
the actual deployment of FMS. It will compare each company's 
desired levels of performance from systems introduced for different 
purposes with that which they actually attain. This part of the 
discussion will conclude that, regardless of the weaknesses that 
are evident in flexible budgets, cost monitoring promotes 
realisation of each company's initial manufacturing objectives by 
transforming the definition of capacity embodied in the pre­
investment justification into the definitions of standards of 
performance to be monitored at the post-installation stage. Thus, 
cost control can actually promote the realisation of flexible 
objectives when ocnpanies had initially sought realisation of these 
ends. The final section of this chapter will investigate the 
separate cost monitoring practice of audits. It will report that, 
contrary to the findings of other writers, audits have been 
conducted on a number of IMS systems. However, they have little 
independent effect because their main purpose is to amplify the 
findings of ongoing cost monitoring.
7 .2  M o n ito rin g  and M o tiv a tio n  o f  S h o p flo o r W orkers.
It was reported in Chapter Four that Wheatley (1989) notes 
that employers use payment-by-results schemes to ensure that 
workers pursue the maximum volume of output. Wheatley contends that 
this form of payment system leads production operators to oppose 
the employment of work techniques that could reduce the volume of 
output and, thus, the levels of their bonuses.
There was no evidence to support these claims at the firms in
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this study. Most companies used measured daywork payments prior to 
their installation of FMS. As workers are paid for the conduct of 
their stipulated work, and not for the volumes of output that they 
produce, measured daywork should not be incompatible with any 
deployment of FMS. There were three firms where sane form of bonus 
system had operated prior to the introduction of the FMS. When the 
respective systems were introduced one company negotiated with 
their FMS operatives to switch to measured daywork. The other two 
weighted their bonus systems to reflect the potential changes to 
output that were likely to arise. It would, therefore, appear fair 
to suggest that payment systems do not constitute an obstacle to 
the installation of FMS.
7.3 Continuity between Pre-investment Justifications and Ongoing 
Cost Control and the use of flexible budgets.
Chapter Four explained that the critique of cost control 
offered by a number of writers is that: the definition of output in 
terms of numbers produced (Jaikumar, 1984: 26? Jones and Scott, 
1986: 7; Jones, 1989: 49), coupled with the impetus to maximise the 
output from the inputs of either labour or machinery (Jaikumar, 
1984: 23? 1986: 71), results in FMS being used to machine a limited 
number of parts in large batch sizes when this is not appropriate.
The findings of this research do not contradict the 
description that these critics have given of the apparatus used for 
cost monitoring. For example, 19 of the 21 systems studied were 
measured by hew well they performed over each hour the system was 
machining. The remaining two companies evaluated the performance of 
their system vis-a-vis the labour hours expended in its operation.
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It will also be made clear in the ensuing discussion that the 
volumes of parts machined were monitored, and the merits of the 
performance of a system were assessed, through a comparison of the 
output of a system with the resources expended in their 
manufacture. However, a distinction must be made between the 
apparatus used for monitoring the standards of performance of FMS 
and the actual standards sought. It has been argued throughout this 
thesis that when engineers prepare the initial financial 
justifications of FIB they stipulate the performance profile of the 
system and this provides the standards by which the system is then 
monitored. Hie objective of this section is to describe how these 
standards are constructed into the cost monitoring apparatus when 
new systems are introduced, so that a manufacturing system may be 
deployed for the purposes for which it was purchased.
It will be recalled from Chapter Five that each year 
production engineers were invited to submit proposals for new 
systems. These systems were supposed to provide the capacity to 
machine the volumes and range of parts that were demanded by a 
company's markets, but which would not be manufactured by a 
company's existing facilities in the forthcoming year. A financial 
appraisal of the proposed system would be conducted. This would 
assess whether the revenues, generated by the improvements that the 
system brought to a company's ongoing manufacturing performance, 
outweighed the cost of purchase. If they did the purchase went 
ahead. The selection of a new system, thus, involves two different 
types of statement that aim to explain the same scenario. Firstly, 
there is the description of an engineering system that is suitable 
for the machining of certain types of parts in particular batch
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sizes, which is able to fill a manufacturing void at the company. 
Secondly, there is a statement of the levels at which different 
resources are to be consumed when the system is machining the 
desired parts if the company's profitability is to be protected.
It is the engineers who are primarily responsible for ensuring 
that the system is used, subsequently, to machine the types of work 
for which it was purchased. It is accountants who are responsible 
for monitoring whether resources are consumed at the desired levels 
of efficiency. A third group of personnel, production management, 
hold the responsibility for ensuring that the work allocated to the 
IMS is processed at the desired levels of efficiency. A description 
of each of these groups' responsibilities will serve to demonstrate 
how the three different manufacturing objectives (1) sought by 
different respondent firms were realised when FMS systems were 
introduced.
After a system has been purchased and operational ised to the 
expected standards of performance by the engineers, and suppliers 
where systems were purchased as turnkey packages, it was generally 
placed under the direct supervision of a production department. 
However, it also added to the total capacity of the machining 
facilities that engineers had at their disposal. It will be 
recalled from Chapter Three that the different types of engineering 
systems that companies possess are, more or less, suited to the 
economic manufacture of parts that are required in different ranges 
and batch sizes. The company's engineering staff had to reconcile 
the demand for a company's products, with the manufacturing 
facilities' capabilities to meet that demand, in the most economic 
way. Thus, the engineers, with the assistance of schedulers and
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shopfloor management, allocated work to departments and 
manufacturing systems according to their available capacity when 
machining operations had to be performed.
If customer demand was as had been projected in the pre- 
investment evaluation, parts that the system had been introduced to 
machine would be channelled to the IMS. If the pattern of demand 
changed and the IKS had to be turned to a new use, the system was 
still expected to attain the levels of performance stipulated in 
the pre-investment justification.
It is inportant to remember that it was the engineers who had 
been responsible for the preparation of the initial financial 
justification of FMS. They knew the standards of performance that 
the system was expected to attain along the different dimensions of 
utilisation, batch size and range of parts. They also recognised 
the argument made in Chapter One above. That is, there is a trade­
off between realising these different ends. The engineers were 
aware of which dimensions of the system's performance premised the 
greatest financial reward (see Section 6.2 above) and they 
allocated work in ways that ensured protection of the dimension 
essential to earning the most profitable return. For example, at 
Small Machine Tool Go. where the system had been introduced for 
reasons aligned to "JIT” philosophy the production engineer 
reported:
"We have situations where the FMS is not 
required. We find it more important that when 
the castings come in, we bring them in in a 
just-in-time policy. We bring them in, they're 
machined, they're to the fitter, he assembles 
them and they're out of the door and we try and 
get the cash as quickly as possible. We're not
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too concerned if we walk through there and 
parts of the FMS are'nt running. We are more 
concerned in getting the component in as late 
as possible, through the FMS to the fitter in 
time for him to assemble them. That is far more 
important than worrying about we only got 20% 
utilisation. As long as obviously the 
utilisation is only 20% because that's all we 
required."
Similar comments were made by engineers elsewhere. For example, at
Coal Co. where FMS had been introduced for reasons aligned to
"Flexible Manufacturing" philosophy, the Production Engineer
commented on his willingness to sacrifice levels of system
utilisation to obtain a wide range of parts;
"We have bought a system which is flexible and 
providing we ma3ce parts within the size of the 
machines, we should be able to achieve our 80%.
There will be times when we will go below that, 
we may have a lot of new work came in and we've 
got a lot of time in proving out so our 
downtime here will be doing prove outs 
initially because we're not running all 
existing work through it, we've got a lot of 
new work coming in. So we can't be running 
existing work because we're doing all prove 
outs for new jobs. You've got seme delay, that 
happens, that's a fact of life, but it should 
only be short term."
This is not to deny that system utilisation did remain the most
important objective for companies with "Mass Production" aligned
objectives. Nor, as the comments above illustrate, that engineers
at the other companies stopped striving to realise system
utilisation (2). However, the important point is that engineers
continued to allocate work to the FMS in ways that conformed with
their initial manufacturing objectives.
The production department had responsibility for machining the 
parts which the engineer allocated to the system. They were 
expected to operate the machinery at the levels of performance
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stipulated as acceptable by the engineer in the pre-investment 
justification, or according to subsequent revisions. PMS systems 
were generally set up as separate budget centres. That centre was 
allocated sufficient funds to purchase the resources necessary to 
process the volume and range of parts in the required batch sizes, 
and at the levels of efficiency, that had been stipulated in the 
pre-investment justification. Thus, the production department would 
receive batches of work to be machined on their manufacturing 
system as free time became available. When machining that work they 
were expected to expend resources at the rate specified in the pre- 
investment justification so that they could remain within their 
budgets. Each batch of work would be accompanied by instructions, 
provided by the engineer and his staff, of the machining operations 
to be performed. The production department would provide details of 
the work which they performed on the batch of parts and when for 
the benefit of the cost department. In some instances this 
information was taken from the system's computer.
The cost department had the responsibility for monitoring that 
FMS, and other systems, were performing to the standards that had 
been claimed for them. The cost department's personnel also had to 
identify the reasons for any failure to realise the standards 
sought. The main technique that they used for this was the flexible 
budget. The degree to which flexible budgets were formalised varied 
between companies. However, the general principle of their 
application was the same. As a means of demonstrating the operation 
of this form of cost control it is of value to reproduce part of 
the more formalised flexible budget documentation (see Exhibit 7.1) 
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As stated above, the production department would be allocated 
a sufficient sum of money to purchase the resources necessary to 
machine the parts at the level of efficiency, that the pre­
investment justification had stipulated for a system. It is 
important to emphasise at this point that, whilst the facet of 
capacity monitored directly by the flexible budget was the level of 
system utilisation, the standard sought could be any proportion of 
system time. The precondition was that it had provided sufficient 
output and revenues at the time of the pre-investment appraisal to 
allow the system to be justified.
Clearly, the method of monitoring output, vis-a-vis the levels 
of system utilisation, is compatible with the process of monitoring 
described by critics of cost accounting. However, as outlined in 
Chapter Six the standards, in terms of the levels of system 
utilisation and the expenditure of other resources, stipulated in 
the pre-investment justification tended to vary. The corollary of 
this is that the levels of expenditure per unit of output allowed 
by flexible budgets also varied, according to whether the company 
had introduced their system for "Mass Production", "Flexible 
Manufacturing" or "Just-in-Time" purposes.
In the course of monitoring the performance of the department 
or system against the standards specified, the accounts department 
collects information from the production department on the 
expenditure of resources, such as the labour employed and the 
length of time that a system was in operation. The accounts staff 
also gathers information on the output from the system in terms of 
the batches that have been machined. If work had been allocated to 
the system in the exact mix of parts and volumes specified in the
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pre-investment justification, and the system had been operated at 
the stipulated level of efficiency, the actual performance would 
correspond with the budgetted sum.
If there was same deviation from this scenario, the accounts 
staff could, by collecting information from the production 
department, see whether the deviation involved an increase or 
decrease in the use of particular resources. By examining the 
information gathered on the batches that were machined, the 
accounting staff could perceive whether the change, from the 
initial scenario, involved an increase or decrease in the levels of 
output. By cross checking the information from the department and 
on the batches, accounting staff could determine whether the 
changes in expenditure and types of output were proportionate to 
one another, or whether they were a consequence of changing levels 
of efficiency. They could also perceive whether the change 
originated in the production department or some other source. For 
example: whether there was an unaccounted change in the efficiency 
of set-ups and machining operations? or, whether there were 
bottlenecks elsewhere, changing mixes of parts, increases in 
development work due to changing markets, etc. Thus, it is only in 
the first instance that accounting staff investigate the levels of 
system utilization. If this is not as anticipated, the accounting 
personnel can investigate the other dimensions of performance that 
are monitored by the flexible budget. They can explore the 
legitimacy of any reasons for this before initiating corrective 
action, if necessary.
It is not intended to infer here that existing methods of cost 
control are ideal for monitoring FMS. They are not. The pre­
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investment justification does not only express the capacity that a 
system was expected to attain, it also articulates the savings that 
FMSs are supposed to realise. The above discussion has sought to 
demonstrate that accountants are able to perceive whether FMS 
systems meet the desired levels of output along different 
dimensions of capacity. However, the flexible budget is unable to 
monitor all of the changes in consumption of resources that arise 
following the introduction of a new system.
The flexible budget focuses on the performance of a 
department. Many of the benefits that arise from seme utilisations 
of FMS, such as reductions in some of the resources consumed, 
accrue elsewhere. A recap of the advantages that engineers included 
in their pre-investment justifications of FMS will help to clarify 
the nature of this disparity. Table 7.1 summarises the number of 
companies with particular motives that justified investment in
Table 7 .1 : Factors b u ilt  in to  d iffe re n t J u s tific a tio n s  o f FMS.
Systems introduced for motives compatible with:
"Mass Production'1 "Just-in-Time" "Flexible Man."
Number of
systems: 13 4 4
Grants 10 4 4






Labour 12 2 2
M/c times 3 1
Sub-contract 3 2 3
Incr'sd Output 5 3
Indirect Lab • 1
Reduced Scrap 1
WIP 3 4* 2
Interest 2 2 1
Intangibles 1 1
234
their systems against the attainment of specific benefits.
It is possible to classify the nature of the different 
advantages by a number of criteria. These indicate the extent to 
which the benefits were more or less visible and accessible to 
control by the flexible budget. Advantages may be classified as: 
one-off or ongoing - arising prior or subsequent to the point of 
inception of IMS - and, at the location of the system or elsewhere, 
either, at other areas of the firm or at the interface between the 
firm and the external market. The first category of savings 
reported in the table, grants, replacements and buildings, are 
"one-offs11. These may arise prior to the introduction of FMS. For 
example, replacements for existing systems and buildings. 
Alternatively, they may be obtained at a definite point subsequent 
to the introduction of systems? for instance, grants. The 
determinate and single mcment when the savings are obtained makes 
the realisation of these advantages easy to identify. Consequently, 
it is unnecessary for them to be monitored. The next group of 
advantages or savings shown by the table, ie, the list between 
energy and scrap, are ongoing and occur subsequent to the 
introduction of FMS. The departmental budget either states these 
savings explicitly, or, as in the case of machining times, sub­
contract costs and increased output, they are implicit in the 
aggregate output performance that the system is expected to attain. 
They are also monitored as accruing at the location of the FMS. 
Whilst it is questionable whether savings in such factors as energy 
or overheads can be tracked unproblematically to a particular 
system, companies had specific calculations for linking their 
expenditure on these items to particular departments. For example,
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these costs were often shared between departments in proportion to 
the numbers of machines in the department. Ocxrpanies thus perceived 
this category of advantages accrueing at the location of the IMS. 
It is these types of advantages that conventional methods of cost 
control are designed to monitor.
It is the next group of financial advantages of reductions in 
work in progress and interest incurred on the stock and Ooal 00. 's 
"intangibles" which are the most difficult to monitor. They are 
both ongoing and occur subsequent to the introduction of IMS. It 
is, therefore, not possible to define a single and definite point 
when they materialise. Also, they do not accrue at the location of 
the IMS. Reductions in work-in-progress if they are achieved often 
materialise between different departments and not in them. The 
advantages, from increased market response and the winning of 
increased orders, embodied in the category of "intangibles" are 
partly manifest at the interface between the company and the 
market. Departmental budgets are not sensitive to the existence of 
the benefits.
It can be seen frcm the table that these types of advantages 
are most salient to the groups of ccnpanies that introduced IMS for 
reasons not aligned to "Mass Production". In this sense 
conventional cost control are incompatible with the novel 
advantages of IMS. There may be a danger that any failure to 
monitor some types of advantages could lead companies to 
compensate, by pursuing the benefits that can be monitored with 
greater enthusiasm than they otherwise would have done. This may 
lead to the misuse of IMS. This is an issue that will be addressed 
in the next section.
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In summary, critics have argued that cost controls' monitoring 
of the volume of output and emphasis on machine uptime, encourages 
deployment of systems for ends that are contrary to a company's 
best interests. This section has explained that the apparatus used 
to monitor the performance of IMS compares with that described by 
the critics of cost control. That is, cost control does monitor the 
volume of output against the time that the system is operational. 
However, the apparatus for monitoring most not be confused with the 
standards that are monitored. The standards of output that are 
embodied in flexible budgets and expected from systems are derived 
from a company's pre-investment justification of FMS. These vary 
according to each firm's different manufacturing objectives when 
introducing FMS. The engineers at the respective companies allocate 
work to their systems according to the firm's manufacturing 
objectives. The accountants monitor the productive activity to 
ensure that the initial targets are being reached. The transfer of 
standards from the pre-investment justification to the flexible 
budget should, therefore, serve to promote pursuit of whatever 
manufacturing objective the company had introduced its system to 
realise. However, it has been suggested here that the failure of 
the flexible budget to monitor some of the novel savings and 
advantages associated with certain deployments of FMS could 
militate against this. The extent to which either factor influenced 
the deployment of FMS at the firms in their study will be examined 
in the next section by a comparison of the actual deployment of FMS 
systems with each company's initial manufacturing objectives.
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7 .4 : Performance o f Systems as measured by companies Ongoing Post 
M o n ito rin g  Techn iques
New that the strengths and weaknesses of cost monitoring have 
been outlined, it is possible to examine their impact by comparing 
the different systems7 actual performance against those which were 
anticipated initially. The strength of cost control practices is 
their capability to monitor the output profile of systems. Their 
weakness is their failure to monitor the changes in the resource 
expenditure profile that takes place when systems are introduced 
for the purpose of either "reducing inventories", or "responding to 
markets for an increasing range of parts". At the close of the 
preceding section, it was suggested that these strengths and 
weaknesses could produce conflicting tendencies. Firstly, cost 
control could promote the use of systems for a company's stated 
objectives by projecting, and encouraging pursuit of, the initial 
output profile. Alternatively, by promoting the pursuit of an 
expenditure profile that does not facilitate realisation of the 
company's stated objectives, cost monitoring techniques could 
discourage companies from using their systems as they had initially 
intended. In effect, their inability to monitor one type of 
reduction in expenditure could result in pursuit of others as 
compensation.
In order to understand whether either of the trends were 
evident at the firms in this study, this section will examine the 
different companies' output and expenditure profile against those 
that were projected in the pre-investment justifications. The 
discussion will detail the output performance along the dimensions 
of capacity of system utilisation, range and batch size.
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Explanations will be offered for any divergence between actual and 
projected performance. Details will then be provided of the 
companies' monitoring of the resources expended. In order to 
simplify the discussion on ccnpanies' monitoring of the expenditure 
profile of systems this section will detail examples only. Details 
of labour savings will be provided as a means of establishing 
whether companies were seeking to maximise savings on resources 
which were visible to compensate for being unable to monitor 
others. The response of companies that introduced FMS for "JIT" 
purposes to their inability to monitor reductions in inventories 
will also be detailed. It will then be possible to establish 
whether the overriding influence on the deployment of FMS is the 
ability to monitor output or the inability to monitor expenditure.
System  U t ilis a t io n
Companies that installed their systems for ends aligned to 
"Mass Production" perceived the economic strength of FMS to be its 
capacity to machine the same type of parts in rapid succession to 
one another. Their objective was to reduce unit costs. 
Consequently, high levels of system utilisation were expected. 
Firms that had introduced FMS for other motives were prepared to 
sacrifice some system time, either for development work and 
changeovers when seeking to machine a wider range of parts, or to 
ensure that parts were only machined when required as a means of 
reducing inventories. Table 7.2 reports the levels of system 
utilisation that had been built into companies' justification of 
their systems and the levels which were subsequently realised.
The table reveals that companies that had introduced their
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systems for reasons aligned to "Flexible Manufacturing11 philosophy 
achieved similar levels of system utilisation to that which they 
had anticipated when composing their pre-investment justification. 
The systems at Nat: Air., Alloy Corp. and Coal Co. had been 
justified against levels of utilisation of 80%, 85% and 80% 
respectively. All respondents reported that their systems had 
realised totals of around 80% utilisation. Only Diesel Engines' 
second system, which had been justified against 75% but realised 
60%, failed to obtain levels of utilisation anywhere near the 
specified targets.
TOble 7.2: levels of machine utilisation expected and achieved with 
FMS.
Systems introduced for ends aligned with:
"Mass Production” "Just-in-Time” "Flexible Manufact. 
Desired Achieved Desired Achieved Desired Achieved
95% + 1
90% + 6 2
85% + 1 2 2 1 1
80% + 4 1 2 3
75% + 1 1 1
70% + 4
Other 4 2 2 1
Companies that had introduced their systems for
aligned to "Just-in-Time” philosophy also tended to obtain the 
levels of system utilisation that they had justified their system 
against. Miner CO. realised their desired level of utilisation and 
Small Machine Tool Co. exceeded their initial projections as a 
consequence of machining an additional part on their system. At 
Print Co. the company reported that the system had not been 
installed a sufficient length of time for them to assess whether
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their initial failure to realise the desired levels of utilisation 
was a transient phase or a settled pattern. Only Soot Ob. reported 
that they had failed to attain the level of utilisation against 
which the system had been justified. The reason given for this was 
that demand for their products had not fully recovered from drops 
in orders from their major customer, British Goal, after the 1984-5 
miners' strike. Thus, cost control mechanisms do not appear to be 
encouraging these companies to use FMS for purposes other than 
those which the systems had been purchased for.
Firms with motivations aligned to "Mass Production" reported 
the greatest divergence between the levels of utilisation that FMS 
had been justified against and those which were realised once the 
systems were operational. Only a small number of companies 
regularly achieved the levels of system utilisation that they had 
originally anticipated. These reductions were not desired by the 
ccnpany, nor were they organised responses to information generated 
by cost control. The ccnpanies would have preferred to realise the 
levels of system utilisation specified in their pre-investment 
justification. However, two factors prevented them from doing this.
Firstly, the markets that the companies catered for changed 
between the times when the systems were initially proposed and 
subsequently introduced. As a consequence the affected companies 
had to adapt their systems to machine different types of work. For 
example, at Coach Co., the FMS had been justified against its 
manufacture of the parts for a new gearbox for a new range of 
coaches. However, in the interim period between the system's 
purchase and installation, the Government had deregulated the 
provision of local transport. The demand for the new model of small
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coaches fran regional transport authorities failed to materialise 
and the ccnpany's IMS had to be turned to alternative uses. Despite 
subsequently taking on sub-contract work, the firm failed to use 
all of the system's machining time.
A similar scenario was experienced at Stoll Motor GO. IMS had 
been purchased because it allowed the company to machine, to 
tighter tolerances, the large volumes of parts for a new gearbox 
that was planned by their major customer. When the customer decided 
not to go ahead with the new model, small Motor Oo. attempted to 
adapt the system to machine the parts for another new contract. 
However, they encountered technical problems because the parts for 
this second contract were too large to be loaded by the system's 
robots. Manual loading of parts resulted in the lower levels of 
utilisation.
Technical problems were the second set of factors which 
militated against ccnpanies' realisation of their desired levels of 
system utilisation. At British Machine Tool GO. and Diesel Engine 
Oo. the problems were caused by failings in system design. These 
two companies systems suffered from the respective problems of 
limitations in routing flexibility and insufficient buffer areas. 
These led to low levels of utilisation, particularly from third, 
fourth and subsequent operation machine tools. Boiler CO. also 
realised lcwer levels of system utilisation than they originally 
anticipated. This was a consequence of the IMS overheating when 
burrowing the immersion heater lids which the company were 
machining. Problems with software management and assimilation 
prevented the desired level of utilisation at Marine CO. Finally, 
Trans Oo. 's system also failed to realise the desired levels of
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utilisation. However, the company's personnel explained the main 
cause of the shortfall as the poor quality of the raw castings 
received from suppliers. This, allegedly, led to the system's 
difficulty when aligning the castings in preparation for 
operations.
In summary, there was a high degree of correspondence between 
the levels of system utilisation which a company embodied in their 
pre-investment justifications and that which was subsequently 
attained once the IMS systems were introduced. This correspondence 
was most clear at firms that had introduced systems for "Flexible 
Manufacturing" and "JIT" objectives. A similar pattern was less 
apparent at firms that had introduced systems for "Mass Production" 
objectives. However, the respondents explained the failure of their 
respective systems to realise the desired levels of utilisation as 
an undesired consequence of changing markets and technical 
failings. There was no evidence to suggest that the pattern was a 
consequence of the application of inappropriate cost control 
techniques. It is interesting to note that in one of the few 
instances where there was an increase in the levels of system 
utilisation obtained, at Small Machine Tool Co., this was 
accompanied by an increase in the range of parts machined. It was 
not the outcome of a cost control led retreat from flexibility.
243
Range of Parts Machined on FMS.
Whilst all of the companies had purchased FMS because it 
offered the capability of machining a range of parts, the size of 
the desired range varied according to a company's manufacturing 
objectives. Firms that had introduced their systems for reasons 
aligned to "Flexible Manufacturing" philosophy had anticipated 
machining ranges of parts wider than those sought by ocnpanies that 
had introduced their systems for other purposes. The size of the 
range of parts that the systems were purchased to machine and the 
actual range on the respective FMS systems are summarized in the 
table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Range of parts desired and obtained from the different 
systems.
Firms motivated to introduce FMS by reasons aligned to: 
"Mass Production" "Just-in-Time" "Flexible Manufact." 
Range of
parts: Desired Achieved Desired Achieved Desired Achieved
2 - 1 0 2
11 - 20 5 3
21 - 30 4 4
31 - 40 1
41 - 50 2 1
51 - 75 1 2
76 - 100 1
101 - 200
200 +
The table shows that the companies that introduced their 
systems for reasons aligned to "Flexible Manufacturing" did succeed 
in loading a wider range of parts onto their systems than ocnpanies 
in the other groups. The range attained tended to be similar to
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that which these companies had anticipated in their pre-investment 
justification. There was one exception to this. At Diesel Engine 
Co. the system had failed to realise the level of utilisation 
desired by the company. As a consequence it was unable to machine 
the aggregate number of parts that the company had hoped for. The 
demand for parts from a proportion of the range that was initially 
intended for the FMS filled the available machining time. 
Consequently, the company scaled dcwn the number of different parts 
that they loaded onto the system. The retreat from flexibility was, 
therefore, proportionate to the retreat from productivity and not 
the consequence of an increase in the latter, arising from the 
application of cost control standards.
There was also a degree of congruence between the range of 
parts machined on systems that had been introduced for "JIT” 
aligned objectives and the range which the firms had initially 
anticipated machining. There were, however, two firms in this group 
that expanded their range of parts. This was a consequence of them 
having excess capacity. As reported above the demand for Scot Co.'s 
products had dropped in the course of the 1984-5 Miner's strike. At 
this point the company added to the range of parts manufactured on 
the IMS by machining sub-contracted work. Elsewhere, at Small 
Machine Tool CO., the increase in the range of parts, in addition 
to those that were originally intended for the IMS, arose out of 
the company's pursuit of "JIT” objectives. The company had built 
their cwn IMS in-house and this had proved to be inexpensive. The 
introduction of the system also facilitated substantial reductions 
in work-in-progress. These two factors allcwed the firm to justify 
their system against a low level of system utilisation which
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provided them with surplus capacity. They used this to develop a 
variant of their major product.
There was a degree of variation between the range of parts 
that were actually being machined by, and those that had been 
intended for, systems introduced for "Mass Production" aligned 
purposes. Some companies increased their range of parts whilst 
others reduced theirs. The changes in use were not consequences of 
preemptive rejections of original aims arising cut of deliberations 
on the findings of cost control. They arose out of attempts to fill 
the systems' available machining time, after circumstances had 
changed, cnoe the companies had decided to purchase FMS. Pour firms 
produced a more limited range than they had originally intended. At 
one company, Boiler CO., part of this retreat from flexibility had 
been anticipated. Both British and European markets were catered 
for. The British markets had been organised around a large number 
of old imperial sizes whilst the European market demanded a smaller 
number of metric sizes. The company's plan, prior to the 
introduction of the FMS, was to phase out the imperial sizes 
gradually. IMS had been purchased because it allowed the company to 
do this. However, this was not the only reason for the reduction in 
the range machined. Like the other three companies where there was 
a retreat from flexibility, the total volumes of the range of parts 
initially intended for the system could not be machined on the 
system. At Industrial Vehicles Ltd. and Trans Co., this was because 
markets were expanding. At Trans CO., Boiler CO. and Diesel Engines 
Ltd., it was because technical problems prevented realisation of 
the anticipated level of system utilisation. The companies 
responded to this excess of demand over capacity by limiting the
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range of parts, that were machined on the system, to that which was 
necessary to fill the system's time. Thus, the retreat from 
flexibility tended to be proportionate to the fall in the 
productivity of the system.
A large number of the remaining companies in this group, ie, 
Obach GO., Dual Air GO., Brit Machine Tool Oo. and Stoll Motor GO., 
were using their systems to machine a wider range of parts than 
they had originally anticipated. This was a consequence of an 
excess of system time after the company had machined all of the 
range of parts that they had initially intended to put on the FMS. 
In all instances this had been caused by loss of markets and 
contracts which necessitated that the companies sought new work.
In summary, there is a high degree of correspondence between 
the ranges of parts that companies initially intended to 
manufacture on their FMS systems and those that they machined 
subsequently. As with levels of system utilisation, the 
correspondence was greatest amongst firms that had introduced their 
systems for "Flexible Manufacturing" and "Just-in-Time" aligned 
objectives. The changes in the sizes of range machined at companies 
with "Mass Production" aligned objectives were not caused by 
preemptive rejection of the companies initial manufacturing 
strategies. They were the consequence of changing markets and 
technical problems.
B atch s iz e s .
Whilst the ability to machine in definite batch sizes was an 
important capability for all companies that purchased FMS, it was 
of greatest importance to those firms that had installed their
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systems for purposes compatible with "JIT” philosophy. These 
perceived the economic advantages of FMS resting with the 
reductions in stocks that would otherwise have been left idle if 
parts had been processed in large batches. The ability to 
manufacture in definite batch sizes was also important to firms 
with "Flexible Manufacturing1’ objectives. The economic advantages 
of machining new parts; demanded by customers without purchasing a 
new system is contingent on machining time being made available. 
Machining in small batches, as and when parts are required, frees 
system time for new purposes.
Most of the ccqpanies that introduced systems to realise "JIT" 
or "Flexible Manufacturing" related objectives wanted to be able to 
machine in batch sizes of one. Firms that introduced systems for 
reasons aligned to "Mass Production" were prepared to machine in 
larger batch sizes. Table 7.4 compares the batch sizes that 
companies built into their pre-investment j ustif icaticn of FTC with 
those that were achieved subsequently.
With the exception of one firm in each of the two groups all 
of the ccnpanies that had introduced FMS for purposes aligned to 
either "Flexible Manufacturing" or "Just-in-Time" objectives did 
machine in batch sizes of one. Therefore, it does not appear that 
cost control distracted companies from their initial intentions. 
The two exceptions did machine seme parts in larger batch sizes, 
partly because they believed it was more economic to do so. 
Obviously, this may be interpreted as cost monitoring wrongly 
encouraging the companies to pursue the mass production related 
abjective of reducing unit costs. Hcwever, there are good reasons 
for doubting that this was the case. It was Nat Air., from the
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group of companies that had introduced FMS to realise "Flexible 
Manufacturing4' objectives, that machined some parts in larger batch
Table 7.4: The batch size of parts desired and obtained from the 
FMS.
Firms motivated to introduce FMS for reasons aligned to: 
"Mass Production" "Just-in-Time" "Flexible Manufact."
Batch
size: Desired Attained Desired Attained Desired Attained
One. (1) . (2) 4 3 3 2 + (1)
2 - 5  1
6 - 1 0  1 
11 -  20
2 1 - 3 0  2
3 1 - 4 0  2
41 - 50 6 3 1 1
51 - 100 5 4
101-  200 1 2
Above 1
() indicates capability not economically applicable to whole of 
range.
sizes. The range of parts that was loaded onto the FMS tended to 
vary in size and cycle time. It was only economic for the company 
to machine some of the small lew value parts, that had short cycle 
times, in batches of ten or more. This allowed simultaneous use of 
other tools in the system to machine larger parts in batches of 
one. Loading the smaller parts in tens was, therefore, a means to 
the simultaneous attainment of the flexibility in the system by the 
concurrent machining of others in batches of one. Small Machine 
Tool Co. from the group of companies that had installed their 
system for "JIT" purposes was the exception that did not machine in 
batch sizes of one. Instead parts were machined in two's because
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the pattern of demand and set-up times made this the most viable 
option. Given that this firm had expanded the range of parts on 
their system it is difficult to sustain an argument that the 
increased batch size represented a retreat from flexibility.
Systems that were introduced far "Mass Production” aligned 
objectives were most likely to be used to machine parts in batch 
sizes different to that which had been stipulated in the pre- 
investment justification. One company, Trans Co., had reported that 
they wanted the capability to machine in batches of one, and 
claimed to have achieved it, although it was not a facility that 
they used. One other company, For Machine Tool Oo., reported that 
the recession in the engineering industry had left them in a 
situation where they could not always fill their FMS. In these 
circumstances they were prepared to lose the IMS to machine one-offs 
for their own product range if necessary. However, this was not an 
economic option and not one which they were be prepared to enter 
into on a sub-contract basis.
A number of other companies in this group did reduce the 
batch sizes of parts from that which they had anticipated when 
justifying their system. However, the impact of cost control had no 
direct bearing on this change in deployment. Companies' loss of 
markets had left them with excess capacity. The work which they 
found subsequently to fill their systems was demanded in smaller 
sized batches. This situation occurred at Coach Co., Dual Air Oo., 
Brit Machine Tool Co., Small Motor Co. and For Machine Tool Co.
In short, there was a degree of comparability between the 
batch sizes specified in pre-investment justifications of FMS and 
those which companies subsequently attained. There were some
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reductions in batch sizes amongst firms that introduced FMS for 
,fMass Production” aligned objectives. This was a consequence of 
loss of markets for large batch work rather than a rejection of the 
belief that the strength of FMS rests with its capability to 
machine in large batches.
Levels o f S ta ffin g  on th e  FMS v is -a -v is  o r ig in a l p ro je c tio n s .
The number of staff employed typifies the resources which 
flexible budgets are able to monitor. Financial and managerial 
staff simply count the number of workers employed. As was detailed 
in Chapter Six, companies that held motives aligned to "Mass 
Production" philosophy were more likely to justify their 
introduction of FMS against the labour savings that it facilitated. 
Table 7.5 summarizes the amount of labour that companies with 
different motivations employed on their FMS vis-a-vis their initial 
projections.
Table 7 .5 : Extent o f attainm ent o f projected lev e ls  o f s ta ffin g  cn 
FMS.
Less Labour Same Labour More Labour Other





"Mass Prod." 1 6  5
"Flex Man." 3 1
"JIT" 2 1 1
The table reveals that companies with motivations aligned to 
"Mass Production" were most likely to employ additional labour to 
that which they had originally anticipated. However, the firms' 
personnel maintained that their initial projections of labour use 
had been correct. One of two reasons was given for the increase.
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First, the additional staffing employed was reported to be a 
temporary arrangement. At Marine Oo. the employment of extra staff 
was explained as the induction of trainees who would provide cover 
for absences. Also, at British Machine Tool Co. the company 
reported that the additional staff employed on FMS were being 
trained in preparation for a return to shift-working.
The second reason that ccnpanies gave for the increased levels 
of staff eirployed was their inability to realise full utilisation 
of the system, with the original number of workers, when the 
circumstances initially anticipated had failed to materialise. At 
Trans Co. up to four extra operatives were employed, partly as a 
result of the expansion in the size of the system, but mainly as a 
consequence of the poor quality of the raw castings. Elsewhere, at 
Small Motor Co. loss of markets led to the redeployment of FMS for 
the machining of a range of parts that were bulkier than those 
originally designated to the system. Two extra operatives had to be 
employed to load the components until the system's robotic loaders 
could be adapted to this purpose. Finally, at Far Machine Tool Oo. 
an additional operator was employed on occasions depending an how 
the system was being used. The changes in use after initial markets 
were lost was also the reason why Coach Oo. did not use the level 
of labour they had initially designated to the FIB. The company had 
failed to fill the system and consequently did not employ the same 
numbers of workers.
Companies that had introduced FMS to pursue objectives that 
were not aligned to "Mass Production" philosophy were more likely 
to employ the levels of labour they had initially designated to the 
system. This appears to be a consequence of their initial
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employment of a higher level of staff rather them a more rigid 
pursuit of controlling the consumption of labour. We have already 
seen that firms in these groups tended to realise their stated 
manufacturing objectives. What is more there was evidence that 
extra labour would be employed if necessary to realise the 
objectives for which the IMS system had been introduced. At Soot 
Oo., where FMS had been introduced for reasons aligned to "Just-in- 
Time" philosophy, an extra worker per machine tool was employed 
because the company had been unable to achieve the adaptive control 
that had been anticipated, when the system was purchased.
Elsewhere, at Nat Air Oo. where FMS had been introduced for 
reasons aligned to "Flexible Manufacturing" philosophy there 
appeared to be relatively little concern about putting any viable 
controls on the sum of labour expended. Extra staff were employed 
on the FMS because the company had not yet merged jobs that they 
had intended to. (See Jones and Scott (1985: 91-2) for fuller 
discussion of this firm's attitudes towards the attainment of 
labour reductions.)
In summary, companies that introduced FMS for reasons aligned 
to '•Mass Production" philosophy had been most likely to justify 
their systems against reductions in labour. However, they often 
found that it was not possible to realise their anticipated savings 
because of technical problems when operationalising systems for new 
uses after markets had changed. Companies that had introduced FMS 
for other purposes were more likely to use their systems for their 
original objectives and employ the same level of staffing as they 
had forecast in their pre-investment justification. There was no 
indication of firms pursuing reductions in labour to compensate for
253
any inability to monitor the realisation of other advantages.
M o n ito rin g  o f In v e n to ry  s a v in g s .
Inventory savings are an example of the types of advantages 
that a company may realise as a consequence of introducing FMS but 
which cannot be monitored by flexible budgets. This is because, the 
reductions in stock do not materialise in the departments where 
systems are installed. An inability to monitor inventory savings 
might have been expected to lead to companies seeking to increase 
other traditional types of gains as compensation. This in turn 
could lead to the mis-use of FMS. However, as we have seen in the 
preceding sections this was not the case. Inventory savings figured 
most prominently in the justifications of systems introduced for 
"JIT" purposes. It is of value to investigate the responses of 
these companies to their inability to monitor inventory savings in 
order to gain an insight into the exact consequences of the 
weaknesses in cost control.
It must be stated that the potential conflict between
accounting staff and engineers over novel benefits were most likely
to arise at the time of the pre-investment appraised. Financial
staff had been wary of including inventory savings in the
justification of a new system because of the risk of double
counting. The Financial Director at Print Co. explained this
problem, thus:
••this particular system (the FMS) has been 
justified on its own merits and the sort of 
savings that could mainly come out of it is 
back to inventory again. But, this is the old, 
old problem. You knew you could find that with 
inventory savings of £2 million here on this 
project and £1 million there on that project, a
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total of £3 million. You could soon find out 
that you end up with negative inventory if 
you're not careful.”
In contrast to this, the engineers' concern was not that
inventory would be double counted, but that it would not be
recognised at all, once the system was installed. The Production
Engineer at Small Machine Tool Co. explained:
"when you look at a machine component purely 
looking at cutting times, you don't get the 
full benefit of an FMS. The benefit of an FMS 
is the reduction of lead times which when it's 
fitted into a costing exercise in the pure 
sense it does not come out. So sometimes you 
have got to keep your accountants off those 
types of calculations."
It will be recalled from Chapters Five and Six above that no 
systematic financial appraisal of IMS had been carried out at Qaaall 
Machine Tool Oo. Thus, initial identification of the reductions in 
inventory, the winning of accountant's approval for their inclusion 
in the pre-investment justification and the verification of the 
realisation of inventory savings remained a limited problem. This 
was also the case at Miner Oo. where the directors had initiated 
the introduction of FMS. The accountant's independent role in the 
pre-investment evaluation process had been precluded by the 
directors' initial justification of FMS and quantification of 
inventory saved. This appeared to make it less imperative to 
monitor that the anticipated reductions in inventory had been 
realised. The following is an extract from a conversation with the 
Production Engineer and System Manager, Simon and George. It 
illustrates that they were satisfied that the inventory savings had 
been realised even though no attempt had been made to substantiate 
this. The FMS had facilitated a general reduction in the number of
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operations in the manufacturing process and this allowed them to 
employ a self-serving calculation to provide a legitimation far the 
existence of the savings.
Simon: "Nobody has done any calculation on 
work-in-progress and stock in any sort of 
detail but its obvious if you like that we've 
introduced a part here and it can be machined 
in an hour and a batch of one hundred could be 
machined over a day or two. Whereas before it 
would have been hanging around in baskets 
waiting to go on a machine which might not be 
available for a while and a number of machines 
were also required to get the same number of 
cps. out of it. Generally, work-in-progress is 
down to days if you like."
George: "Really, the way that we're working out 
the work-in-progress is the lead time for a 
component is 1.4 weeks x the number of 
operations. So in the past we might have six or 
seven, up to twelve operations on any 
component. And the volume of work-in-progress 
would be the number of operations x 1.4 x the 
ocmponents as they moved right through the shop 
and into assembly. Now because the system can 
reduce the operations down to one or two you're 
reducing your work-in-progress by the ratio of 
operations we're taking out."
The impact of not monitoring inventories was felt more acutely
at those companies where the production engineer had proposed the
introduction of FMS. For exanple, at Socfc GO., the FMS had been set
up as a separate facility in a budget centre of its own and with a
separate overhead cost, to reflect the heavy expenditure in the
FMS. When comparisons were made between the cost performance of FMS
and other systems, FMS appeared more expensive because the company
measured only the expenses incurred in the department. The
production engineer explained:
"I'm speaking as a production engineer, and I 
have to say that I'd criticise the way that our 
FMS is monitored. They're monitoring the costs
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of the output say on a monthly bases, X number 
of units per month. They're monitoring the 
costs and they compare these costs against what
they'd take to produce these an a conventional
machine, and that's all they monitor. So the 
bottom line sums does not take into account the 
savings in manning, or the savings in 
inventory. I'd have thought that you'Id start 
from where you had spent X amount of money and 
you'd get credited far the value of what you're 
saving in work-in-progress and you'd get 
credited with the savings that you had made in 
manning, and then the remainder. Then, whatever 
you're producing you should be getting it based 
on that bottom line figure rather than the 
topline figure."
Despite his grievances over the costing system the respondent did
report that the calculations did not affect the allocation of work
to the FMS. The company's flexible manufacturing system simply
appeared as inefficient vis-a-vis other systems and this was to his
detriment.
It is clear from the inclusion of inventory savings in the 
pre-investment appraisal that accountants were willing to accept 
engineers assertions that FMS would facilitate financial gains 
through reductions in the stocks carried. However, the failure of 
departmental budgets to articulate such savings does result in a 
potential conflict, between accountants and engineers, at the cost 
monitoring stage. This is related to the accountants and engineers 
different responsibilities and location in the enterprise. The 
production engineer is aware that the inventory has gone from one 
department. The accountants felt that this was not proof that it 
had not been transferred to another part of the organisation. The 
production engineers had an interest in the savings being 
registered. It was they who had defined the economic viability of 
FM5 in terms of the inventory saving and it was they whose careers
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were on the line, if the system did not appear to the observer as 
economically viable. The accountants, on the other hand, would be 
put in a tenuous position if overall profitability and return on 
investment were to drop, as a consequence of a number of 
investments not giving financial performance the boost which they 
had initially anticipated. Thus, they had an interest in not taking 
the actuality of these savings on the word of a production 
engineer. As has been reported above, these pressures were 
alleviated to a large extent in those companies, such as Miner Oo. 
and Small Machine Tool Co., where directors had initiated the 
introduction of FMS and could hold no-one but themselves 
responsible if the investment proved to be an economic failure. But 
this was not the case at Scot Co. or Print Co.
This problem did not lead accountants to deny without evidence 
that the reductions had been attained once the system was 
installed. Nor, as we saw above, was there any evidence that an 
inability to monitor inventories was leading to a change in 
manufacturing priorities and the pursuit of other gains. It will be 
recalled from the earlier part of the discussion that it was 
engineers who had justified the system and continued to allocate 
the work to the IMS, in accord with the principles that had been 
embodied in the pre-investment justification. The role of the 
accountant was to ensure that the systems were used efficiently 
when pursuing that objective. In other words, they had to find ways 
of monitoring the deployments of IMS that existed and not to find 
deployments of IMS that they could monitor. This led to plans to 
change the method of monitoring at Print Oo. so that the company 
could identify the existence or otherwise of reductions in stocks.
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The financial director reported that the company was in the process 
of installing Manufacturing Resource Planning II (MRP II). This is 
a system of scheduling and allocating parts when needed by 
identifying (a) the products to be manufactured? (b) the parts 
which were needed for this production; and (c) from where and when 
the parts were to be taken as defined by an individual bill of 
materials for each product. It provides information on exactly 
where each product is in the production stage and, by extension, 
the size of inventories in each area. The company hoped that when 
they had installed this system, it would allow them to assess how 
IMS and any other new future purchase helped in the reduction of 
inventories. The accountant at Scot Oo. had been appointed just 
prior to this fieldwork being conducted. He also reported that he 
might initiate changes to the techniques of monitoring the FMS once 
he had a fuller appreciation of the company's manufacturing 
operations.
In summary, inventory reductions, that were used to justify 
the introduction of IMS systems for "Just-in-Time" objectives, 
provide an example of the types of novel advantages that the cost 
control methods of flexible budgets are unable to monitor. Accounts 
staff tended to respond to this failing in one of two ways. When 
directors had initiated the introduction of FMS realisation of 
savings was accepted without question. When the production 
engineers had initiated the introduction of IMS, the accountants 
sought ways of confirming the realisation of inventory reductions.
Summary.
This section has investigated how the pattern of deployment of
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m s  systems that were introduced for purposes aligned to "Mass 
Production" "Flexible Manufacturing" and "Just-in-Time" 
philosophies compared with the performance that was anticipated 
from them when their initial pre-investment justifications were 
prepared. The objective has been to examine whether the evidence 
suggests that cost controls' capability to promote realisation of a 
company's initial objectives, by projecting the desired output 
profile, is outweighed by the inability of cost monitoring to track 
the accompanying patterns of expenditure. The overriding pattern is 
that variations in deployment tend to approximate those anticipated 
in the pre-investment justification. This suggests that the most 
inportant impact of cost monitoring on the deployment of FMS is the 
definition of output capacity. This is derived from the pre­
investment appraisal.
This conclusion is not contradicted by either the findings of 
this research, at the companies where the actual use of FMS 
differed frcxn that which was initially intended, or the findings on 
the effect of cost control's inability to monitor expenditure 
profiles. On the first count, the only group of systems that were 
used for purposes other than those stated in their pre-investment 
justification were the IMSs which were introduced to meet "Mass 
Production" aligned objectives. The decreased levels of machine 
utilisation of these systems indicates a fall in productivity. The 
companies themselves reported this to be a consequence of losing 
old markets.
On the second count the example of labour showed that, 
whatever other resources companies are failing to monitor, firms 
are not seeking greater reductions in labour to compensate. The
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example of inventory reductions demonstrates that a firm's 
inability to monitor changes in the expenditure of resources 
expressed in the pre-investment justification results in either, a 
simple acceptance that the changes have taken place, or a search 
for ways of monitoring the existence of premised savings. It does 
not lead to a rejection of the deployment that gave rise to the 
advantages in the first instance.
This suggests that it is wise to conclude that the main 
variation, in deployment of IMS systems, between companies is a 
conscious and deliberate one which originates prior to the 
installation of the systems. In other words, the systems tend to be 
used in accord with the motives that the engineers gave for 
purchasing the systems. Regardless of the weaknesses in accounting 
practices the transfer of the definition of capacity, from the pre­
investment justification to the cost monitoring apparatus, serves 
to promote the realisation of a company's initial manufacturing 
objectives.
7.6 Audits,
Before concluding this chapter, it is of value to report the 
influence of one set of cost monitoring techniques, audits, which 
have been ignored by many discussants of the impact of accounting 
on FMS. Like other methods of cost monitoring, audits compare 
actual events with the scenario projected in the pre-investment 
justification. They use the same information as ongoing cost 
control. Where they differ is that they attempt to take a longer 
term view of the performance of a system. Two different types of 
audits were reported at the companies in this study: (a)
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expenditure audits; and (b) performance audits. Hie extent of the 
influence of each on the deployment of FMS will be discussed in 
turn.
(a ) E xp e n d itu re  A u d its .
Theoretically, expenditure audits are important to the 
deployment of IMS. If they restrict the cash spent on a system they 
may prevent the investment necessary to expand its range of uses. 
The need for expenditure audits was pre-empted at a number of 
companies, particularly those firms with "Mass Production” aligned 
objectives, as systems had been installed as turnkey packages. 
Purchasing companies' contracts with the suppliers of FMS included 
initial programming costs. Of the remaining companies, only one 
firm, Print Oo., assembled a structure that allowed monitoring and 
control of their expenditure on the installation of FMS. Their 
motivations for doing this was that their FMS systems was one of 
the most expensive configurations installed. Whilst a total budget 
was set aside for the system as a whole, with someone appointed to 
supervise the expenditure, its main elements were justified, and 
supplied, separately as six individual items. The toted budget, and 
the expenditure audit, allowed the company to ensure that the 
system, and its cost, did not grew out of reasonable proportion and 
that each item was reconciled with the total system. At the 
remaining companies where systems had been "home grown” reports of 
expenditure on the FMS exceeding initial projections were 
commonplace. The prevalence of turnkey packages, the relative 
absence of expenditure audits and the evidence of overspending, 
suggests that in-house expenditure audits have had little influence
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on the deployment of FMS.
(b ) P o s t - in s ta l la t io n  perform ance a u d its .
Post-installation performance audits probably have the 
greatest potential of different types of audits to influence the 
pattern of deployment of IMS. Firstly, they allow the company to 
establish the value of their investment and this may influence the 
extent of subsequent investments in similar systems. Secondly, they 
may lead to changes in how the system under investigation is 
deployed. However, a number of authors have suggested that the 
influence of audits an the deployment of IMS is minimal. Different 
writers have reported that audits of FMS have not taken place, 
either because of a company's inability to monitor the non­
productivity gains of FMS (Finnie, 1986), or because of the 
potential opposition of the personnel who championed the 
introduction of the system in the first instance (Bessant and 
Haywood, 1987).
These arguments fail to recognise that many companies did not 
anticipate non-productivity gains from FMS (see Chapter Six above) 
and the actual merits of a system, and the competence of its 
champion, are likely to be indicated by ongoing cost control long 
before any audit is carried out. What is more, it is difficult to 
perceive why executives would be prepared to tolerate failure to 
comply with formal practices, such as audits, which are designed to 
help monitor the continued profitability of a company? especially 
if that profitability appears to be threatened. Therefore, a more 
detailed account of the influence of audits and an adequate 
explanation of why they are not always applied is necessary.
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Part of the reason why audits have not been applied in some 
instances is because, historically, they had not been a normal 
practice at the companies studied. Only ten firms that had 
introduced a total of eleven systems reported that full post audits 
had historically been part of their normal procedures. These were 
generally conducted between 18 to 30 months after the initial 
installation of systems. Two additional firms, Soot Oo. and Boiler 
Oo., reported that they carried out interim audits. Finally, in two 
other companies, Motor Oo. and Diesel Engines Ltd., audits were 
reported to take place only as the cxxrpany thought necessary. Thus, 
14 companies in all, that had introduced a total of 16 systems, 
reported that performance audits of one form or another were 
facilitated by their normal procedures. This left five companies, 
Trans Oo., Miner Oo., Small Motor Oo., Gear Oo. and Small Machine 
Tool Oo., where it was reported that no system of audits existed 
prior to the introduction of IMS. Not surprisingly, the majority of 
these, Trans GO., Small Motor Oo. and Small Machine Tool Oo., were 
drawn from the group of small independent companies.
Preceding customs were not the only factor that influenced 
whether audits were conducted. Often changes in the nature of the 
organisation precipitated audits where they were not initially 
anticipated and precluded the conduct of others where they had been 
intended. For example, a large corporation had taken over Small 
Motor Ob. and instigated new accounting procedures (see section 5.3 
above). The new accountant anticipated that at some time in the 
future a post audit would be conducted on the IMS. In contrast to 
this, audits had been reported as regular features of the practices 
at Nat Air CO. and British Machine Tool Oo. but were unlikely to be
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performed on the FMS. At both companies there had been 
organisational or procedural changes subsequent to the introduction 
of the systems. As a consequence FMS had fallen between the two 
stools of the old procedures and organisations and the new. It had 
been unaffected by either.
The absence of audits at other companies did not preclude the 
individuals in the firms from developing monitors which they felt 
allowed them to report the general performance of their system. For 
example, at Trans Go. extensive modernisation had taken place. As 
the IMS was just a snail part of this, the company's accountant was 
unwilling to isolate its individual contribution as separate from 
the other developments. Instead he monitored the aggregate effect 
of all the investments by changes on general performance indicators 
- such as returns on total capital employed, the level of the 
general overhead rate and overall machining times.
The consequence of historical legacies, changes in the 
companies' organisation and the development of alternative 
monitors, was that checks that purported to reflect the overall 
contribution of FMS to the company had, at the time of this 
research, been performed on only nine of the twenty-one systems 
studied. Scot Oo., Dual Air Go., Trans Oo., Far Machine Tool CO., 
Boiler Oo., and Goal Oo. had all audited their resp>ective systems. 
Industrial Vehicles Ltd. had audited both of their systems and 
Diesel Engines Ltd. had performed an audit of their first IMS. (See 
table 7.6.) It must be stated that in no instance was it reported 
that the audit had led to a change in the beliefs of a company's 
personnel, about what constituted the manufacturing strengths of 
FMS, or a rejection of a company's central manufacturing
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obj ectives.
Part of the explanation why sane companies had not conducted 
performance audits of FMS, when such practices had been part of 
their normal procedures, is because insufficient time had lapsed
Table 7 .6 : Extent o f in te n t and conduct o f performance audits.
Anticipated checks on Actual Checks on system, 
system.








Checks other 2 4
than audits:
since the system's installation. However, another reason was that 
no-one had a great interest in conducting the audits. This is 
because audits carry costs but promise little other than the 
amplification of the findings of ongoing cost control. That is to 
say, they use the same information to compare the system's 
performance against the same standards specified in the same pre- 
investment justification. If ongoing cost control suggests that the 
FMS is not performing satisfactorily, the accountant may initiate a 
full audit to clarify the nature of the drop from the previously 
defined standards. If ongoing cost control indicates that the 
system's performance corresponds with the anticipated standards, 
accountants and executives may leave engineers to assess the value 
of a system when they see fit. Two examples from this study, For 
Machine Tool Oo. and Diesel Engine Oo., will serve to illustrate
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that when audits sure published, their purpose is to amplify the 
findings of cost control. However, publication of the findings of 
those audits are precipitated by extraordinary events.
For Machine Tool Oo. like marry other engineering companies 
suffered from the economic recession in the 1980's. Falling demand 
left the company with surplus capacity. The Production Engineer vho 
had the responsibility for proposing EMS generally conducted the 
audits of the investments. As explained in Section 7.3 above the 
engineer also had responsibility for deciding which system should 
be used to machine different types of work. As he had excess 
capacity he had more latitude in allocating parts to different 
machines according to different criteria. What is more the company 
machined parts for their cwn range of products as well as for work 
contracted to them by others. Contracts for others had definite 
prices but the value of parts machined for internal purposes were 
not always specified. Thus, the engineer enjoyed a degree of 
freedom to allocate and emit to allocate work in ways that would 
embellish the apparent performance of FMS.
When asked for details of his recent post-audit of FMS, the 
Production Engineer reported his aggregate findings against those 
which had been projected in the pre-investment justification. The 
personnel from the cost department were also present in this 
interview and the production engineer refused to reveal the full 
breakdown of the findings. When pressed to expand on one aspect of 
the details of the initial financial justification, he admitted 
that there had been greater expenditure in this one area but added 
that this had been compensated by an accrual of additional 
advantages/ savings elsewhere. The engineer had, in performing the
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audit, provided a legitimation of his earlier decision. He also had 
information which he could use to demonstrate his competence to his 
superiors when necessary. The general lack of demand for the 
company's products meant that he was placed in a situation where he 
could claim that he was using the system to the best possible 
effect.
The cost departments personnel's subsequent comments
illustrates that they perceived the engineer's conduct of audits as
a process of selection and omission which was, at best, a distorted
picture of the reality that it sought to represent. They found this
acceptable in the situation of low demand, as long as it did not
pose a threat to the company's profitability. Their protection
against this was vigilance in ongoing cost monitoring and it was
anomalies indicated by this, that would precipitate action by them.
One member of the accounting staff said:
"in good faith judgements and predictions can 
go wrong. You heard Brian saying that the 11% 
was proven right, not because it was spot on in 
the first place, but because there was some 
overspending but we got more production. I mean 
OK you don't really believe that it came out 
exactly at 11.14% and he said that: "Well, that 
was lucky." I don't know which one he found out 
first, I suspect he found out the overspending 
first and then panicked, and then just found, 
it was convenient to say that we had more 
production. OK, that sort of thing is something 
that you need to be sure of because you can be 
coming along with an overhead recovery rate 
that may not be in anywhere near the truth and 
you may be going out to Massey-Ferguson and 
saying £25 an hour, deal. New if it's costing 
you £30 an hour that's bad news, you're 
subsidising Massey-Ferguson tractors."
The events at For Machine Tool Co. contrasts with those at 
Diesel Engine Co. It was at the latter where the managing director 
had instructed the production engineer to submit proposals for FMS.
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Hie production engineer proposed a system using only traditional 
dimensions of performance. Some of the claims that he made were 
extravagant in the extreme. Far example, he justified the system on 
7-day, three-shift operation when, to the accountant's knowledge, a 
new shift pattern had not been considered; at least, not to the 
extent of discussing it with the trade unions. On other dimensions 
of performance, expectations were not excessive. For instance, the 
FMS was justified against only 75% machine utilisation. The 
anticipated performance of systems at seme other companies had been 
90% and above. (See Chapter Six far full details.) However, the FMS 
had been developed in-house and poor design and technical problems 
prevented it from ever reaching these levels of performance. 
Similarly, the machining times of parts were never realised. Hie 
exact reason why the problems were never resolved is unclear. Hie 
engineer's knowledge and commitment to the system might be 
questioned. However, it was clear that he felt there was little 
practical support for FMS amongst his superiors. He bemoaned his 
directors failure to make money available to develep the system to 
its full potential even though they spent money servicing cars for 
their own use. It is difficult to assess the validity of his 
complaints as the accountant also reported that there had been 
significant over-expenditure in the purchasing of the FMS.
Hie general market situation of the company did not serve to 
obscure the poor performance of the FMS. Hie FMS had been set up as 
a separate cost centre. As already noted, it was justified on
traditional criteria. Hie continuation of the markets for parts
\
which the system was justified against, enabled the accountant to 
see exactly what was going into the department and what was failing
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to came out. The IMS's failure to machine at the pace which had 
been claimed in the justification resulted in large volumes of 
work, which should have been brought back in-house, still being 
sub-ccrrtracted out one year after the system had been installed. At 
the same time other forms of expenditure had risen to above that 
anticipated by the initial justification. This precipitated the 
conduct of an interim audit by the accountant. The main findings of 
this was that: levels of system utilisation were only 17% based on 
the seven-day working which the system was justified against or 
23%, based on the five day week which it was actually operated; and 
net savings in sub-contract costs were one-sixth, £25,000 per 
annum, of those that had been anticipated. This led to the setting 
of seme interim targets for the system to meet in order to improve 
its profitability. The audit was, thus, a means of amplifying the 
findings of ongoing cost monitaring techniques which indicated that 
work was not being processed at the speed at which it should have 
been.
In summary, critics of accounting practices have given 
insufficient attention to the impact of performance audits on the 
deployment of IMS. This section has reported an uneven pattern in 
the conduct of audits. Some firms have not, historically, conducted 
audits and organisational changes have led others to deprioritise 
their utilisation. It has been contended here that when audits are 
conducted they are used as amplification techniques to elaborate 
the findings of ongoing cost control. Contrary to the arguments of 
other authors, this appears to be the reason why they have had 
little impact on the deployment of FMS.
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7.6 Conclusion.
The objective of this chapter has been to explain the 
influence of cost control on the deployment of FMS systems 
introduced for the purpose of either: 11 increase or maximise machine 
utilisation”? or, "respond to demand for an increased range of 
parts"? or, "to reduce costs by carrying less inventories". In the 
preceding discussion, a distinction has been made between the 
apparatus used in cost monitoring and the standards that the 
apparatus monitors. This chapter has concurred with a number of 
writers that cost control, measures both the inputs and output of 
FMS. However, it has been explained that the standards of these 
outputs and inputs may vary according to a company's initial 
manufacturing objectives. This is because the definition of 
performance expressed in the pre-investment justification is 
embodied in the monitoring apparatus of the flexible budget and 
this, coupled with the engineer's role in the allocation of work, 
serves to promote the pursuit of the ends for which FMS systems are 
initially introduced.
As a consequence, systems introduced for reasons aligned to 
"Flexible Manufacturing" and "JIT" philosophy were deployed in ways 
that corresponded with a company's initial intentions. There were 
changes in the ways that systems that were introduced for purposes 
aligned to "Mass Production" manufacturing philosophy were 
deployed. However, these changes were, in the main, a consequence 
of changing markets rather than responses to the representations of 
the systems' performance by cost control. Finally, the impact of 
audits on FMS has been examined and it has been argued that the 
reason why these have little effect on the deployment of FMS is
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because they are used to amplify the findings of ongoing cost 
control.
Footnotes.
(1) See Chapter Six, above, for details of these different 
manufacturing objectives.
(2) Even when new work was introduced onto the FMS there were 
limits to the amount of system time allowed for this purpose. This 
was partly to protect general levels of system utilisation; but 
also to allow the engineers to plan in advance when other work 
could be machined. The general practice for introducing new work 
onto the IMS once the system was operational was as follows. The 
engineer would decide whether or not to allocate a new part to the 
FMS. A decision based on information provided by sales and the cost 
department. Once the decision had been taken the machining 
instructions for the part and the programs necessary for its 
machining would be developed away from the system. When the parts 
were introduced onto the system the production departments would be 
allowed multiples of the base time for machining the first batch. 
The base time would be determined by the engineers knowledge of 
such factors as the nature of the raw casting and feed and speed 
rates of machines. Each time the parts were machined there would 
be a graduated reduction in the number of multiples of the base 
time that the production department was allowed to reflect the 
increased elimination of teething problems. If the initial 
estimation of the base time was accurate it was expected that the 
system would realise this time after a specified number of batches 
had been machined. If it was inaccurate the information would be 
fed back to the engineers, schedulers and cost department so that 
they could adjust their calculations.
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C hap ter E ig h t
8 .1  R estatem ent o f  Id e a s .
It was explained at the outset of this thesis that the initial 
idea that prompted this research project was the work of Jaikumar 
(1984; 1986). He had argued that the philosophy of Scientific 
Management was pervasive in the American companies that had 
introduced IMS. One of the manifestations of this was cost control 
techniques which emphasised machine uptime and volume of output as 
suitable measurements of a system's performance. In contrast, 
Jaikumar suggests that the strength of IMS systems, which embody 
the philosophy of flexible manufacturing, is their ability to 
machine a wide range of parts in the batch sizes that are required 
by customers. Realisation of these strengths may at times reduce 
both the machine uptime and the volume of output that is obtained. 
When IMS systems have been introduced, the legacy of Scientific 
Management inherent in cost control has prevented realisation of 
the true benefits of the system. Instead IMS systems have been 
deployed for the less advantageous end of large volume production 
of a limited range of parts.
Jaikumar argues that the effect of this misuse of FMS is 
accentuated by the level of capital intensity in American industry. 
Most costs are now fixed. There is only limited potential in 
gaining an economic advantage by increasing the productivity of the 
small numbers of remaining employees. By contrast, real 
improvements to a company's profitability may be obtained by 
greater expenditure on labour, which would make possible the 
exploitation of the flexibility in IMS by increasing the range, and 
by implication, the value of output.
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Hie initial aim of this project was to apply Jaikumar's ideas 
to Britain, to establish whether accounting protocol did constitute 
an obstacle to the economic success of companies. However, Chapter 
One offered a critique of Jaikumar#s ideas and suggested that: (i) 
insufficient attention is given to hew engineers, as the source of 
change, and accountants and accounting criteria, as the impediments 
to that change, relate to one another; (ii) the assumptions of the 
intrinsic qualities of FMS coinciding with an era ripe for the 
exploitation of those qualities, generalise the systems and the 
period? and, (iii) the analysis of the deployment of FMS in 
isolation from the process of change that led to that deployment is 
inappropriate.
Firstly, it has been argued that an examination of the 
historical development of accounting controls in their social and 
organisational context, suggests that the potential for accounting 
to diverge from engineering systems may be limited. Where 
engineering and accounting functions have been separated, engineers 
have access to information about the shcpfloor which accountants do 
not share. As a consequence accountants are dependent on the 
engineers to provide them with information about the contours and 
merits of production systems. Therefore, the potential for 
inappropriate accounting practices to be imposed on engineering 
systems through remote procedures or distant practitioners should 
not be assumed. Instead, an analysis of the application of 
financial controls to FMS must start with the role of engineers in 
the application of accounting techniques to the systems that they 
propose.
Secondly, it has been contended that as neither the qualities
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of systems nor the period may be generalised in absolute terms, the 
type of economically viable deployment of FMS, and the financial 
benefits that arise, cannot be assumed in advance. Before the 
influence of accounting practices can be identified, the advantages 
that are likely to accrue to a company from their particular use of 
FMS must be established by reference to criteria that are relevant 
in specific contexts. In particular, the ability of a system to 
remedy the weaknesses in a company's existing methods of 
production, and the extent to which realisation of their stated 
manufacturing objectives precludes the realisation of other 
financial advantages.
Thirdly, the deployment of FMS should be seen as the 
culmination of a process of technical change. This process starts 
at the point when a company identifies a need for a new system to 
manufacture a range of goods in particular batch sizes. It 
progresses through the selection and justification of the machinery 
to its eventual use. Accounting practices are employed at two 
different stages in that process: at the point of the pre­
investment evaluation? and, subsequently, at the point of cost 
monitoring. Whilst there will be a strand of continuity from the 
point when a company identifies its manufacturing needs through to 
the eventual deployment of the system, potential biases exist in 
the accounting practices employed at each stage. Therefore, the 
impact of each on systems introduced for different purposes must be 
investigated.
The research conducted has sought to understand the impact of 
accounting practices on the eventual deployment of FMS from within 
this framework.
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8 .2  G en era l O verview  o f  F in d in g s .
Chapter Five of this thesis explained that of the nineteen 
companies covered by this study, fifteen belonged to corporate 
groups vhere a total of sixteen FIG systems had been introduced. At 
these companies a clear division of labour existed between 
accountants and engineers, and accountants tended to hold formally 
superordinate positions to engineers. However, accountants7 limited 
access to the shcpflocr resulted in engineers having responsibility 
for the identification of which new system to purchase and the 
initial preparation of its financial justification. This did not 
mean that engineers would express the exact financial profile of 
any new manufacturing system that they proposed: engineers may not 
have possessed sufficient understanding of accounting practices to 
mate changes to their format? a company's executives or financial 
staff may have set general hurdle figures too high; accountants may 
rule that certain categories of savings are not legitimate. 
However, it does mean that engineers were, at least, provided with 
the opportunity to mate accountants aware of the financial merits 
of FMS.
There were two companies amongst this category of firms that 
belonged to corporate groups where the likelihood of engineers 
expressing novel advantages in the financial justification had been 
increased. Executives at the respective companies had promoted the 
engineering function within the organisation and given engineering 
personnel a brief to introduce novel systems.
The remaining four companies investigated by this study were 
independent concerns. A hierarchy of offices between the accounting 
and engineering functions had not yet evolved and this facilitated
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an easier assimilation of accounting and engineering information 
when their total of five FMS systems were introduced.
Chapter Five did not deny that biases in accounting practices 
may be restricting the introduction of FMS. In fact, it reported 
seven instances where changes had to be made to different 
companies' procedures. This sometimes facilitated a relaxation of 
financial criteria before FMS was introduced. The outcome of the 
adaptions was that all of the companies in this study were able to 
justify their introduction of FMS.
Chapter Six examined the early stages of the process of 
technical change and reported: the motives that companies had for 
installing FMS and the perceptions that companies had of the 
economics of manufacturing with their system? and, the extent of 
the different companies' success in composing a financial 
justification that reflected their aspirations when deploying FMS. 
Chapter Six reported that all of the companies in this study had 
previously used conventional machine tools for the production of a 
range of parts in varying batch sizes. However, the improvements 
that FMS systems were expected to bring over a company's preceding 
production arrangements, and the financial benefits that were 
expected to follow from this, varied between the different 
companies. All of the firms claimed to have purchased FMS to 
realise one or another of three manufacturing and financial 
objectives. Thirteen systems were introduced "to increase or 
maximise machine utilisation" - ie, Mass Production aligned 
objectives. Four firms installed their systems "to reduce the cost 
of stocks by carry less inventories" - ie, Just-in-Time related 
cfojectives. Finally, four systems were introduced for the purpose
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of "responding to demand for an increasing range of parts” - or 
Flexible Manufacturing aligned objectives.
Hie personnel at the firms appeared to enjoy some success in 
adapting their financial appraisals to reflect their stated 
manufacturing intentions. Hie nature of the calculation in the pre­
investment justification is to: assess the income that will be 
generated from the output machined on the additional capacity of a 
new system? quantify the value of any other financial benefits that 
arise frcsn the installation of the system; and, calculate whether 
the aggregate total of these over the lifetime of the proposed 
investment outweighs the cost its purchase. A range of criticisms 
have been made of pre-investment justifications by other authors 
who suggested that the techniques of appraisal understated the 
lifetime, advantages and capacity of FMS.
Chapter Six reported that this study found that companies 
already used methods of appraisal that attributed FMS lifespans 
that were longer than those claimed by critics. Where short-term 
appraisal methods were employed previously, seme ccnpanies extended 
their normal amortisation period to facilitate the introduction of 
FMS.
Hie discussion in Chapter Six showed that this research has 
found that the personnel who composed the justification of FMS were 
able to adapt the definition of the capacity in the justification 
to reflect their intended machining objectives. Thus, companies 
with Mass Production aligned objectives tended to justify their 
systems by assuming a high level of system utilisation, when 
machining a relatively limited range of parts in large batch sizes. 
Hie firms that introduced their systems for reasons akin to JIT
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assumed a lower level of utilisation, as a means to producing in 
small batches. Finally, the companies that introduced their systems 
for purposes consistent with Flexible Manufacturing philosophy, 
justified their systems against its capacity to machine a wider 
range of goods at a lower level of machine utilisation.
It was also reported in Chapter Six that not all companies 
were able to translate their perceptions of the strengths of IMS 
into financial advantages that could be expressed in the pre- 
investment evaluation. The companies with Mass Production aligned 
objectives might not have been expected to realise any gains other 
than the traditional benefits of improvements in machining time and 
reductions in labour. These featured prominently in their pre­
investment justifications. The firms that introduced their systems 
to pursue JIT objectives were able to justify their systems against 
the reductions in inventories that they anticipated.
The firms that expressed objectives aligned to Flexible 
Manufacturing philosophy, were, however, generally unable to 
express this as a category of financial advantages in their pre- 
investment justification. One firm did include in their appraised, a 
category of "intangibles", but offered no systematic way of 
calculating this. The remaining three companies need for 
flexibility in their respective systems arose from their desire to 
bring back in-house work that had been sub-contracted out. Thus, 
reductions in sub-contracting costs featured prominently in their 
pre-investment appraisal. However, to reiterate, they did not 
include a direct expression of the financial benefits of the 
flexibility in the system. The reason for this may be that their 
preceding methods of production were the flexible conventional
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batch production systems. As a consequence FMS did not bring the 
additional quality of flexibility per se. In order to establish 
whether there is a weakness in pre-investment evaluations that 
prevents expression of a novel quality of flexibility it would have 
been necessary to include a sector such as the automobile industry 
where flexible systems have sometimes been introduced to replace 
dedicated machinery. Unfortunately, access for research in this 
sector has, thus far, been limited.
Chapter Seven examined the impact of cost control on the 
deployment of FMS systems. A distinction was made between the 
apparatus used for cost monitoring and the standards that the 
apparatus embodied. It was explained that the cost monitoring 
apparatus aimed to monitor a system's expenditure and output 
profile, as detailed by the pre-investment justification. The 
technique used for this purpose, the flexible budget, focuses on a 
department where the system is located. Whilst this proved adequate 
for monitoring the expenditure profiles that were anticipated when 
systems were introduced for "Mass Production" and "Flexible 
Manufacturing" aligned objectives, it was not suitable for 
monitoring the expenditure pattern that was anticipated far systems 
introduced for "Just-in-Time" purposes. Inventory savings had 
featured prominently in the justification of these systems. 
Departmental budgets could not track whether the expenditure on 
inventories had actually been reduced or simply transferred 
elsewhere in the company.
The flexible budget was more successful in monitoring the 
output profile of systems. The definition of the capacity that a 
system was expected to attain was transferred from the pre­
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investment justification to the flexible budget. This definition of 
capacity provided the standards of performance that systems were 
expected to attain once they were introduced. Whilst, in the first 
instance, the output capacity was measured against the levels of 
system utilisation, accounts staff did have access to information 
on range and batch size. As a consequence, the cost monitoring 
machinery of flexible budgets, coupled with the engineers' role in 
the allocation of work, served to promote realisation of the 
different companies' initial manufacturing objectives. Systems that 
were introduced to realise Flexible Manufacturing and JIT aligned 
purposes, tended to be deployed in ways that were consistent with 
the respective companies' initial intentions. There were changes to 
the ways that systems that were introduced for Mass Production 
aligned purposes were used. However, these variations represented a 
reduction in the levels of productivity and tended to be market led 
rather than driven by the findings of cost monitoring.
8 .3  In te r p r e ta t io n  o f  F in d in g s .
There are three types of issue that have been discussed in the 
course of this thesis which have relevance for three types of 
theory alluded to in the introductory chapters of this thesis. 
These are: (i) whether or not change to IMS confirms or refutes 
theories of long term trajectories? (ii) the significance of the 
face-to-face relationship of accountants and engineers at the firms 
in the study for theories of accounting? and, (iii) the types of 
biases identified in accounting practices and the significance of 
their impact on FMS for theories of the influence of accounting 
practices. Each will be discussed in turn.
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The theories of long term trajectories that were discussed in 
Chapter One inferred or stated explicitly, that only one of two 
types of possible uses of computerised multi-purpose manufacturing 
systems would be viable in the long term. The first set of theories 
were those of "Flexible Manufacturing" (Jaikumar, 1984; 1986) or 
"Flexible Specialization" (Piore and Sabel, 1984). These argued 
that the only financially secure future option of firms, when 
deploying new machinery, was to produce a wide range of goods to 
satisfy niche markets. The alternative vision, offered by "Neo- 
Fordist" and "Labour Process" theorists, was an extension of the 
fordist logic of increasing the productivity of labour, by using 
the intelligence in the system to displace seme workers (Aglietta, 
1978) and to control those that remain (Braverman, 1974).
The majority, ie, thirteen out of twenty-one, of the FMS 
systems that were introduced by the companies in this study were 
installed for, and justified against, their ability to improve the 
rate at which parts could be machined and labour displaced. This 
could be interpreted as being generally supportive of the idea that 
there is a general movement towards mass production principles. In 
which case, this would be indicative of the scenario advocated by 
theorists from the "Labour Process" and irNeo-Fordist" traditions. 
Hcwever, the greater nunber of companies with these motives is more 
likely to be a consequence of the numerical predominance in this 
study of firms that employ batch production techniques? a 
predominance which is reflective of the pattern in the country as a 
whole (Gallagher, 1980? Littler and Salaman, 1984). As Chapter 
Three explained, the major weaknesses of this method of production 
are the poor levels of machine and labour utilisation.
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What the different motives expressed by companies in this 
study indicate is, there are more potential routes to profitability 
than any of the different theories of long term trajectories 
suggest. The different authors' respective focus on the different 
ways in which the 1 abour-machinery axis may be organised when 
manufacturing systems are deployed, leads them to neglect how the 
use of these resources may be combined in different ways with the 
profitable exploitation of stocks of raw materials, part-processed 
goods and finished items. This potential for different pemutaticns 
in the profitable exploitation of stocks, labour and machinery 
highlights that, regardless of the long term developments suggested 
by writers who advocate "Flexible” (Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Jaikumar, 1984) or "Fordist” futures (Braverman, 1974? Aglietta, 
1978), there are a number of different countervailing tendencies 
that exist in the short to medium term. The economic and social 
factors that underpin the different tendencies include: the 
relative costs of stocks? the extent of company's sub-contracting 
costs; local trade union organisation; and the size and stability 
of a company's markets.
The second set of ideas that this discussion has relevance for 
are theories of accounting. Chapter Two explained that different 
writers have described how a range of different factors have given 
rise to accountants holding prominent positions in decision making 
processes (see Stracey, 1954; Jchnscn and Kaplan, 1987? Loft, 1988? 
1989? Armstrong, 1987a? 1987b). This thesis has not challenged 
these ideas. However, the discussion here has illustrated that 
these theories are incomplete. Any discussion of the influence of 
accountants should not focus only on the source of their power. It
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is also necessary to investigate any obstacles, potential or 
otherwise, to its administration in specific situations. The 
discussion in this thesis has illustrated that the administration 
of accountants' power is contingent on the co-operation of groups 
that hold formally subordinate positions, such as engineers. 
Therefore, the actual power of accountants is more limited than is 
often implied by the writers who discuss the original sources of 
accountants' power.
Let us turn our attention now to the third issue of the extent 
to which there are biases in accounting controls and whether, as 
some theorists have argued, these are responsible for a given 
pattern of deployment of FMS. This thesis has reported that there 
is some evidence of bias in both pre-investment justification and 
cost control mechanisms, although the bias is not as extensive as 
critics of accounting practices claim.
If the central tenets of this thesis are set aside, it is 
possible to view the pattern of deployment of FMS at the respondent 
firms as a consequence of the biases in accounting practices. Of 
the twenty-one systems that were installed at the companies in this 
study: thirteen were introduced for "Mass Production" ends; four 
were introduced for "JIT" objectives? but, only four were 
introduced for "Flexible Manufacturing" purposes. In three out of 
the latter four instances, FMS systems were introduced through 
procedures that either did not generally conform with the capital 
sanctioning routes described in Chapter Two above, or there was 
sane change to that route at the time when the FMS was introduced. 
In other words: two installations were at firms where the 
engineering function had been given a more prominent role in the
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capital sanctioning route? and, one other was at the company where 
the managing director had acted in a surreptitious manner, and 
instructed the production engineer to propose FMS. As noted above, 
none of these three companies were able to quantify advantages that 
expressed their systems' flexibility. This could be perceived as 
representing a failure in pre-investment appraisal techniques which 
discourage companies from introducing FMS for flexible production 
objectives. Such an interpretation is not contradicted by the 
evidence from the remaining company that had introduced FMS for 
"Flexible Manufacturing" purposes. Their method of quantifying the 
flexibility in FMS was arbitrary and unsystematic.
It is also possible to identify weaknesses in the cost control 
practices, and to interpret those as causing the pattern of 
deployment of FMS at the firms in the study. The measures that have 
been developed to monitor the performance of production systems 
have an initial structure that is analogous to, the expenditure and 
output structure of, work methods that are dedicated to the 
production of a single good. The first measure of performance that 
companies' cost control techniques focus on is the level of machine 
or system utilisation. Cost control also monitors the level of 
output that is produced. These measures are not inconsistent with 
those that have been described by writers such as Jaikumar (1984; 
1986), Jones and Scott (1985) and Jones (1989), and which are 
alleged to encourage the use of systems for the large volume 
production of a limited range of parts. As many of the systems 
covered by this study were used to machine a finite and often 
limited range of goods in relatively large batches this may be 
interpreted as supporting the view that biased accounting
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techniques promote the pursuit of mass production ends.
However, the approach of this thesis has been to adopt a 
sociological and processual perspective which seeks to locate each 
instance of technical change in its specific context. This 
perspective has allowed it to be demonstrated that the existence of 
biases in accounting practices and their coincidence with FMS 
systems deployed in particular ways does not provide sufficient 
proof that the former caused the latter.
This research found that different companies introduced FMS to 
pursue manufacturing strategies that were compatible with either 
"Mass Production”, "Flexible Manufacturing" or "JIT" philosophies. 
The adoption of a processual approach has allowed a comparison to 
be made between the pattern of deployment of FMS and the companies' 
initial intentions for purchasing their systems. This has revealed 
that companies often use their systems in the ways that they had 
initially intended when purchasing them, rather than changing their 
deployment as a consequence of the application of accounting 
controls. The investigation of the accounting practices that cure 
applied in the intervening process, between the selection of a 
system and their actual deployment, has shown that, in many 
instances, there is no need for those practices to be changed to 
express and monitor the advantages that a company sought from FMS. 
This suitability of accounting practices was particularly evident 
when companies had introduced their system to improve their 
previous levels of system or labour utilisation, ie, realise 'Mass 
Production” ends, in the area of conventional batch production. 
Further, in sane instances where adaptations to the format of pre­
investment justification were necessary, companies were able to
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make those alterations so that FMS could be introduced. For 
example, inventory savings were included in the pre-investment 
justifications of firms where IMS was introduced for JIT purposes. 
This, in turn, precipitated changes to cost monitoring techniques.
Of course, this is not the whole story. At seme of the firms 
in this study, there remained a degree of incongruence between 
accounting practices - both in terms of pre-investment 
justifications and post-installation cost controls - and some 
deployments of FMS. However, a sociological approach to the 
application of accounting controls has allowed it to be 
demonstrated that accountants do not enjoy unlimited power, when 
applying their analysis to the evaluation and monitoring of a 
system. In the process of technical change other groups, fran belcw 
and above the accountants in a company's hierarchy, may make 
interventions that facilitate the introduction of FMS. Engineers, 
who hold formally subordinate positions to accountants, may use 
their knowledge of engineering systems to identify weaknesses in 
accounting and to manipulate change to accounting categories. These 
categories are then more reflective of the merits of FMS. The 
ability of accountants to resist such proposals are restricted by 
their own limited knowledge of manufacturing operations and 
inability to propose alternative engineering systems.
Where accountants and accounting criteria prove to be 
resistant to change there are others with greater power who may 
overrule the initial financial evaluation. Directors can and do 
ignore accountants' recommendations and the hurdle figures in 
accounting calculations. Instead executives use other forms of 
discourse such as "acts of faith", "gut feelings" and "fundamental
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strategies” to justify the introduction of new systems. A 
discussion of the limits of the power of accountants has allowed it 
to be demonstrated that, FMS systems have been introduced into 
companies where an examination of the pre-investment evaluation 
used, prior to the development of FMS, would suggest that it was 
not possible for such systems to be introduced.
The sociological approach of investigating the limits to 
accountants' power has also allowed it to be demonstrated that once 
systems are introduced, they are generally deployed for the 
purposes for which they were purchased, despite the weaknesses in 
cost monitoring. This is because accountants only supervise the 
apparatus for monitoring. The other groups of personnel that are 
discussed here are involved in defining the standards by which 
systems are evaluated. Thus, however incomplete the apparatus is, 
engineers' articulation of the standards of performance that 
systems are monitored against, generally means that FMS systems are 
deployed in accord with the companies' initial manufacturing 
intentions.
8.4 Suggestions for F*uture Research
This research was conducted shortly after FMS systems were 
introduced. Also, the project was, intentionally, focused on the 
relationship between the assumptions in the pre-investment 
justification and the conduct of cost control. The companies in 
this study have now been employing FMS for some time. The systems 
are no longer new. The relative increase in the length of time 
since the inception of this first crop of FMS systems into British 
firms, makes possible new opportunities for further research. In
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addition, there are other routes of enquiry that may build on the 
work of this study. The following may offer possible options for 
future research.
Cost Controls - Budgets are not given on tablets of stone which 
cannot be changed for the remainder of time. They are re-negotiated 
and modified annually, depending cn such factors as changing orders 
and past performance. Investigations into the processes of 
negotiation and the rationale employed to justify a certain level 
of budget where FMS is employed, and its comparison with the 
initial justification, could provide useful information on 
companies' changing perceptions of the economic strengths of FMS. 
Diffusion of FMS - In the first half of the 1980s, the State took 
positive action to encourage installations of FMS. Since that time 
conditions have changed. Most notably, the provision of grants has 
ceased. However, one potential source of diffusion of systems has 
increased as a consequence of the early deployment of FMS. That is, 
the production engineers, who often initiated the introduction of 
these systems, gained experience of FMS and, at times, had their 
own competence judged by the success of the installations that they 
had proposed. A study of the production engineers and their 
subsequent activities including any further involvement in changes 
to new work systems could provide valuable insights into: the 
transfer of knowledge and experience between companies by 
individuals; the professional socialisation of "project champions"; 
and, a reflective account of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
early installations of FMS.
Engineers' concern with Job content - The arguments of Jaikumar 
suggest that it is accountants and accounting criteria that are, at
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least partially, responsible for the perpetuation of the de­
humanising forms of work organisation that originated from the 
introduction of Scientific Management. However, this research 
highlights the importance of the interventions of engineers to the 
selection of new machinery and the provision of the initial 
financial justification. This suggests that engineers play an 
integral role in either perpetuating or changing the job content of 
employees. Ihe extension of research into the engineers' priorities
- for example, financial, technical, humanistic - when they are 
selecting and evaluating new systems, could open up the 
possibilities for positive policy initiatives.
Sectoral Carparisons - It has been reported in this research that a 
number of companies expressed motivations compatible with Flexible 
Manufacturing philosophy, to explain their installation of IMS. 
However, they failed to express these advantages in their pre- 
investment justification. It has been suggested here that it is not 
possible to establish whether this was either a consequence of 
weaknesses in pre-investment justifications, or the companies' 
previous employment of the more flexible system of conventional 
batch production. If it was the latter, the weakness in pre­
investment justifications do not exist. A comparison of the 
findings of this research with research into another sector, such 
as seme areas of motor car production where IMS systems have been 
introduced as successors to dedicated systems, would allow 
clarification of this issue.
Extension of Sociological and Processual Approach to Technical 
Change
- This research has illustrated that sociology has a positive
290
contribution to make in clarifying the process of technical change 
and the organisation of accounting protocol in that process. This 
study was deliberately focused on the introduction of a novel 
system. It might be expected that in these circumstances there 
would be a degree of incompatibility between the contours of the 
proposed system and the predominant accounting analysis. 
Consequently, the probability of companies modifying, or waiving, 
some financial criteria are likely to be increased. An application 
of the approach adopted here, in an investigation of the 
introduction of traditional manufacturing systems, would allow it 
to be established vhether accounting ever represents accurately the 
advantages of new investments. This would cast light on both the 
process of technical change and the general value of accounting.
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N ote on M ethodology.
The P roblem ,
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when its 
claims to providing the "Workshop of the World" (Chambers, 1961) 
were being eroded, British Industry has suffered a relative decline 
vis-a-vis the industries of other nations. In the early 1980's this 
decline gathered pace and a large number of manufacturing jobs, in 
sectors such as engineering, were lost. (See, for example, Gaffikin 
and Nickson, 1984a? 1984b.) A wide variety of theories have been 
put forward to explain this decline. These explanations range from 
the self-interest of footloose multinational capital shifting their 
production facilities overseas (ibid), to the limited efforts of 
British workers. (See Nichols, 1386, for discussion of the validity 
of this latter set of ideas.)
The fear of industrial decline that has concerned British 
commentators has, in recent years, found a parallel expression 
across the Atlantic. Writers in North America have started to worry 
about their own industries' eclipse by Japanese companies. One 
writer, Jaikumar (1984; 1986), has observed that, in contrast with 
Japanese companies, American firms' accounting practices are 
serving to hamper financially viable deployments of new computer 
based manufacturing systems. In British industry, as in American 
companies, and unlike the more successful industrial nations such 
as Japan and Germany, accountants hold a prominent position 
(Armstrong, 1987a). Thus, there appeared to be the potential for 
accountants in Britain to apply inappropriate accounting standards 
when evaluating the performance of computerised work systems. If
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this happened it could accentuate Britain's poor industrial 
performance and hasten manufacturing decline. As the advent of 
microelectronic work systems constitutes part of what some 
commentators (see, for example, Braun and MacDonald, 1980) have 
described as a "revolution", any inappropriate restriction on their 
use at the current juncture could have catastrophic consequences in 
the future. The impact of accounting practices on the use of FMS 
was a problem with practiced relevance to a large audience outside 
of academic circles and, thus, worthy of study.
The R esearch S tra te g y .
Two inter-related problems present themselves to any 
researcher who seeks to investigate the impact of accounting 
practices on the deployment of FMS. The first is to determine the 
use that FMS would have been put to had accounting practices not 
intervened. As FMS systems are flexible, they may be deployed far a 
range of different purposes. If the effects of accounting practices 
are to be assessed, it is necessary to define the alternative form 
of deployment of FMS that would have existed, otherwise. The second 
issue is to determine the stages at which the comparison should be 
made between the desired deployment and the usage that arises as a 
consequence of the biases in accounting practices.
The previous research in this field has not failed to give 
proper consideration to such questions and, so, does not provide 
any indication of how to address these issues. (See, Chapters One 
and Four above, and, in particular, Jaikumar, 1984; 1986.) Instead, 
the investigators have assumed, a priori, a best use of FMS on the 
basis of their perceptions of, either, the intrinsic qualities of
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the system, or, the long term trajectory of the economy. The 
researchers have then compared this use with the actual deployments 
of IMS. Any variation in actual deployment from the conceptualized 
best use is attributed to the impact of cost control. Comparisons 
between nations where variations in accounting practices and actual 
deployments of FMS exist, are often used to support these 
arguments. (See, for example, Jaikumar, 1984? 1986). Whilst the 
researchers claim to study the impact of the accounting practice of 
cost control cn the deployment of Fie, they are, in fact, reporting 
observations of two separate phenomena: the type of accounting 
practices that are present in firms in different nations; and, the 
forms of deployment of FMS. No link exists between the two other 
than that which exists in the theory itself.
This project sought to ensure that it was possible to identify 
the link that existed between the accounting practices of different 
companies and their respective deployment of FMS. To this end a 
"processual" approach has been adopted. The process that is assumed 
to exist is, a firm's deployment of a particular manufacturing 
system, that has been selected rationally, because it is perceived 
to have the machining qualities necessary to meet the firm's 
anticipated production needs. The reason why this author believes 
that this process exists is because the introduction of new 
machinery into any firm is purposive. Expenditure on large 
purchases such as FMS has to be justified to, and sanctioned by, 
people other than those who proposed the purchase in the first 
instance. Therefore, the advocates of particular projects must have 
a reason for selecting a given system. That reason must be 
understood by others within the context of that particular firm. Of
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course the original conception is subjected to a number of 
pressures that may divert the process from its originally defined 
path. These pressures include technical, social and economic 
factors, as well as the organisational influences that includes the 
application of accounting practices. Ideally, the researcher would 
investigate all of the other pressures so that each may be 
isolated. It would then be possible to identify the exact iirpact of 
accounting practices. However, the potential sources of influence 
are so great in nuntoer and so varied in type, researchers are never 
able to investigate them all. (See, Weber, 1949, for further 
discussion of this problem.)
Ihe approach that has been adopted here has been to examine a 
series of stages in the process of technical change to IMS: from 
the initial Impetus for its selection; through the application of 
accounting techniques; to the final deployment of the system. The 
stages that are examined are: (i) the caipany's initial reasons for 
selecting IMS, as expressed in their manufacturing strategy, and 
perceptions of the strengths of IMS; (ii) the employment of the 
pre-investment evaluation and its capacity to express, in financial 
terms, a company's aspirations vhen justifying new systems; (iii) 
the nature of the cost control mechanisms employed, and their 
ability to monitor the dimensions of performance of FMS; and, (iv) 
the actual performance of the system once operational. The changes 
between a company's initial intentions and their actual deployment 
of IMS, that have arisen as a consequence of biases in accounting 
practices, have been established by: a comparison between the 
intended and actual use of IMS; an investigation into the extent to 
which accounting practices failed to express a company's
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manufacturing objectives for their system? and, an enquiry into the 
alternative reasons for changes in the deployment of the system. 
(1)
There are a number of benefits that arise from adopting this 
approach of investigating the application of accounting practices 
as part of a longer process of technical change. Firstly, by 
identifying the initial intended use of a system at different 
companies, it is possible to identify the range of trends that 
exist within the general phenomena of change to FMS. Secondly, by 
examining the biases in accounting practices employed at different 
stages in the process of change, it is possible to identify the 
exact source of any mis-direction by accounting practices and any 
incremental growth in any mis-use of FMS that may arise through 
biases in more than one practice. Thirdly, by studying specific 
practices it is possible to make comparisons between firms: This is 
important because human behaviour is idiosyncratic and unique and 
does not lend itself to comparative analysis. However, the types of 
institutions and practices that human beings develop often gives 
rise to behaviour of a standardized form (Goldthorpe, 1973) . 
Accounting practices, which act as a restriction on courses of 
action within different firms, provide a force that serves to 
regularise activity. A study of the presence of accounting 
practices at comparable stages in the process of technical change, 
allows that process to be examined at a whole range of different 
companies. This permits comparisons between the different firms, 
despite their unique and individual facets.
At first sight this topic, which aims to investigate a process 
of technical change that spans a lengthy period, would appear to be
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an ideal subject for a conventional longitudinal stud/. Such design 
is, in fact, impractical because of the following reasons. Firstly, 
the length of the process cannot be pinned down to a finite period 
in advance. Most research projects only provide funds for a limited 
period. It is extremely difficult to reconcile the period of the 
research project to that of the process of technical change at any 
one company. These difficulties are multiplied when the 
investigator seeks to conduct comparative research and has to study 
change at several firms. Secondly, many companies that plan new 
systems often fail to introduce them. Resources spent investigating 
such firms could produce material that is of little relevance to 
the question under investigation.
In order to overcome these problems this research elected to 
study firms that had already introduced IMS. In some instances of 
social research, when sufficient information has already been 
collected and the situation is relatively static, it is possible 
to; define in advance the contours of the population to be studied? 
select representative parts to investigate? and, then employ 
statistical analysis to assess the probability of the responses and 
trends bing reflective of those existing in the population as a 
whole. Thus, any theory that is derived from the pattern found may
be considered to be applicable to the whole population.
%
The population of firms that had introduced FMS was in a state 
of flux. FMS was a new system. The small number of companies that 
possessed such configurations multiplied over a relatively short 
period, partly as a consequence of the provision of Government 
grants. Thus, the designated population was not only changing in 
composition but very little was known about many of its constituent
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parts. Indeed, even identifying which firms fell into that 
population was extremely difficult because previous researchers in 
the field disagreed on what constituted an IMS system. (See, for 
exairple, Scott, 1987; Browne et al, 1984? Gerwin and Leung, 1981.)
It was, therefore, necessary to investigate individual cases 
as entities in themselves rather than as representatives of a wider 
population. This type of research does have its merits. It is 
exploratory and extends the knowledge of the population under 
investigation. This is a pre-condition to any research that can 
claim to be representative of the wider population.
Exploration is only part of the value of the case study 
approach adopted here. Theoretical understanding of the population 
studied may be enhanced. Whilst it may not be possible to claim 
general applicability of a theory on the basis of cne or more case 
histories (cf, Durkheim, 1976), it is possible to refute existing 
arguments, depending on the empirical evidence gathered. (See, for 
example, Goldthorpe et al, 1970.) Of course, refutation can be a 
negative exercise. If alternative ideas are proposed, it is 
possible to develop the original thesis through a dialectical 
interplay with cne or more antithesis. This is how this project has 
sought to develop theory. Jaikumar's (1984? 1986) ideas, which were 
developed in the USA and which argued that the deployment of IMS 
systems were being affected by cost control practices, were refined 
prior to the conduct of this research in Britain by the proposals 
that: (a) engineers' understanding of engineering systems, coupled 
with their role in preparing the initial financial evaluation of a 
proposed purchase, provide a counterweight to biases in accounting 
techniques? (b) the economic gains of FMS to be articulated and
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monitored by accounting practices cannot be defined by some 
absolute criterion, they are contextual and relative to each 
individual company's production facilities and future manufacturing 
strategy; and (c) the final deployments of FMS are also influenced 
by pre-investment evaluations which may, either, promote a 
company's original aims, or, if there are any biases in these 
practices, encourage particular types of deployment of FMS that are 
different from those that were originally intended. Through this 
refinement of the original theory, it has been possible to develop 
an alternative set of ideas that are able to explain the pattern of 
empirical evidence gathered in the course of this research.
It may also be added that whilst this thesis does not claim to 
report cases that are representative of the population as a whole, 
the number of companies that constitute the wider population is 
relatively small. The nineteen firms with 21 systems that are 
included in this study constitute between one-third and one-fifth 
of the total population of companies that possessed FMS at the time 
that the research was carried out. (Estimate based on private 
correspondence with DIT, October, 1987.) The trends identified here 
may, therefore, be seen as relatively significant when perceived 
against the backdrop of a small population.
The R esearch .
Fieldwork was carried out at two points in this project. 
Erpirical evidence was first gathered in the form of a pilot study. 
This sought to assess the relevance of the issues to be researched, 
the adequacy of the interview schedule, the suitability of the 
class of respondents for the issues investigated, etc. The pilot
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study took place between June and October 1986 when five companies 
that had installed FMS were visited. At different firms, 
executives, accountants, engineers, operations managers and 
shopfloor staff were met. This stage of the research confirmed that 
the accountants and the engineers were the personnel who would be 
most useful in the conduct of this research. Apart from the two 
firms that were subsequently visited again in the course of the 
main study, the information gathered from these firms cure not 
reported in the text above. (2)
The main study of the field work was conducted in the course 
of 1987. In total, 21 firms were visited. Whilst two of the 
companies were intending to introduce FMS, their plans had not come 
to fruition at the time of the research visits. There was no 
indication that this was a consequence of accounting practices. 
They had carried out an initial financial evaluation of the system 
and were still intending to purchase FMS. As the concern of this 
thesis is the inpact of accounting practices on the actual use of 
systems, the information gathered at these firms has been excluded 
from the analysis and discussion. This left a total of nineteen 
firms. Seventeen of these companies had each introduced one FMS and 
two others each possessed two systems. Over a ten month period, in 
the course of 1987, eighteen of the companies were visited cnoe and 
Brit Machine Tool CO. was visited twice. Thus, when the pilot study 
visits to Diesel Engine Co. and Goal Co. are included, sixteen of 
the firms in the main study were visited once and three companies 
were visited twice.
As the objective of the research was to investigate the nature 
of conflict between accounting and engineering rationales, attempts
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were made to interview both the engineer responsible for the 
initial selection and financial proposal of the FMS system and a 
member of the accounting staff. (3) This was possible at ten 
companies. At eight of these firms additional interviews were 
conducted with other members of staff. This included one of the 
directors at Miner Go., where the introduction of FMS had been 
reported to originate from the board. A director was also 
interviewed at Beit Machine Tool Go., where negotiations for a 70% 
grant towards the cost of FMS took place between board members and 
a Government agency. In the course of each visit, attempts were 
made to speak with accountants and engineers separately so that any 
divergence and conflicts of opinion could be expressed by each 
respondent, without fear of contradiction by the other. At three of 
the ten companies this was not possible? the engineer chaperoned me 
in irry meetings with accountants at Scot GO. and Industrial Vehicles 
ltd. and the accounting staff accompanied me in my meeting with the 
engineer at Far Machine Tool Go. The general pattern of responses 
received from these companies tended to confirm, rather than 
diverge from those received from the other companies. In effect: 
the perceptions of the strengths of FMS held by accountants and 
engineers tended to conform with one another? engineers had more 
detailed knowledge of shopfloor operations? and, accountants tended 
to have more knowledge of the intricacy of higher levels of 
financial decision-making. The parallel findings at the different 
companies where accountants and engineers were interviewed both 
together and alone suggested that there was no value in presenting 
these findings separately. As a consequence, they are reported 
together in the text. It should be added that, the opportunity to
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interview some accountants and engineers together proved to be a 
blessing in disguise. It served to demonstrate how the parameters 
to each group's danain was manifest in practical situations, when 
interaction took place.
At three of the remining nine companies - ie, Alloy Corp., 
Boiler Co. and Print Co. - it was only possible to interview 
accounting staff (although at Print Co. both the company's 
accountant and the Financial Director were interviewed) • To some 
extent the significance of this is limited at Alley Corp. where the 
FMS system had been instigated and constructed at the company's 
Research and Development division and was not initiated by the 
company's in-house engineering staff. At the remaining six 
companies - Marine Go., Coach Co., Nat Air Go., Motor Co. Gear Co. 
and Coal Co. - engineering staff were interviewed but accountants 
were not. At four of these companies, Coach Go., Nat Air Go., Motor 
Co. and Coal Co., additional interviews were held with other 
production management staff as a means to assessing the validity of 
the claims of the initial interviewees.
At all of the firms semi-structured interviews that followed a 
pre-set schedule were ccnducted when accountants and engineers were 
met. In effect, a pre-defined set of topics were covered at each of 
the companies but the order of the questions, and the areas 
expanded in the course of the discussion, varied according to the 
specific contingencies of the firm visited. As the research was 
concerned with engineers' and accountants' contribution to the same 
process, the interview schedule designed for each of the different 
groups covered many of the same topics.
The interview schedule with the engineers covered the issues
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of: the company's manufacturing interests? the respondent's 
responsibilities? the background to the decision to select and 
invest in FMS? the type and design of system purchased? the time 
scale from the conception of FMS to its final commissioning and 
operation? the work that the system was purchased to machine and 
the standards of performance in terms of output that this 
represented? the content of pre-investment justifications and each 
engineer's awareness of the financial criteria that any new 
investment had to meet? the engineer's contribution to, and 
awareness of, the capital sanctioning route? the nature of the 
financial monitoring procedures and the engineer's awareness of 
other financial calculations such as overhead allocations? the 
actual performance of FMS? the engineer's perceptions of the merits 
of the FMS's current performance and the reasons for any divergence 
ffan planned use; and, the procedures for introducing new work cnto 
their company's manufacturing facilities, including FMS.
The interview schedule with accountants covered the issues of: 
their knowledge of FMS and other production systems that their 
particular company were using and considering at the time of the 
field visit? their perceptions of the capital sanctioning route, 
both for FMS and for other systems? the content of the financial 
justifications for different systems including FMS? the financial 
criteria that a company generally used to assess the merits of a 
new investment and the reasons for any changes when FMS was 
introduced? details of cost control and overhead allocation 
mechanisms and any changes to these that were necessary following 
the introduction of FMS? the respondent's perceptions of the 
performance of FMS and their possible recourse to action if they
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were not satisfied with that performance.
Apart from with all of the respondents at Brit Machine Tool 
Co. and with the engineer at Diesel Engine Co., all interviews 
were tape-recorded. It took between 45 minutes to three hours to 
cover the interview schedule with engineers. The most cannon time 
was around two hours. Interviews with accountants lasted between 
thirty minutes and two hours and the most common time was just ever 
one hour.
In addition to the details of firms gathered through 
interviews with accounting and engineering staff, interviews were 
conducted with other personnel if the discussions with the initial 
respondents suggested that this would be necessary and/ or when 
there was the opportunity to do so. These interviews did not have a 
pre-conceived schedule but ware used to clarify issues. In addition 
to the interviews, documentary evidence - particularly that 
pertaining to financial protocol, investment in, and monitoring of, 
FMS - was sought from the firms when appropriate. Impressionistic 
evidence based on observations - in particular, perceptions of 
relationships between accountants and engineers - was also noted 
mentally and reproduced in a notebook at the end of the visit. If 
appropriate, a respondent from the firm would be invited to comment 
on the impression. In addition to the information gathered at the 
companies: relevant journals were searched for information on the 
respective firms; and, research by other investigators at Bath 
University (Scott, 1987; Jones and Scott, 1985), who had also 
examined the deployment of IMS at sane of the respondent firms, was 
also consulted.
The information available has made possible the construction
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of detailed case studies of the respondent firms before the 
relevant details have been reported in the text above. The wide 
sources of information that were available has also helped to 
overcome same of the perennial problems of research of this type. 
These are: whether it is possible to trust that a single 
respondent's memory is correct; and, who is to be believed when 
there appears to be contradictory accounts of the same event being 
recalled. When the claims of any individual member of staff have 
not been corroborated by, either, interviews with other personnel 
at the same firm, or, evidence from another source, they have 
either been excluded or the text of the thesis draws attention to 
the potential limits to the validity of the claims.
E x te n t o f  Coverage o f th e  S tu d y .
The companies were selected for study on the basis of their 
purchase of IMS. Suitable firms for investigation were identified 
through a number of sources including: colleagues at Bath 
University who had already visited some of the respondent firms? 
articles in the financial and technical press that reported 
installations of FMS; information provided by Government agencies; 
and, word of mouth from respondents who knew of installations at 
other companies. Although the firms were not selected for study in 
any systematic way the large number of FMS installations 
investigated in the course of the research did result in the study 
of a wide cross-section of companies. The size of the companies' 
workforce ranged from less than 100 up to several thousand on the 
sites where FMS systems were introduced. The companies ranged from 
small independent firms to British based corporations to
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subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations. Ibis, in part, 
reflected another variation. Some companies were experiencing 
growth, whilst others were in a stable situation or in decline, 
when defined in terms of volume of output and/ or numbers employed.
The companies studied also covered a wide area in terms of 
their geographical locations and in the area of engineering which 
they catered for. Each of the regions in the United Kingdom, apart 
from Northern Ireland, was the home of at least one company. The 
numbers of companies that fall into the different Sic groups of 









Source of Classification: Employment Gazette, October, 1989. 
Despite the spread of companies from across the different criteria 
discussed above there are limitations to the claims being made in 
the thesis. These are in addition to those that stem from the 
general limitations on theory that arise from the case study 
approach, discussed above. The reader should be aware of these and 
should not attempt to generalise these findings to areas where no 
inference is intended by the author.
This thesis discusses the applicability of accounting criteria 
when used to assess the merits of FMS in a range of contexts. As 
reported in the main text of the dissertation all of the 
installations of FMS in this study were introduced into firms that 
had previously employed batch production techniques. The gains that
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FMS offers over these systems are largely productivity and 
inventory related. Any prejudice in accounting techniques that 
favour the expression and monitoring of productivity gains, are 
likely to be less apparent, at the firms studied, than, at other 
firms, where FMS offered gains of flexibility over the preceding 
manufacturing configurations. Therefore, the findings above cannot 
be generalized to instances where the installations of FMS were 
preceded by mass production methods which may have resulted in FMS 
improving the flexibility of the company. (4) Similarly, the 
arguments above describe instances where the companies already 
possessed manufacturing facilities which FMS systems were expected 
to improve upon. The same situation does not exist when FMS are 
being introduced into new companies. In these companies accounting 
practices may prove to be more or less restrictive.
Another proviso to these findings arises directly from how the 
firms were selected for study. All of the companies had introduced 
FMS successfully. The study did not research companies that had not 
introduced flexible manufacturing systems (apart from the two firms 
alluded to above that were still intending to introduce FMS). This 
does not mean that other firms have not considered purchasing FMS 
and failed as a consequences of the biases in accounting practices. 
Therefore, it is possible that the firms investigated by this study 
are exceptional because accounting practices have not prevented 
their deployment of FMS.
Finally, the purpose of this research was to investigate 
accounting practices. However, accounting is also a way of looking 
at the world. If respondents have internalized the logic in 
accounting techniques, they may dismiss purchase and certain types
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of deployment of FMS without giving them proper attention before 
applying the practices. Therefore, it may be that, it is only in 
situations where FMS promises productivity gains, that specific 
accounting techniques are ever applied in practice. Apart from the 
evidence, where engineers are proposing changes to accounting 
practices to accommodate certain types of deployment of FMS, no 
claims are being made about the extent to which traditional 
accounting criteria have not been internalized by engineers. This 
thesis is addressed simply to the question of explicit practices. 
Footnotes.
(1) The point at vhich the performance of the system is taken to be 
typical of the systems use is that which was defined by the 
companies as typical at the time of the fieldwork visit. As the 
different systems had been introduced at different points over a 
period of, approximately, six years, there was same variation in 
the length of time that different systems had been operational. As 
a consequence there was the possibility that more factors would 
intervene and increase the possibility that the systems of some 
companies would be used differently to what was intended for 
reasons other than accounting practices. However, it did also mean 
that the interviewees' recollections of how a system was being 
deployed were more likely to be accurate. Also, as noted above, 
explanations for variations in the deployment of FMS from that 
which was initially intended, other than the influence of 
accounting practices, were sought from the respondent firms.
(2) There is nothing in the information gathered at the other firms 
visited in the course of the pilot study to suggest conclusions 
other than those reached by the discussion in this thesis.
(3) It will be recalled from above that the pilot study had 
confirmed that the key personnel articulating these rationales were 
accountants and engineers.
(4) All researchers experience limits on their time and resources. 
Identifying and negotiating entry to firms that have previously 
employed mass production techniques in the hope that they might 
reveal a pattern that is different to that found at the companies 
that have been visited constitutes a double gamble. On the one hand 
access may not be granted and so resources that could have been 
spent investigating other cases will be lost. On the other hand, as 
many firms employ a range of different mass production and batch 
production techniques, the firms will not provide any outstanding 
insights if their system has been introduced into an area where 
batch production techniques have been employed previously. As this 
research was exploratory, and all cases could help to illuminate
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the process of technical charge to FMS, the strategy adapted was to 
research as many companies as possible, rather than risk wasting 
resources in vain pursuit of possible anomalies to the trends 
identified at the firms that were studied.
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Appendix 2.
Chapters Five to Seven contains details of the financial 
investments of the firms of the study. Further details of Marine 
Go., Coach Go., Dual Air Go., Brit Machine Tool Go., Far Machine 
Tool Go., Gear Go., the first system at Diesel Ehgine Go., Nat Air 
Co., Goal Go. and Scot Go. may be found in Scott (1987). These 
appendices contain scxne minor background information on the firms 
in the study. Detailed financial information is emitted for reasons 
of confidentiality. Hie order of the case studies conforms with the 
chronological sequence of the visits made to the different 
companies.
Marine Co.
Marine Go. was part of the same group of engineering companies 
as Diesel Engine Go. and Motor Go. It was situated in the North- 
West of England and manufactured diesel engines for the power 
generation and marine industries.
Hie motivation for purchasing FMS was to increase output by 
reducing the number of tool changes. Hie company had purchased the 
system as replacement capacity for a number of conventional 
machines that were being decommissioned. However, work was 
transferred from the conventional machines onto the company's 
existing CNC machinery. Hie larger batch work that had been cn the 
CNC machine tools was transferred to the IMS. The company had 
initially planned to introduce an FMS containing four machining 
centres. At the time of my visit there were only three machine 
tools in the system.
The company had made a number of minor changes to their
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accounting practices either to facilitate, or as a consequence of, 
their introduction of FMS. Their normal payback period had been 
extended from two and a half to three and a half years. The company 
also switched the IMS operatives from a piecework payment system to 
measured daywork. Machine hours were used to monitor the output and 
performance of the machinery at the firm, including the FMS.
Coach Co.
Coach Co. had been part of a nationalised group of companies 
involved in the manufacture of motor vehicles. This particular 
company manufactured coaches and was situated in the North-West of 
England.
The motivation for introducing FMS was to improve on the 
levels of machine utilisation that the company would otherwise have 
obtained from conventional machine tools when manufacturing the 
parts for a new range of gearboxes. The company had introduced a 
five machining centre system. The company did not make any 
significant changes to their accounting practices, either, 
immediately before, or, when, FMS was introduced. The company's 
general practice was to vary the payback period according to the 
nature of the equipment purchased. Thus, FMS was justified over the 
company's maximum amortisation period. Machine hours were used to 
assess the performance of the FMS, once introduced.
S cot Co.
Soot Co. was the division of a multi-national group involved 
in the manufacture of mining equipment. It manufactured underground 
coal mining equipment and was situated in an industrial area of one
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of the major Scottish cities.
IMS had been introduced because it allowed the company to 
carry less stocks and to improve market response by reducing lead 
times. The company had introduced an FMS comprised of six large 
machining centres. No changes had been made to the company's normal 
accounting criteria when FMS had been used. It was still expected 
to realise .a DCR of 30% over a 7 year period.
The general method that the company used to monitor the 
performance of production systems was to investigate the output 
that was produced in a given number of machine hours. They 
continued to use this method to monitor the performance of the FMS. 
This was a source of friction between the production engineer and 
the accountant. (See text of thesis for full explanation of this.)
D ual A ir  Co.
The company is a producer of parts for the aerospace industry. 
At the time of the introduction of FMS it was owned 52:48 % by two 
corporations. It is situated across two sites in the West Country. 
The majority of the work goes to the defence industry.
The motivation for introducing FMS was to maximise output by 
reducing set-ups and run-times to a minimum when producing a number 
of parts for a new contract. The system introduced was comprised of 
three machining centres. The company's normal practice was to 
amortise capital over the length of the contract for the work 
machined. FMS was no exception to this. No other modifications were 
made to the costing system. Machine hours were used to assess the 
performance of the FMS.
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N a t A ir  Co.
The company is cne site of a division of a farmer nationalised 
company manufacturing for the aerospace industry- It is situated in 
the North-West of the country. Its largest single customer is the 
Ministry of Defence. The system installed was one of the largest 
and most expensive covered by this study and was organised around 
ten machining centres.
The main motive for introducing the system was to respond to 
markets that were demanding an increasing range of goods but one of 
the advantages that IMS offered was the ability to machine to the 
tighter tolerances demanded by their customers in the defence 
industry. These often provided rigid specifications of the quality 
of the parts to be made. These stipulations served to limit the 
type of adaptions that a company's personnel could make to the 
range of parts machined on the IMS. The IMS was also purchased 
because it offered the company the opportunity to reduce the amount 
of stocks carried.
The general practice of the company was to justify new systems 
on the stock reductions that they facilitated against single 
projects. These were what the company termed 1’project" investments. 
The IMS was expected to bring reductions in stocks to a particular 
process which machined the parts for a wide range of projects. In 
this sense it was a "process" investment. The company generally 
used DCF calculations to justify systems conducted over 10 - 15 
years depending on the anticipated life of the project. The time 
allowed for recovery on the IMS fell in the middle of this. DCRs of 
30% were reported. The general system of monitoring the IMS was by 
machine hours. This was the same measure that the company used for
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all machine tools of a later generation than Numerical Control. The 
personnel did express a desire to introduce a cell rate but had 
not, as yet, devised a suitable method for calculating this.
Brit Machine Tool Co.
Brit Machine Tool Co. was part of a snail group operating in 
the metal working industries. The majority of the group was 
situated in the South-East. Hie company that had purchased the IMS 
was a manufacturer of machine tools.
The FMS was comprised of nine machine tools. Although the 
company sought an inpruvement in machine utilisation by introducing 
IMS, the main impetus for installation of the system had been the 
provision of a Government grant that offered recompense for any 
additional costs that the company incurred as a consequence of 
using IMS. instead of the company's normal conventional machining 
centre.
The firm generally sought payback of an investment over the 
length of given contracts. However, the FMS was reported as not 
being viable without the Government grant when assesssed over 15 
years. (This was between four and five times longer than the 
periods used most frequently.) The company monitored the efficiency 
of the system by the investigating the sum of output that was 
produced over the number machine hours that were available.
Trans Co.
The company was a small independent firm situated on the 
outskirts of a Northern Welsh City. Its main line of business was 
the production of ccxrpcnents for industrial vehicles and 70% of its
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production went to its major customer, Industrial Vehicles. (See 
below.)
The FMS was one of the largest and most expensive in the study 
and was comprised of ten machining centres and auxiliary machines. 
Prior to the introduction of the FMS the company had only produced 
axles. The firm had won the contract to manufacture gearboxes and, 
thus, they needed to increase their production capacity. FMS was 
selected as part of this expansion because it allowed the company 
to obtain high levels of system utilisation, when machining the 
range of parts necessary for both the gearboxes and axles.
The method of appraisal that the company used was payback 
periods of up to four years for large investments. The FMS had 
premised returns over 3.2 years. The manufacturing performance of 
systems was measured against the machine hours consumed in 
obtaining a given level of production output.
S m all M otor Co.
This gear manufacturer is situated in the South of England. At 
the time of their installation of FMS they had been a small 
independent company.
Prior to the purchase of FMS, 80% of the company's parts went 
to its main customer, a major manufacturer of motor vehicles. The 
customer was seeking to improve some of their product range. The 
company tendered for the contract to produce a new range of 
gearboxes required in high volumes. When the company won the 
contract they looked for a system that would enable them to 
manufacture the parts in large volumes and selected FMS because it 
offered the additional advantage of machining to tighter
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tolerances. The system comprises four machining centres and 
auxiliary facilities.
The general method of appraisal used was payback. This had 
been extended from a limited period of two years up to five years 
to facilitate the introduction of FMS. The introduction of FMS led 
the company to switch from labour to machine hour measures when 
monitoring the performance of a system.
Miner Co.
Miner Co. was a division of wider group producing cutting and 
drilling equipment for the mining industry and lighting equipment 
for the petro-chemical industry. The firm visited constituted the 
company's cutting division and was situated in the North-East.
The company was concerned with their levels of efficiency and 
costs. FMS was introduced because it allowed the firm to: (i) 
reduce costs by reducing stock levels; (ii) iirprove market position 
and response time by reducing lead times; and, (iii) improve 
efficiency by introducing night-shift working. The local Trade 
Unions had resisted this, previously. FMS allowed the firm to 
operate through part of the night shift with a skeleton staff when, 
hitherto, the factory had been shut.
The firm perceived only limited opportunities to exist for 
flexible manufacturing because of design constraints imposed by 
their major customers whose work environment was extremely 
volatile. The system purchased was one of the more limited 
configurations. It incorporated only two machine centres with a 
number of auxiliary machines.
The general method that companies used for assessing the
332
merits of a new system was payback. The production engineer 
described the amortisation period allowed in the following terms: 
'•Two years sure desirable. Three years is becoming touch and go. 
Above that, it's becoming dodgy." However, the directors had 
initiated the introduction of FMS and a payback period of four 
years had been allowed. Machine hours were used to calculate the 
performance of the system. The company used a bonus payment system 
and had to negotiate a special weighting for payments for FMS 
operatives to take into account the higher output from the system.
F o r M achine T o o l Co.
The company is the European base of a North American multi­
national corporation. Their main products are machine tools. The 
factory is situated on the outskirts of a West Midlands city.
The company had installed FMS to improve on the levels of 
machine utilisation that they obtained from their existing machine 
tools when machining larger batch work. They also wanted to develop 
their own range of FMS systems and was seeking to use their 
installation as a demonstration tool. The system was one of the 
smallest included in this study and was comprised of only one 
machining centre with a number of auxiliary machining facilities. 
However, one of the selling points of the system was its modular 
design, and the company hoped to add additional machining centres 
as demand for their products increased.
The company conducted DCF calculations over 10 years and 
expected DCR's of 20%. The anticipated return cn the FMS system was 
less than this at 11.14%. The engineer reported that an audit had 
been performed on the system and this indicated that the
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anticipated return was being achieved. The company had previously 
assessed the merits of manufacturing systems' ongoing performance 
against the levels of labour employed. They switched to machine 
hours for monitoring the FMS system. A bonus system was in 
operation and FMS operatives were included in this. However, the 
company adjusted the weighting in the payment to reflect the 
greater output from the system.
Motor Co.
The company was situated in a large town in Yorkshirethe 
North-East. It was a subsidiary of the same British based 
multinational group that owned Marine Go. and Diesel Engines ltd. 
This firm manufactured electrical engines both for heavy industrial 
and domestic usages.
The company was having to purchase new systems to replace a 
number that were coming to the end of their useful life and its 
purchase of FMS was part of this program. The system was purchased 
to obtain high levels of system utilisation in the machining of 
casings for the companies engines. It comprised four machining 
centres and a number of auxiliary machining facilities.
The principle method of evaluation was payback calculated over 
a period up to five years. However, it was also common for the 
accountant to conduct a DCF calculation and include the findings of 
this as a "rider". The FMS had promised returns within the 
company's normal payback period. The company did not have to change 
its method for monitoring the performance of the system, once 
installed. They continued using their normal method which was to 
evaluate output performance by the number of machine hours used.
334
Alloy Corp.
The company was the British division of a Canadian based 
multinational. The main business of the division in the UK was the 
manufacture of extrusions. The attraction of FMS was that it 
allowed the company to machine a wide and increasing range of 
hollcw extrusion dies for new markets. The installation of the FMS 
also allowed the company to bring back in-house a number of their 
range that had been previously been sub-contracted out at high 
expense.
The system was comprised of three machining centre systems. 
The FMS had been developed at the owning corporation's own Research 
and Development Division.
The company generally used payback calculated over two years 
to assess the value of new systems and included DCF calculations as 
riders. However, as the FMS system was developed by a Division 
within the corporation the pre-investment was not used to indicate 
whether purchase of the system should go ahead. Despite this, the 
system was expected to pay for itself, over the normal amortisation 
period, once operational. The company generally used machining 
hours to monitor the performance of departments and no change was 
made prior to the introduction of FMS.
In d u s t r ia l V e h ic le s  L td .
The company was an independent firm based in the North-West 
midlands. Its main area of business was the production of 
excavating equipment. The company classified their products into 
two types, depending on the size of demand, large volume and small 
batch work. Both of the FMS systems were installed to maximise
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machine utilisation when machining parts in high volumes for the 
products that went to large-scale markets.
Die first of the company's FMS systems was comprised of three 
machining centres and a robot welding cell. It was being used to 
machine ram cylinders. The second system was comprised of two 
machining centres and was being used to machine kingposts and 
carriages.
The company generally used payback, conducted over two to 
three years, to evaluate the worth of a new investment. Both FMS 
systems were justified using this method. For cost control 
purposes, the factory was divided into two. Die assembly area was 
labour intensive. Thus, labour hours were used as a measure of 
performance. Die machining areas, which were where the FMS systems 
were situated, were measured against the machine hours consumed. No 
changes were made for the monitoring of the FMS systems.
G ear Co.
Die ccsrpany is a subsidiary of a North American multi-national 
corporation. It is situated in the middle of Scotland. The main 
business of the subsidiary company is the production of gear pumps.
Die parent company was in the process of shifting seme of its 
production from its base in North America to its Scottish 
subsidiary. Hitherto, production in North America and subsequent 
importation of products into Europe had made the price of their 
goods uncompetitive. Die subsidiary company selected FMS because it 
promised a high level of machine utilisation. The system was 
comprised of three machining centres, an inspection machine and a 
number of robots performing supporting operations.
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The ccrpany generally sought payback of an initial investment 
over two years. However, the best possible projection with the FMS 
was three years and it was anticipated at the outset that this was 
unlikely to materialise. The company were prepared to extend the 
maximum payback period up to five years in order to facilitate the 
introduction of F’MS. The company used labour hours for cost 
monitoring purposes and made no changes as a consequence of 
introducing FMS.
S m all M achine T o o l Co.
The ccsrpany was a small independant machine tool manufacturer 
situated across two sites in the East of England. It was owned by a 
single family.
The FMS system was one of the smallest and least expensive 
configurations in the study. It was comprised of the company's own 
five face machining centre supported by a number of auxiliary 
machining facilities. The reason for constructing the FMS was that, 
prior to the installation of the system, the catpany's product took 
four to five weeks to reach the fitting shop. This created a heavy 
strain on the catpany's cashflow because each raw casting cost in 
excess of £2,000. The desire was to reduce this time to days to 
facilitate marked savings in inventory.
No full financial evaluation had been conducted on the system. 
The company were aware of the types of savings that would arise. 
They also had to give the DTI an indication of the cost of the 
system in order to obtain a grant. However, they never assessed 
whether the revenues that would be generated outweighed the costs, 
and over what type of period. The company generally monitored the
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performance of systems against the machine hours that were used to 
realise production output and they did not alter this method when 
monitoring FMS.
B o ile r  Co.
Boiler Go. was the head of a division that belonged to a 
British corporation with interests in building, electrical and 
general engineering. It was situated in the North-West and 
manufactured immersion heaters.
FMS had been introduced to machine immersion heater lids. The 
company's preceding method had proved inefficient. It had required 
two processes: The burrowing of the lid on the lathe and the 
brazing on of connections. Previously, both had taken a long time 
and required a high level of labour. The company hoped that, by 
introducing IMS, they would be able was to integrate the operations 
into a single process and obtain the highest possible level of 
machine utilisation. Further, the firm machined metric and imperial 
sized lids for British and European markets respectively. The 
introduction of FMS allowed the company to phase out the imperial 
sizes gradually.
The company used DCF on all projects over £10,000 and aimed to 
obtain a DGR of between 20 - 30%. FMS was assessed by this method. 
The company generally used labour hours consumed to monitor the 
merits of output from a given department and they made no changes 
to this method as a consequence of introducing FMS.
D ie s e l Engine Co.
The company belongs to the same corporate group as Marine Go.
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and Mater Go. It is situated across three sites in the South-West. 
The main line of business of this firm is the manufacture of diesel 
engines for industrial use.
The ccnpany had purchased three systems (although only two are 
included in the study). The systems were introduced as part of an 
overall manufacturing strategy. Each were designed to machine parts 
of particular batch sizes and ranges depending on the size of the 
markets that the products went to. The first FMS system was 
introduced to machine a small range of parts required in large 
batches; the third was to machine a wide range of the small batch 
work; and, the seccnd was to machine a range that fell somewhere in 
between the two. The general rationale given for the introduction 
of the systems was to increase the efficiency of production 
facilities in a situation of less predictability whilst bringing 
work that had been sub-contracted out back in-house. The emphasis 
for the introduction of the first system was to increase efficiency 
whilst the emphasis on the latter was to respond to the less 
predictable situation. The capability of machining to tighter 
tolerances also featured in the justification of the first system. 
As reported in the text the initiative for IMS had come from the 
Managing-Director acting through the proxy of the Production 
Engineer. Interviews were held with the accountant, the production 
engineer and other members of the engineering staff. Thus, only 
their version (which is the formal one) of the rationale for 
selecting FMS may be reported.
The FMS systems ranged in size: The first was built around 
four machine tools; the second around six lathes; and the third 
encompassed three machining centres.
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Hie main justification technique that the company used was 
payback with an official maximum of four years; although, the 
production engineer reported working to an unofficial maximum of 
three. Additional calculations of DCRs were conducted by the 
accountant, but the key justification indicator was the payback 
period. Hie method of monitoring the performance of the FMS systems 
at the cost control stage was against the number of machine hours 
consumed to produce a given output.
C oal Co.
Hie ccnpany was part of a group involved in the manufacture of 
equipment for the mining, aerospace and general engineering 
industries. This firm was situated in the South-West and 
manufactured mining equipment.
Hie FMS system comprises four machining centres and additional 
facilities. Hie main reason why the ccnpany had introduced FMS was 
to increase the range of products in response to changes in 
overseas markets. FMS had been evaluated by DCF calculated over a 
ten year period. This was the technique that the ccnpany generally 
used when assessing the merits of any investment that exceeded 
Emillion. The DCR sought was 15%. A number of novel savings had 
been included in the justification of the system. The company 
generally used machine hours for monitoring the performance of 
systems, once installed, and they did not alter this method as a 
consequence of introducing FMS.
P r in t  Co.
Hie company was part of a wider corporate group involved in
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the engineering industry. The firm was situated in the East 
Midlands and its main line of business was the manufacture of 
printing presses.
The cost of the company's product to their customers was 
between £1.5 million and £4 million in 1987. As a consequence their 
customers sought to delay their commitment to such heavy capital 
expenditure until the last possible moment. This created the 
impetus for the firm studied to seek ways of reducing their lead 
times which stood at about twelve months in 1982. The firm was also 
seeking to improve their cost efficiency on their high value items 
by reducing inventories. These two factors provided the motivations 
for installing FMS.
The FMS system comprised six different machining centres. Each 
constitutent part was justified individually by the company's 
normal techniques of DCF calculated over 10 years with an 
anticipated DCR of 25%. The prevailing method of cost control was 
to monitor the performance of systems by machine hours. However, 
the company's main concern, after introducing IMS, was to monitor 
inventory sayvings. They were in the process of introducing MRP 
(ii) as a means to achieving this.
341
